

The wars on illicit drugs and terrorism as state building strategies.

The Colombian case

Claudia Lopez. Northwestern University

September, 2013.

Introduction

This paper analyzes the influence of Plan Colombia-PC (more broadly US policies on the “war on drugs” and “the war on terrorism”), in influencing Colombia’s state building strategies during the last decade, and its heterogeneous effects for state formation at the national and subnational level.

The paper is framed within an analytical framework of contemporary state building, as an alternative to the classic European framework, using a multi method research design of historical and quantitative analysis. The analytical framework puts forward three main hypotheses for the study of contemporary state building. First, that the interaction between multiple sovereignties and contentious politics is what explain contemporary state building strategies. Second, that state building strategies’ heterogeneous effects across territory and population explain variation in state ‘formation’ trajectories and outcomes. Third, that rather than an exception, such heterogeneous effects are the norm, and they are what sustains the gap between empirical and juridical sovereignty in our era.

Contemporary State Building analytical framework

Unevenness of sovereignty across states has well-established analytical frameworks in political science (Clark, 1988), usually referred as the regime of dual sovereignty - the gap between juridical and empirical sovereignty-, (Jackson, 1987), or the game of dual sovereignty (Aalberts, 2004). But sovereignty unevenness has also a within states subnational dimension that has been pointed out by different authors, but has no yet a well established analytical framework, equivalent to the international regime of dual sovereignty.

For example, authors in the democratization literature, such as Guillermo O'Donnell, refer to the distinction between blue, brown and green zones, according to the reach of the state and its rule of law within its own boundaries (O'Donnell, 1999); and authors in the civil war literature refer to multiple sovereignties to describe a situation in which the national government does not have the monopoly of coercion and the control of its territory (Kalyvas S. , 2006).

Yet, rather than a comprehensive analytical framework accounting for unevenness of stateness within sovereign states, the analysis of this phenomena is either full of misleading adjectives and indexes ('the failed states', the 'weak states', the 'risky states', so on and so forth) or it is trap in a midway academic and consultant type of literatures about 'peace building', 'nation building', 'state building', and so on, usually linked to 'guides' of how-to-deal with terrorist threats (from guerrillas, to Al Qaeda's, up to organized crime cartels) or how-to-handle the aftermath of super power military interventions. (RAND Corporation, 2007) (OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development , 2008) (DFID Department for International Development, 2008) (Fukuyama, 2004). There is not even a point of actual comparison between this so called 'new' state building literature with quantity and quality of the great 'classics' of European state building literature (Tilly, 1992) (Spruyt, 1994) (Mann, 2012) (Moore, Jr., 1993) (Gerth & Wright, 2009) (Anderson, 1994) (Levy, 1988)

Non European, or more generally 'non-Western', state formation, has also great pieces in political science literature, some using the European analytical framework explaining why it does or does not apply to other contexts (Centeno, 2002) (López-Alves, 2000) (Herbs), and some others developing a more contemporary approach (Slater, 2010) (Kurtz, 2013). However, all of them focus on explaining the emergence and establishment of sovereign states (and their political regimes) as units further integrated into the international system, the same unit of analysis of the European framework.

This paper proposes an alternative unit of analysis and analytical framework for contemporary state building. It argues that contemporary state building should focus on studying unevenness of stateness within and across the population and territory of sovereign states, rather than on explaining the emergence and formation of sovereign states as units within the international system. The emergence of sovereign states, and their prevalence as units in the international system was the unit of analysis of the European state formation. In contrast, beyond the era of

decolonization and formation of 'independent' states, the unit of analysis of contemporary state formation must focus on the subnational level vis a vis the national and vice versa, as juridically sovereign states at the international level are already established units. Thus, for example, rather than explaining why and how Colombia or the Philippines or Nigeria became sovereign states, contemporary state building should focus on explaining why these established sovereign states exhibit such internal unevenness of stateness across its population and territory, what are its effects, and the prospects of altering such unevenness.

If one agrees on such perspective the central questions are what is stateness and what is unevenness? This paper argues that stateness refers to the state constitutive attributes: the means of coercion, extraction, commitment and their administration; and state building to the distribution and institutionalization of these means of ruling across the population (political space) and territory (physical space) of sovereign states. Such distribution and institutionalization could be more or less even depending on how inclusive it is for its political space and how far it reaches its physical space. Unevenness of stateness is what characterizes and define contemporary state building.

The difference between the classic and contemporary approaches of state building does not reside on what ontologically the state is, but on what is the unit of analysis and outcome to be explained. Based on the great legacies that the authors in the classic state building literature have inherited us, (Gerth & Wright, 2009) (Tilly, 1992) (Spruyt, 1994) (Poggi, 1978) (Moore, Jr., 1993) (Mann, 2012) one can start by saying that building states is about building a particular system of rule based on claiming the institutional monopoly of certain means of power, in particular coercion and extraction. Up to nowadays, the fundamental weberian notion of what a state is (an entity of political dominion that claim the legitimate monopoly of the means of coercion and administration over a given territory) remains firm on academic grounds, though not without some qualifications. Among the most important qualifications are the notion that within the means of administration for

ruling, a state should also claim the monopoly of extraction (Tilly, 1992) (Levy, 1988); also the notion that the state, rather than a single entity, is a set of complex institutions (and so the product of a 'crafted' process of institutional differentiation) to rule over a territorially bounded society" (Poggi, 1978); also the recognition that the state no necessarily "stands in the top place" of organized dominion (as Weber said), given that dual or competing forms of supra sovereignty coexists (Jackson, 1987), and finally, the recognition that alternative means of ruling, not necessarily based on coercion and extraction, but on other grounds such as, identity, ethnicity, race, religion, culture, etc- compete as sources of ruling, while both state and society dynamically constitute one another (Migdal J. S., 1988) (Migdal J. S., 2001).

If such rough description¹ account for a basic academic consensus, then contemporary state building should focus on explaining the distribution and

¹ Max Weber's definition of the state:

"[A] state is a human community that (successfully), claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory." (Gerth & Wright, 2009, p. 78)

"I state only the purely conceptual aspect for our consideration: the modern state is a compulsory association which organizes dominion. It has been successful in seeking to monopolize the legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination within a territory. To this end the state has combined the material means of organization in the hands of its leaders and it has expropriated all autonomous functionaries of states who formerly control these means in their own right. The state has taken their positions and now stands in the top place." (Gerth & Wright, 2009, p. 83).

"[O]rganized domination requires control of the personal executive staff and the material implements of administration. (Gerth & Wright, 2009, p. 80)"

"The political associations in which the material means of administration are autonomously controlled, wholly or partly, by the dependent administrative staff may be called associations organized as 'estates'" (Gerth & Wright, 2009, p. 81)

"In the end, the state controls the total means of political organization, which actually come together under a single head" (Gerth & Wright, 2009, p. 82).

Gianfranco Poggi definition of the state:

The modern state is perhaps best seen as a complex set of institutional arrangements for rule operating through the continuous and regulated activities of individuals acting as occupants of offices. The state, as the sum total of such offices, reserves to itself the business of rule over a territorially bounded society; it monopolizes in law and as far as possible in fact, all faculties and facilities pertaining to that business" (Poggi, 1978, p. 1)

Joe Migdal's definition of the state:

"the state is a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) *the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory*, and (2) *the actual practices of its multiple parts*.

"In the definition here, the image of the state is of a dominant, integrated, autonomous entity that controls, in a given territory, all rule making, either directly through its own agencies or indirectly by sanctioning other authorized organizations – business, families, clubs, and the like- to make certain

institutionalization of the state constitutive attributes -the means of commitment, coercion, extraction, and their administration- within and across the territory and population of sovereign states. Put it in Tilly's words, state and regime formation (connections and transactions for ruling) is ultimately about the distribution and use of three means of control²: coercion, capital and commitment. (Tilly, 2005). Following Tilly's (in general the classics') well established fact that "systems of rule depends on a decline of coercive control combined with increasing reliance on capital and commitment", this paper assumes that state building goes hand in hand with processes of regime formation understood as a type of political relation in which the use of coercion is not predominant, but compensated with the use of other means of ruling; in Tilly's words, "a movement from repression to toleration and facilitation."(Tilly, 2005, p. 105)

circumscribed rules. (Migdal, 2001, p.16)

"the interaction of states and other social formations is a continuing process of transformation. States are not fixed entities, nor are societies; they both change structure, goals, constituencies, rules, and social control in their process of interaction. They are constantly *becoming*. (Migdal, 2001, p.57)

Charles Tilly's definition of regime:

"A regime means repeated, strong interactions among major political actors including a government."

"When interactions between a pair of actors recur in similar forms, we begin to speak of a relation between the actors. We then describe a regime in terms of prevailing relations among political actors, including the government."

"with respect to any particular regime, the term "power holders" singles out those members that currently exercise the greatest control over governmental agents."

"Political resources divide broadly into coercion, capital, and commitment. The term "coercion" includes all concerted means of action that commonly cause loss or damage to the persons, possessions, or sustaining social relations of social actors. It features such means as weapons, armed forces, prisons, damaging information, and organized routines for imposing sanctions. Coercion's organization helps define the nature of regimes. With low accumulations of coercion, all regimes are insubstantial, while with high levels of coercive accumulation and concentration all regimes are formidable." (Tilly, 2010, p. 19)

Guillermo O'Donnell's definition of regime

"the ensemble of patterns, explicit or not, that determines the forms and channels of access to principal governmental positions, the characteristics of the actors who are admitted and excluded from such access, and the resources [and] strategies that they can use to gain access." (O'Donnell, 1999, p. 141)

² Political dominion in Weber's terms (Gerth & Wright, 2009)

Contemporary state building is also more about a process to build a system of rule than about a particular outcome³. In this regard, Joe Migdal, have complemented the classics' definition of the state and offer an alternative approach for state building studies. According to Joe Migdal, "states operate in two intersecting arenas. The first is the world arena in which state officials interact with representatives of other states, large corporations, international organizations, and an assortment of other transnational actors. The second arena is the society that the state seeks to rule." [And from both] "state leaders face obvious constraints in the sorts of actions they can take" (Migdal J. S., 2001, p. 62).

Thus, rather than supreme hierarchical units, states are fields of power constantly constrained and even contested from above and from below; from above according to the state position and interaction in the international order, and from below according to the state position and interaction vis a vis the society they intend to rule. Consequently, contemporary state building is also a process mediated from above, in the international arena particularly by "the game of dual sovereignty", and from below, in the subnational arena by the contentious political processes occurred across the territory of a sovereign state between those who rule and those who are ruled. (Migdal J. S., 2001).

This paper uses such approach, and so analyzes state building as a contentious⁴ political process of distribution and institutionalization of the state constitute attributes across its territory and population. State building is by definition a contentious political process because it attempts the distribution of political resources for ruling, and so of power. And because it 'implies political relevant

³ A general framework of state building should account for state formation beyond their variation. State building must be able to explain the process of formation of "democratic", "leviathan", "capitalist", "socialist" or "welfare" states, as these other set of adjectives usually derived from the nature of the political regime rather than from the constitutive attributes of the state in itself.

⁴ Contentious politics was defined by its founding fathers as "episodic, public, collective interactions among making of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims or a party of the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized affect the interests of at least one of the claimants." (McAdam, Tilly, & Tarrow, 2001, p. 5).

actors making consequential claims on other politically relevant actors” (Tilly, 2010, p. 19) (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007) (Tilly, 2008a) (Tarrow, 2012)

Using the framework of “contentious politics” for state building implies that the national government is always a player in state-building, as contentious politics assumes the government is always an originator or recipient of consequential political claims; it implies also that non continuous, content events are more predominant in state building than continuous, current, normal politics. (McAdam, Tilly, & Tarrow, 2001) As Tilly nicely put it “inevitably, all struggles to acquire or retain governmental power involve contentious politics” (Tilly, 2010, p. 21).

Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam proposed a process-mechanism approach to study contentious politics and broadly classify all the possible mechanisms found in contentious events in three types⁵: environmental (mechanisms that operate as externally generated influences, such as availability of resources), cognitive (mechanisms that alter individual and collective perceptions, such as commitment and identity) and relational (mechanisms that alter connections among people, such as brokerage). (McAdam, Tilly, & Tarrow, 2001, pp. 26-27).

This conceptual and methodological framework of contentious politics is compatible with a perspective of institutions as “distributional instruments laden with power implications”, which “invariably has distributional consequences” and “unequal

⁵ “**Environmental mechanisms** mean externally generated influences on conditions affecting social life. Such mechanisms can operate directly: For example, resource depletion or enhancement affects people’s capacity to engage in contentious politics (McCarthy and Zald, ed. 1987).

Cognitive mechanisms operate through alterations of individual and collective perceptions; words like organize, understand, reinterpret, and classify characterize such mechanisms. [...] For example, commitment is a widely recurrent individual mechanism in which persons who individually would prefer not to take the risks of collective action find themselves unable to withdraw without hurting others whose solidarity they value.

Relational mechanisms alter connections among people, groups, and interpersonal networks. Brokerage, [is] a mechanism that recurs [...] and we define as the linking of two or more people previously unconnected social ties by a unit that mediates their relations with one another and/or with yet other sites. Most analysts see brokerage as a mechanism relating groups and individuals to one another in stable sites, but it can also become a relational mechanism for mobilization during periods of contentious politics, as new groups are thrown together by increased interaction and uncertainty, thus discovering their common interests.

Environmental, cognitive, and relational mechanisms combine.” (McAdam, Tilly, & Tarrow, 2001, pp. 25-26)

“Mechanisms seldom operate on their own. They typically concatenate with other mechanisms into their broader processes (Gambetta 1998: 105). Processes are frequently recurring causal chains, sequences, and combinations of mechanisms.” (McAdam, Tilly, & Tarrow, 2001, p. 27)


implications for resource allocation” (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 8). Using this “power-distributional” approach of institutions is compatible with using any of the three types of institutional comparative analysis –rational, historical or sociological- (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Yet, this paper argues in favor of using rational and historical comparative analysis and process tracing methodology for the study of contemporary state building, as it understands it as a contentious process of both political and institutional change measurable in years, rather than as a macro sociological structural change measured in centuries.

State building “power distributional” approach of institutions is also able to account for both endogenous and exogenous factors and paths of change as it assumes that “there is nothing automatic, self-perpetuating, or self-reinforcing about institutional arrangements” (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 8); “The need to enforce institutions carries its own dynamic of potential change, emanating not just from the politically contested nature of institutional rules but also, importantly, from a degree of openness in the interpretation and implementation of these rules.” (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 10)

Based on all the aforementioned qualifications, this paper conceptualizes *state building as contentious political processes that intend to alter the allocation, enforcement and institutionalization of political means of ruling (coercion, extraction, commitment and their administration) across the political and physical spaces of a sovereign state.*

Institutionalization is what allows the processes and mechanisms developed for state building to become stable rules of the game of centralized and responsive political and territorial binding by the accumulation (monopoly) allocation (or reallocation) and enforcement of coercion, extraction, commitment and their administration; in sum, for the state to become a set of complex institutions for long lasting ruling.

Framing that definition and all the aforementioned qualifications within a process-tracing schema with sufficient and necessary conditions, a general analytical and methodological framework for contemporary state building, in which contentious politics works as the independent variable and state building as the dependent one, looks like this:



This general framework rests upon a set of scope conditions and analytical assumptions. The scope conditions of contemporary state building are the existence of an international order based on juridical sovereignty regardless of their empirical foundations, a lack of monopoly of the means of ruling and consequently the existence of competing forms of authority (e.g. what Kalyvas refers as “multiple sovereignties” (Kalyvas, Shapiro, Masoud, & Eds., 2008). Within these scope conditions the state, as an entity with the empirical and not only juridical means for ruling, is still an option, though it has competitors to overcome.

Within an international regime of dual or multiple sovereignty, in which some states have a broader gap between their empirical and juridical sovereignty than others, or in which non state supranational actors have means of political influence at their disposal, their actions became fundamental factors shaping contemporary strategies, trajectories and outcomes of state building. The closer the gap between their empirical and juridical sovereignty the larger the influence some states

exercise upon others; and the larger the gap the more subject to external influence a given state is.

Within these scope conditions, state-building processes may originate at the supranational vs national level, or at the national vs subnational level, or in other possible combinations between these territorial levels. Contentious political processes at any of these levels always involved the national government as one of the claimants or subjects of consequential political claims, and they always involved the use of political resources (coercion, extraction/capital, and commitment) among political relevant actors (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007) (Tilly, 2010). The state, as an entity of ruling at the national level, is a contested “field of power” that can be modified from below (the subnational level) from above (the supranational level) or from both levels at the same time, but not necessarily with the same intend or direction. (Migdal, 2001) (Migdal J. S., 1988)

Contentious political processes are necessary for state building, as they attempt to alter the allocation, enforcement or distribution of political resources (means of ruling) within a sovereign state. State formation, the outcome derived from processes of state building, occurs when changes in the allocation and or enforcement of political resources became institutionalized at any territorial level. Heterogeneous effects or unevenness of institutionalization of political resources at one territorial or population level at the expense of another (e.g. national at the expense of the subnational, the inclusion of one social group at the expense of the exclusion of another) produces or makes endure unevenness of stateness. Unevenness of stateness may produce or endure multiple sovereignties and vice versa. Consequently state building is also a “game” of not only dual but multiple sovereignties, (Aalberts, 2004) whose dynamics depend on the initial allocation of political resources, their eventual redistribution, and the gap between juridical and empirical sovereignty among actors.

Based on this analytical framework, the rest of this paper analyzes the influence of US policies on the “war on drugs” and “the war on terrorism”, in influencing Colombia’s state building strategies during the last decade, and its heterogeneous effects for state formation at the national and subnational level. In particular the paper focuses in ‘PC’, a US and Colombian initiative agreed in 1999 and executed until 2007, with the main goal of reducing by half cocaine production, by strengthening the state and its ability to exercise the rule of law across coca infested and contested territories. This paper analyzes PC origins, transformation and implementation as an allegedly state building strategy, its effects and implications for state formation.

Colombia’s regional state building antecedents

Although PC is usually presented as a US–Colombia joint initiative to reduce illegal drug production, within the Colombian political context PC has not only being presented and used as an antinarcotics strategy, but also as a regional state building strategy. Indeed, the official Presidential document explaining PC was titled, “PC: Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State”⁶.

PC actually belongs to a long-lasting set of Presidential programs aiming at “bringing the central state into conflictive regions-BSCR”⁷, whose antecedents go

⁶ The Presidential document stated that “The government [of Colombia] is committed to consolidating the central responsibilities of the state: promoting democracy and the rule of law and the monopoly in the application of justice, territorial integrity, employment, respect for human rights and human dignity, and the preservation of order as established by political and social rules....It is central to this strategy to move forward decisively in partnership with the countries which produce and those which consume illegal drugs, under the principles of reciprocity and equality.”

PC: Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State,
Government of Colombia, Office of the Presidency, October 1999.

⁷ Colombia is the only country in the Western Hemisphere still confronting a six decades long, bloody civil war⁷. Since the 1980s the political armed conflict has been mixed with criminal violence related to illegal drug trafficking, as Colombia became the number one worldwide producer of coca leaves and cocaine. The political and criminal conflicts mix a myriad of actors: leftist-guerrilla groups, right-wing paramilitary groups, narco gangs, and the State armed forces.

back up to the 1950s. These type of Presidential Programs originated in 1958 after the period known as “la violencia” when the Liberal and Conservative parties agreed a consotional, sharing power agreement (El Frente Nacional) to stop the massive wave of political violence that started during the 1940s⁸. The first Presidential Program intending to “bring the state into conflictive regions” was named “La Comision Especial de Rehabilitation-CER”, and was initiated in 1958 by the first President of the Frente Nacional, the liberal Alberto LLeras Camargo. The CER intended to deal with the social, economic and political consequences of “la violencia” in the most affected and still contending regions; yet after intense political debate with the Conservative party, CER was ultimately closed in 1961.

Amidst that debate, during the second Presidential term of the Frente Nacional, lead by the conservative Guillermo Leon Valencia, Colombia and US launched Plan LASO (Latin American Security Operation), the first, joint counterinsurgency initiative embodied within US President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress ideology and based on the national security doctrine and the counterinsurgent tactics of the Vietnam war. Yet, rather than eradicating the by then self-defense peasant groups, they transformed into the radicalized and offensive guerrilla movement, later named Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC. Plan LASO officially operated 5 years. (Federal Research Division , 2010, p. 339)

Thus, since their inception, BSCR type of Presidential programs departed from the idea that the current, normal operation of the Governmental institutions is not enough to bring the state into conflictive regions; an additional, counterinsurgent and focused effort is required. Usually this take the form of a Presidential Program, based in the Executive’s Office, lead personally by the president and the Army, with autonomy from other governmental agencies, having independent coordination, budget and operational procedures, regionally focused, and relatively isolated from usual partisan, Congressional dealings.

For reasons beyond the reach of this paper, BSCR Programs faded after the 1960s and only regain governmental prominence by the 1980s, when violence sparked again amidst the illegitimization of the consociational bipartisan deal, the growth of coca production, the polarization around whether to deal with the guerrilla groups by military contestation or political inclusion, and the empowerment of narco cartels and paramilitary groups.

Every President since the 1980s has interpreted the challenge of bringing the state into conflictive regions according to his diagnosis of what is causing political and criminal related violence and how to deal with illegal armed groups and illegal drug trafficking. Some of them have put emphasis on the connection between political exclusion, poverty and conflict (Belisario Betancur 1982-1986 and Ernesto Samper 1994-1998), others on the issue of political legitimacy and state capacity to deliver public goods (Virgilio Barco 1986-1990), others on liberalizing the economy and strengthening state efficacy from the national up to the local level (Cesar Gaviria 1990-1994), others on offering peace agreements while enhancing military state capacity (Andres Pastrana 1998-2002 and Alvaro Uribe 2002-2010).

NUMBER OF MUNICIPLITIES INTERVENED BY PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAMAS AMING "TO BRING THE STATE INTO CONFLICTIVE REGIONS" 1982 AL 2011								
PRESIDENT	BETANCUR (1982-1986)	BARCO (1986-1990)	GAVIRIA (1994-1998)	SAMPER (1998-2002)	PASTRANA (1998-2002)	URIBE (2002 - 2006)	URIBE (2006 - 2010)	SANTOS (2010-2014)
NATIONAL PROGRAM / PROVINCE, # MUNICIPLITIES	PLAN NACIONAL DE REHABILITACIÓN-PNR			PLANTE*	PLAN COLOMBIA I*	PLAN COLOMBIA II - CCAI*		CONSOLIDACIÓN TERRITORIAL*
Amazonas			2					
Antioquia	32	35	36			2	12	10
Arauca	4	4	7			4	4	
San Andrés								
Atlántico								
Bogotá D.C								
Bolívar	3	9	15	5	5		2	2
Boyacá	10	12	32					
Caldas		3	4					
Caquetá	14	14	15	12	12	2	2	3
Casanare			8					
Cauca	15	36	37	17	17	5	6	5
Cesar	4	7	13			3	3	
Chocó	3	19	18			7	7	
Córdoba	6	7	14			3	4	5
Cundinamarca	13	9	17					
Guainía				1	1			
Guaviare	1	1	4	4	4	2	2	
Huila	19	22	21	18	18			
La Guajira		4				2	2	
Magdalena		2	13			3	4	
Meta	11	11	13	10	10	4	6	6
Nariño	3	12	23	9	9	1	1	1
Norte de Santander		18	19	1	1	10	10	7
Putumayo	9	9	10	9	9	6	6	4
Quindío								
Risaralda		3	4					
Santander	19	20	27	1	1			
Sucre		24	24				2	2
Tolima	16	17	18	8	8		4	4
Valle del Cauca							5	2
Vaupés			1					
Vichada		3	4	1	1			
Total	182	301	399	97	97	54	82	51

* For these Programas, the table refers only to municipalities selected based on both drug trafficking and political/criminal related violence.

All these Colombian Presidents have argued that there is a correlation between State absentee or weakness and drug trafficking production, also with illegal armed groups' strength across territory⁹. All these Presidential Programs have received technical, financial and military cooperation from the US Government.

Thus, PC was neither the first nor the last Presidential initiative aiming to bring the state into conflictive regions, as such type of Programs existed since decades ago. Yet PC was the first 'comprehensive' US-Colombian joint initiative to reduce drug production, weaken terrorist groups and strengthen state capacity, all in once.


⁹ See <http://www.semana.com/especiales/articulo/el-tercer-cartel/11412-3>

Contentious politics within the game of dual&multiple sovereignties explaining the adoption of PC as a state building strategy

According to official data, by 1999 Colombia had a critical situation both in security and drug trafficking. Since the mid 1990s production of cocaine and political and criminal related violence skyrocketed. Cocaine production almost quadruple between 1994 and 1999, passing from 37,000 Ha up to 160,119 Ha, making Colombia the top worldwide producer of cocaine, of which 60% was trafficked to and consumed in the US. (Mejia, 2012) Although the average homicide rate kept reducing along the 1990s, by 1999 Colombia had the top worldwide rate of kidnappings -half of the worldwide kidnappings occurred in Colombia-, 40% allegedly committed by guerrilla groups; 403 massacres occurred in 1999 leaving 1836 victims -an increased of 40% compared to 1998-, 40% allegedly committed by paramilitary groups; studies showed that “from April to December 1999 have produced about 1500 episodes of political persecution and abuse of authority involving extrajudicial killings , disappearances, violations of physical integrity and above all, arbitrary detention with direct involvement of state agents”(CIDH, Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 1999)

From 1994 to 1996, the so called “marchas cocaleras” (coca growers massive protests) put around 200,000 peasants from Putumayo, Guaviare and Caqueta Provinces marching and blocking roads, demanding to stop aerial spraying eradication and to receive alternatives for economic development (Ramírez, 2001). Colombian authorities denounced these marches were promoted and enforced by guerrilla groups, in particular the Farc, along with interested narco cartels, intending to destabilize the country. In 1997, candidates in 132 out of 1,071 municipalities resigned and no local elections were held as scheduled due to the Farc’s acts of sabotage and threats upon these candidates; during the electoral campaign in 1997 elections, there were 165 homicides, 431 kidnaps, and 153 murder attempts against political actors (Avila Martínez, 2010, p. 180) (López Hernández, 2010ii)

Gráfico 1. Comportamiento del número de hectáreas sembradas de coca en Colombia, 1990 - 2005



Fuente: SIMCI, Policía Nacional - Dirección Antinarcoóticos, UNODC y Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos de América.

Within such context, in 1998 the conservative candidate Andres Pastrana became President of Colombia offering peace negotiations with the Farc (the oldest, largest, and strongest guerrilla group) and to reestablish Colombia's international reputation after the US government decertified Colombia and cut financial cooperation because drug cartels funded the campaign of President Ernesto Samper, the liberal candidate who defeated Pastrana in the 1994 elections. Samper managed to remain in power in spite of the scandal and increasing pressure from the US government.

Samper was the first Colombian President who institutionalized within the Executive branch a Program -PLANTE- to eradicate (mainly by aerial spraying) and substitute illicit drugs in 1995. PLANTE was the pioneer in utterly integrating the antinarcotic component into a presidential program aiming to bring the state into conflictive regions. In spite of this, because of Samper mafia-electoral scandal, US decertified Colombia for its lack of 'effective cooperation in drug trafficking' and revoked Samper's US visa.

After inaugurated in August 1998, and overpassing the opposition of the Army, some elites and right wing paramilitary groups, President Andrés Pastrana conceded to the Farc a cease-fire zone of 45.000 sq kilometers, known as *El Caguan*, in the Provinces of Meta and Caqueta, where Farc troops were supposed to be concentrated while negotiating. Additionally, in an effort to make credible his commitment with the negotiations and with halting the Army's links with paramilitary groups, Pastrana removed four generals from active military service for their alleged links with paramilitary groups. These decisions heighten tensions with the right wing political sectors (some elites, the Army and paramilitary groups), which honored the discharged generals in a highly attended and publicized event, whose main speaker was Alvaro Uribe, former Provincial governor of Antioquia Province and an ascendant political figure.

President Pastrana attempted to initiate peace negotiations also with the ELN –the second largest guerrilla group-, but the attempt failed as regional elites and paramilitary groups mobilized part of the population against it, blockade the roads and impeded the establishment of another cease-fire zone in the Magdalena Media region, along the Provinces of Antioquia, Bolívar, Cesar and Santander.

As aforementioned, Colombian government framed PC as its center peace to support the peace process, promote development, strengthen rule of law and reduce drug trafficking, while the US government emphasized the last two goals¹⁰. In the rhetoric the goals nicely overlap, but the money was actually 8 out of every \$10 dollars spent on US targeted goals, given that the only clear numeric goal established in the actually executed version of PC was to reduce coca production by half in 7 years. "ACI [Andean Counterdrug Initiative] funding for PC from FY2000 through FY2005 totals approximately \$2.8 billion. When FMF [Foreign Military Financing] and DOD

¹⁰ "The primary U.S. objective is to prevent the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, as well as to help Colombia promote peace and economic development because it contributes to regional security in the Andes. The primary objectives of Colombia are to promote peace and economic development, increase security, and end drug trafficking. Both U.S. and Colombian objectives have also evolved over time from a strict counternarcotics focus to encompass counterterrorism activities." (Congressional Research Service, 2005)

assistance is included, the total level of U.S. support to Colombia is \$4.5 billion.” (Congressional Research Service, 2005) This money was spent mainly on aerial coca eradication, interdiction and infrastructure protection by strengthening the state’s rule of law capacity.

This so called “military” component of PC spent 84% of PC’s budget, of both US (\$3,252 millions) and Colombian (\$5,765 millions) sources¹¹ (DNP , 2006, p. 11), mainly in equipment, intelligence and operational capacity for the Army and for Police’s units eradicating and interdicting coca, along with US contractors, by aerial spraying. A smaller part of this component (\$93 million) was spent in nationwide support to the Judicial system, the Attorney’s General Office and the Ombudsman Office¹². Up to 2002, 90% of the coca eradication effort targeted the Putumayo Province, along the border with Ecuador; the remaining 10% took place in Bolívar Province and in Norte de Santander Province, along the border with Venezuela¹³. Initially, both US Congress and the Executive insisted PC’s counternarcotics money and efforts should keep independent of counterinsurgent operations.

PC’s so called “social” component received 16% of the budget¹⁴ (DNP , 2006) and did not have any clear Provincial or municipal targeted regions or goals; its investments were sparsely distributed along 272 municipalities, mainly in small infrastructure projects, such as paving local roads, rebuilding schools or health centers, as well as on alternative (to coca) development projects. As part of this social component, a nationwide means tested poverty reduction program known as Familias en Accion started in 2001. This Program supplements poor women’s cash income, depending

¹¹ According to official Colombian documents, Colombia assigned in total \$6,950 millions to PC from 1999 to 2005 and US assigned \$3,782. (DNP , 2006, p.11). Yet, according to US official documents when “FMF [Foreign Military Financing] and DOD assistance is included, the total level of U.S. support to Colombia is \$4.5 billion.” (Congressional Research Service, 2005, p. 1)

¹² See (Congressional Research Service, 2005) and http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/colombia/fs_000328_plancolombia.html

¹³ Interview with Gonzalo de Francisco, Colombian Presidential Security Adviser and Camilo Gómez, Colombian Presidential Peace Commissioner under President Andrés Pastrana term.

¹⁴ Colombia assigned \$1.185 millions to the social and development investments in PC, and US assigned \$530 millions (DNP , 2006, p11)

on her children school attendance, nutrition and overall health wellbeing, verified at least twice a year. Since its inception, Familias en Accion has been the most effective national poverty alleviation program in rural areas (DNP, 2008).

Although being a small portion of PC's budget, these 'social' investments became relevant for Colombia regional investments after 1999, when the country was hit by the back slash of the Asian financial crisis and the bankruptcy of the national mortgage housing system. Amidst economic crisis, intensified violence, and a trembling peace process, PC resources and US political support was fundamental for Pastrana's government political standing, as it alleviated regional economic hardship as well as national political tensions with strong sectors of the elites and Colombia's Army, who opposed the peace negotiations, but agreed on PC harder line approach.

9/11 and a failed peace, the critical juncture for PC shifting towards counterinsurgent, regional state building approach

In February 2002, President Pastrana halted the peace negotiations, and required to the international community to classify the Farc as a terrorist group, alleging they violated the peace agreements, and use the cease-fire zone to recruit combatants, increase coca production and keep hostages. Within the context of the war against terrorism launched by the US after the 9/11 attacks, and as requested by President Pastrana, the FARC, ELN and the AUC (the largest confederation of narco and right wing paramilitary groups) were declared terrorist groups by US government and also by the European Union¹⁵. Public resentment against the Farc sky rocketed and whether to continue peace or intensify war against this group became the central debate during the presidential campaign in 2002.

¹⁵ FARC, ELN and AUC were "designated foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) by the State Department, [pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132)].⁶ In 2003 the FARC and AUC were designated Significant Foreign Narcotics Traffickers under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (P.L. 106-120)." (Congressional Research Service, 2005, p.3)

A cattle rancher, former senator and provincial governor, and a Farc's victim, Alvaro Uribe took the oath of office as President of Colombia in August 2002. Uribe strongly opposed the negotiations with the Farc since the very beginning and won the Presidency offering to defeat the Farc under a new 'democratic security policy'-DSP that will defeat terrorists, recover governability and economic development. Uribe framed his anti Farc and DSP within the US "war on terrorism" agenda and jargon; since 2003 none governmental document mention a situation of political or armed conflict in Colombia; instead, the official documents referred to a "narcoterrorist threat". Uribe also presented himself as a trustworthy conservative partner to the US government amidst the rising of the left in Latin American Politics, in particular as a counterbalance to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's influence in the region. Colombia and US Governments mutually supported their own "wars on terrorism". Colombia, under President Uribe, was the only Latin American country that politically supported the US military intervention in Irak in 2003; Costa Rica also did it; additionally, Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic sent troops (Tokatlian, 2004). US officials gradually started emphasizing Farc's deep level of involvement in drug trafficking and terrorism, in particular after 2003 when 3 US military contractors were kidnapped by Farc; some years after, both US and Colombian officials started making public statements affirming Farc was "the largest worldwide narco cartel"¹⁶.

Based on their mutual and converging interests, both governments agreed to refocus PC's goals and money. US government lifted the restriction of "exclusive" use for counternarcotics and allowed the use of their funds for counterterrorist assistance. They also authorized to raise, up to the double, the number of US military personnel and contractors based in Colombia and a more direct involvement in military planning and operation on the ground. (Tokatlian, 2004) (Congressional

¹⁶ See <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/elmundo/articulo-270500-talibanes-y-farc-los-mayores-narcotraficantes-del-mundo-eeuu>
<http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1475921-las-farc-son-el-mayor-cartel-de-drogas-del-mundo>

Research Service, 2005). In 2002 Uribe convinced Colombia's elites to pay a one-time security tax over wealth and patrimony to enhance Colombia's army capabilities and to support DSP. This was the first time since the civil war started during the 1950s that a Colombian President was able to levy a national tax exclusively to fund public security. This new tax, along with the more flexible reallocation of PC's resources for counter guerrilla operations, allowed Uribe's government to overhauled Colombia's Armed Forces' strategies and refocuses their operations towards combined antiterrorist and counternarcotic tasks in selected targeted regions.

In 2003 the Army launched the biggest counter guerrilla operation since the 1960s called "Plan Patriota" to attack Farc's economic and territorial strongholds in different regions, in particular in *el Caguan* region. Meanwhile Uribe started peace negotiations with the AUC narcoparamilitary groups, who vowed to agree to a cease-fire and demobilization process. Even though the cease-fire was violated several times, the negotiations continued and the AUC demobilization started in 2004 and culminated in 2007. By 2003 official data estimated AUC rank and file troops in 13,500; by 2007 roughly 35,000 paramilitaries' rank and file demobilized.

In 2008, Uribe extradited to the United States 14 AUC top commanders, accusing them of violation of the peace agreements and continued involvement in drug trafficking. The peace process broke up; some combatants effectively demobilized and an uncertain number reengage in violence. Nevertheless the government declared the end of paramilitarism and from 2007 on used the term "criminal gangs" (Bacrim by their Spanish acronym) to refer to "emerging" narcocriminal gangs.

Initially journalist investigations in 2005 and then formal judicial investigations since 2007 unraveled the massive intervention of narcoparamilitary groups in the 2002 national elections. By 2011, 45 Congress members elected in 2002 had been sentenced guilty under electoral fraud and joint criminal enterprise charges with narco paramilitary groups; 8 out of 10 of these Congress members belonged to President Uribe coalition. Another 2 Congress members were sentenced guilty for

similar charges with guerrilla groups; both belonged to opposition parties. Several prominent members of Uribe's coalition and cabinet were also sentenced guilty for joint criminal enterprise with narco paramilitary groups, including his cousin, Senator Mario Uribe, the Director of the Presidential Security Office¹⁷ (equivalent to US Secret Service) and the Director of The Presidential Intelligence Department-DAS¹⁸ (equivalent to US CIA) (López Hernández, 2010ii).

The 2002 elected Congress approved 2004 Law #175, known as the Peace and Justice Law, under which paramilitary groups demobilized and were prosecuted. They also amended Colombia's Constitution to allow one term consecutive Presidential reelection, and approved the US Colombia Free Trade Agreement. Alvaro Uribe was the first president to be reelected after the constitutional reform in 2006 by a super majority 53% vote share.


CCAI's subnational institutional repertoire, the regional state building component of PC

Confident on the prospects of the 'democratic security policy', but worried about the challenges to its sustainability, US and Colombian military officials recommended to President Uribe the adoption of an institutional coordination mechanism to ensure the arrival of national civilian institutions, public goods and services to the Plan Patriota's regions; in other words another "bringing the state into conflictive regions" type of program. This new approach (new for PC, but not for Colombia's public policy) was institutionalized in the Center for Coordinated and Integrative Action-CCAI, which started operations in 2004.

¹⁷ See <http://www.verdadabierta.com/component/content/article/75-das-gate/4394-el-general-santoyo-y-los-paramilitares>

¹⁸ See <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/jorge-noguera-condenado-25-anos-carcel/246385-3>

CCAI works as an ad hoc interagency coordination mechanism for the operations and investments of 14 Executive Ministries, Colombia’s Army and National Police in some targeted municipalities unraveled by violence, coca crops and weak state presence. On a year basis, the CCAI selects municipalities for its intervention and designates a “padrino” (liaison), who coordinates the delivery of the CCAI’s institutions’ programs into the selected municipalities. Such institutional delivery is implemented sequentially. First, the Army achieves some level of territorial control and progressively the set of civilian institutions came in parallel to achieve “social recovery” of these territories. The CCAI has no involvement whatsoever in military operations’ planning or execution; it is a civilian institutional mechanism to enhance coordination and effectiveness in the delivery of public services, programs and investments at the municipal level.



Source: Minister of Defense 2009. Modified by author

CCAI’s rationale follows the typical “clear and hold” and “hearts and minds” counterinsurgency approaches that have been part of US military and non-military assistance to Colombia since the 1960s; yet, both US and Colombia’s governments affirm the CCAI is not simply another counterinsurgency initiative, but a comprehensive state building program, applied regardless of the type of illegal group -guerrilla or neo-paramilitary group (bacrim)- challenging the state, and

having as ultimate purpose not only the defiance of these illegal groups, but the establishment of long lasting democratic state ruling in these regions.

The CCAI “treatment” package (repertoire) consists on three different types of interventions: 1. Military and Police deployment in the targeted municipalities to combat illegal armed groups, diminish coca crops and increase state led security; 2. Targeting nationwide social programs and investments towards CCAI’s municipalities so that their security and social indicators reach the national average. These programs usually focused on the provision of health care, schooling, land registration and titling to habilitate access to official subsidies and credit for rural development projects, as well as support to the municipality to improve its planning, administrative and fiscal procedures; and 3. Executing CCAI’s exclusive programs –usually micro economic projects to substitute illegal crops- as well as small infrastructure projects to facilitate agricultural production and commercialization. These local projects are funded by US Agency for International Development-USAID and carried out by USAID’s contractors. In order to avoid the program to look like “outsourcing state building to the US” and to ensure public recognition goes to the Colombian government, USAID contractors and investments are presented in the regions and municipalities under the name ‘Colombia Responde’.

Since its inception in 2004 CCAI has brought its institutional package up to 82 municipalities, though the figure varies per year. On average, municipalities remained 5.4 years under CCAI intervention up to 2010 when CCAI schema changed and the CCAI as such ceased to exist.

CCAI’s initial repertoire was adjusted twice. In 2007 when the former Minister of Defense, Juan Manuel Santos, updated the national “Democratic Security Policy” and created a particular CCAI version for the Macarena region named “Programa de Consolidacion de la Macarena-PCIM. The Macarena region is located in Colombia’s eastern plains in the Meta Province, which is a historical stronghold of the FARC, as


well as a large coca production area. The PCIM encompass three main differences from CCAI's. First, a regional development and national integration approach as compare to the more local, municipal focus of the CCAI. Second, a permanent civilian teamwork based on the region, as opposed to the individual liaison of the CCAI schema. Third, a more comprehensive intervention "package" focused on three main areas: regional economic development, local institutional development, and citizen participation. PCIM operates in 6 municipalities in the eastern Meta Province since 2007. A mix of CCAI and PCIM approaches were adopted as a national public policy in 2009 when President Alvaro Uribe issued the Presidential Order (Directiva Presidencial) No. 001 of 2009, creating the National Plan for Territorial Consolidation.

The second and definite change to the CCAI schema came in 2010 when the former Minister of Defense, Juan Manuel Santos, became President. Santos incorporated the National Policy of Territorial Consolidation as part of his National Development Plan approved by Congress in 2011. Then in November 2011 the government issued the Decree 4161 creating the 'Administrative Unit of Territorial Consolidation-UACT', a formal institutional branch of the also newly created "Executive Department for Social Prosperity". The UACT formal institutional unit substituted the ad hoc coordination mechanism of CCAI. UACT adopted the PCIM as a role model for its operation. During the transition in 2010, CCAI-UACT announced the selection of 100 municipalities for its intervention (including CCAI's 82 municipalities and adding 18 more, see Map 5), but ultimately in 2011 the UACT selected only 51 municipalities for its intervention, of which 47 were previously intervened by CCAI (see Map 6).

Assessing Plan Colombia-CCAI's State Building Effects

According to this paper's state building analytical framework, so far it has been argued how contentious politics and the game of dual&multiple sovereignties at the supranational, national and subnational level explain the adoption of the democratic security policy-DSP and Plan Colombia-CCAI, (from know on PC-CCAI) and also how

these policies intended to alter the distribution, enforcement and institutionalization of the state means of coercion, extraction and commitment (political and territorial responsive binding) across Colombia's political and (some) territorial spaces (mainly 82 municipalities). This analysis corresponds to the left hand side of the process-tracing schema proposed in the first section, which for this specific case looks like this:



This section analyzes what have been the state building effects of such policies/strategies, both at the national and subnational level, whether such effects have been relatively homogeneous or heterogeneous between these two levels, and how institutionalized they become. This analysis corresponds to the right hand side of the process-tracing schema.

To assess the effect at the national level the paper continues using mainly qualitative analysis. To assess the effects at the subnational level, the paper uses additionally quantitative causal estimation methods -Matching- to estimate the overall average effect of PC-CCAI (the treatment) in the 13 regions and 82 municipalities intervened, and also to find out and estimate likely differential effects between regions. The analysis is also complemented with information collected through 70 semi-structured interviews held in the summer 2012 with officials in

charge of the PC-CCAI policies/programs, as well as with local officials and community leaders in the regions intervened¹⁹.


For this section analysis, the paper uses some “proxy” variables to account for each of the 3 means of political ruling and stateness (coercion, extraction, commitment and their administration) that define whether or not an intervention is an state building initiative and its effects. The general list of proxies is summarized in table 1; their specific used is explained along this section.

TABLE 1. Proxy variables accounting for stateness		
Means of coercion	Means of extraction	Means of commitment (political and territorial binding)
Proxys at the National level		
Security and defense expenditures as % of GDP	National Tax collection (direct and indirect taxes) as % of GDP	Electoral participation in Presidential and Congressional elections
Proxys at the Subnational - Municipal level		
Rate of State lead military operations (per 100.000 inhabitants)	Municipal Development Indicator (fiscal sustainability and administrative capacity at the municipal level)	Percentage of national cash transfers towards provincial and municipal governments
Rate of non-state, illegal armed groups attacks (per 100.000 inhabitants)	Local Tax collection Land taxes Economic activity taxes	Electoral participation in Mayors elections
Number of municipal judicial tribunals (per 1.000 inhabitants)	Number of Ha of coca (per rural inhabitant) as proxy for illegal armed groups “tax” collection	
Rate of homicides (per 100.000 inhabitants)		
Rate of kidnappings (per 100.000 inhabitants)		
Rate of massacres (per 100.000 inhabitants)		
Rate of forced displacement, idps (per 100.000 inhabitants)		

PC-CCAI National state building effects

¹⁹ Appendix A has the full list of persons interviewed as well as the basic questionnaire used.

During three decades, from 1950s until mid 1980s, Colombia spent in Security and Defense-S&D about 2% of its GDP; then after the Constitutional Reform in 1991, S&D expenditures started growing up steadily (Giha Tobar, Riveros Reyes, & Soto Velasco, 1999, p. 168).



Source: taken from Giha Tobar, Riveros Reyes, & Soto Velasco, 1999, p. 168

Official methodology for calculations of S&D expenditures varies. According to the National Department of Planning-DNP, by 1998 Colombia spend 3.26% of its GDP in S&D and by 2005 4.23% (mainly taking into account the Armed Forces and the National Police budget) (DNP , 2006). But according to the Minister of Defense methodology the figure was 4.2% in 1998 (including all civilian agencies of the S&D sector); and 5.3% by 2007. (Ministry of National Defense, 2009). This paper will follow the Minister of Defense data as it has the longest time series, and also includes, on comparable basis, US financial military assistance.

Colombia's Defense Sector Budget as % of GDP 1990-2007



Source: taken from Colombia's Ministry of Defense, 2009, p.23

This additional 1.1% of GDP in 5 years was financed both by Colombia and US' Plan Colombia resources. Colombia's input came mainly through the 'new security tax'²⁰, which collected \$2.06 billion pesos (roughly US\$1.1 billion dollars) in 2002, and similar amounts in 2003, 2006 and 2009 (Ministry of National Defense, 2009).

On the other hand, US military assistance (the green line in Figurexx) in the first year of PC was equivalent to an additional 1% of GDP, but up to 2007, on average was equivalent to 0.5%. Thus, Colombia and US funded almost half and half the increase of Colombian S&D expenditures as % of GDP between 1999 and 2007; 0.6% Colombia and 0.5% the US. (Ministry of National Defense, 2009, p. 26). Colombia's steady upsurge in S&D expenditures is reflected in manpower growth; the number of soldiers per 10.000 inhabitants grew from 35 in 1991; to 60 in 1998, to 70 in 2002, up to 88 in 2007 (Giha Tobar, Riveros Reyes, & Soto Velasco, 1999, p. 178) (Ministry of National Defense, 2009, p. 17). According to the Ministry of Defense, between 2002 and 2007, Colombia Armed Forces grew 30%, roughly 100.000 new

²⁰ Executive Decree 1838/2002 levied the security "tax" as a one-time 'emergency contribution', which has been renewed in 2003, 2006 and 2009 by Congressional Law. Yet, the 'emergency contribution' can disappear at any point, if either the Executive does not request it periodically or Congress does not renew the approval.

troops were recruited²¹. (Ministry of National Defense, 2009, p. 12). The Army distributed its new personnel in 2 military divisions, 17 new counter guerrilla battalions, 7 meteoro companies, 24 units of highly specialized snipers. The Police invested in 168 Police stations and 108 substations across the country, 13 urban antiterrorists units, and 3 additional units specialized in preventing kidnaps (Gaula groups) (Ministry of National Defense, 2009, p. 17).

Institutionally speaking, since 2002 both the Armed Forces and the Police strove to achieve better coordination and division of labor. The Police leads coca eradication while the Army counter insurgent operations. Both the Police and the Army invested in tactical, intelligence and operational equipment to improve mobility and combat capacity. To improve coordination and efficacy the Armed Forces created Joint Task Forces Commands-JTF (Comandos Conjuntos) who operate at the regional level, overcoming Provincial political limits, which are artificial and nonsensical for military purposes. Some of these JTF matches with CCAI regions and support their operation.


The intelligence units of the Executive branch (DAS), the Army and the Police established protocols and rules to share information and plan more highly sophisticated operations, such as the rescue of hostages –e.g. the rescue in 2010 of the 3 US contractors and another 7 Colombians kidnapped by the Farc- or to jointly attack “high value” targets, such as FACR top commanders – e.g. the attack against FARC second top commander, alias ‘mono Jojoy’, in 2010-. To cover highly strategic geographic points, the Army increased in 6 the number of Mountain Battalions (Batallones de Alta Montaña) to cut some strategic points of illegal groups’ logistics and operation between inter valley regions; these Batallions are complemented with 8.000 campesino soldiers and 31 additional Police Carabineers units in rural areas. 2.400 additional Police officials and 1.200 motorized units were assigned to patrol main national and provincial roads. (Ministry of National Defense, 2009, p. 24)

In 2002, 169 Colombian municipalities did not have Police presence, either because Farc expansion during the mid 1990s, and their tactic of razing towns to displace authorities (majors, council members and Police), forced the Police to retreat, or because of peace negotiations in *El Caguan* the Police had left. By 2007 all municipalities had recover Police presence, at least in their inner areas. Additionally, municipalities in the Provinces of Caqueta, Meta and Guaviare, where the Plan Patriota was launched, received 17.000 soldiers specialized in counter insurgent operations, as well as the Provinces of Cundinamarca and Antioquia where smaller counterinsurgent operations –e.g. Operation Libertad I and II, with roughly 2.000 soldiers each- were launched. Furthermore, the Police increased deployment and security operations in the National and Interprovincial road system, which consequently decreased by more than 50% guerrilla attacks, blockades and “pescas milagrosas” –random kidnaps- in these roads.

This deployment was focused in targeting Farc and ELN strategic areas at the expense of other illegal armed groups strongholds. However the government claimed this targeting was due to the fact that AUC accepted a cease-fire and was negotiating demobilization. Dissident AUC factions were also attacked within the new deployment of the Armed Forces between 2002 and 2007, in particular in Meta and Casanare regions. Yet, by 2007, when AUC demobilization finished, Neoparamilitary groups remained operating in AUC previous strongholds; by 2010 these Neoparamilitary groups (named Bacrin by the government) had 4.500 members according to official figures; non-governmental sources estimate this figure in 10,000 members (CNAI, CERAC)

This ‘colombian’ state building effort was half done with another country and citizens’ tax money; a fact that could be interpreted as a contemporary form of “outsourcing state building”. However, beyond the security tax, Colombia’s taxpayers almost double their tax payments as % of GDP during PC-CCAI period. According to Colombia’s Ministry of Treasury, in 1999 national tax collection as

percentage of GDP drops to 7.8%, compared to 8.7% in 1998, as a result of the economic crisis; but since 2000 that percentage increased steadily up to 13.4% in 2007, remain there for a couple of years, and then marginally dropped to 12.2% in 2010. Since 1999, Colombian authorities approved 6 Tax Laws (indicated in dotted red lines in the figure), including three in which the security contribution was reformed. In spite of the security contribution and its transformation into a tax over wealth and patrimony during this period, direct taxes as proportion of total national tax collection dropped from 65% in 1990 to 55% in 2010, while indirect taxes – most regressive and mainly levied over consumption- increased from 35% in 1990 to 45% in 2010. (Ministry of Treasury, DIAN, 2013)




On average, 55% of the security contribution –later the wealth&patrimony tax- was paid by large corporations, other corporations and individuals leaving in the capital city, Bogota; 18% by those living in Medellin, the second largest city; 8% in Cali and 4% in Barranquilla, correspondingly the third and fourth largest cities in Colombia; the remaining 25% was paid in the rest of the country (Ministry of Treasury, DIAN, 2013). Thus, collecting this new contribution/tax was not so much an issue of extending taxation capacity throughout the country, but of exercising political leverage upon wealthy elites to increase their share in the provision of security. In

this sense, the causal mechanism between increase taxation and increase security provision in this case looks closer to Slater’s argument of elites’ collective action under conspicuously contentious threats (Slater, 2010) (Rodríguez-Franco, 2012) than the Tilly’s bellicist argument of strengthening taxing capacity to fight external wars (Tilly, 1992). However, these two arguments miss the role of the game of dual sovereignty and subnational contentious politics in explaining what enemies and wars are picked up, financed and fought, which consequently shapes state building strategies and outcomes.


As it was mentioned, the main interest of the US government with PC was to decrease by half cocaine production in Colombia, and correspondingly cocaine trafficking and consumption in US. According to the US Congressional Research Service “Despite increased eradication of drug crops and interdiction efforts under PC, U.S. government agencies responsible for tracking drug trends report that the availability, price, and purity of cocaine and heroin in the United States have remained stable.” (Congressional Research Service, 2005, p. 4). UNDOC data also supports the same conclusion, as the following figures (taken from (Mejia, 2012)) show:

Figure 3. Coca cultivation and eradication campaigns (manual and aerial) 2000-2008



Source: UNODC (2010).

Figure 6. Coca Base Production and Prices in Colombia 2000-2009



Source: UNODC (2008, 2009 and 2010).


The implication of these results for the “war un drugs” policy is not the concern of this paper, but its implications for state building. The rents of cocaine production are taken in this analysis as proxy of Illegal armed groups’ (IAG) “tax” collection, as

these groups (ELN, FARC and Paramilitaries as AUC) are all heavily involved in drug production and trafficking.

Cocaine rents feed the coffers of the state's armed competitors and additionally serve as a mean to corrupt its own officials, an additional collateral damage. It is hard to estimate exactly how much money the cocaine rents is, so endless debates surround this topic (Chris & Al, 1994) (Dermot, 2009) (Gaviria & Mejía, 2011) Yet, the most recent calculations, estimate that in a year (2008) "between \$7 billion and \$8 billion (US dollars) entered the Colombian economy due to cocaine production and trafficking [which] corresponds, on average, to about 2.3% of Colombian GDP in that year" (Mejia, 2012). If this figure approximates reality, then Colombia's state competitors' "tax" rents could have offset PC's contribution to increase S&D expenditures -1.1% of GDP between 1999 and 2007-, although as a whole, Colombian state spend, at least, twice as much as their competitors in S&D, in total 5.3%.

Given these ambiguous results on cocaine production and trafficking, both US and Colombian official assessments of PC have praised it for its results in terrorism reduction (United States Government Accountability Office , 2008) (Congressional Research Service, 2005) (DNP , 2006). Though no word was mention in the original Plan about negotiating and demobilizing narcoparamilitary groups, PC's governmental assessments pointed out the AUC demobilization as part of the successful effects of PC. Curiously, Colombia's assessment (DNP , 2006) did not mention a word about the Plan Patriota (the biggest military campaign launched against the Farc in 2003). Some information about Plan Patriota results is provided in the US assessment, mentioning that "anecdotal evidence indicates that the Colombian Military has forced the Farc to change tactics by atomizing into smaller cells to avoid detection and reducing the number of large scale attacks on military facilities." "Colombian military claims that Plan Patriot has reduced FARC ranks from 18.000 to 12.000 in the past year." (Congressional Research Service, 2005, p. 8)

The US Report also cites a reduction in measures of violence and oil infrastructure attacks that coincide with Colombian official statistics, which show the following trends in some of the main indicators of armed groups attacks and violence, before, after and during PC.




Given disparate trends on aggregate data at the national level, it is hard to assess the correlation of PC's execution on security and anti terrorism, and practically impossible to determine any type of causality at this aggregated national level. These types of effects will be analyzed at the subnational level. However, these graphs indicate that during the initial period of PC, from 1999 to 2002, violence indicators continued deteriorating, while on overall, they start improving after 2002, as the sharp decreased of massacres and kidnappings, steady decreased in homicides and much slower decreased in forced displacement indicates. Massacres were a war tactic heavily used by paramilitary groups, so both its increase before 2002 and posterior declined could be more correlated with AUC operation and partial demobilization than with PC execution. As it has been argued, neither Colombia's Army operations nor PC military component was targeted towards paramilitary groups, so it is questionably to accrue AUC demobilization as a result of Colombia's military pressure or PC execution. Confronting Farc and negotiating with paramilitary groups is better explained by Colombia's contentious politics than by US policies. Yet, 9/11 and US shift towards the war on terrorism explains the alignment of these two factors and also the shift of PC towards a regional state building focus.

The opposite could be argued for the sharp decrease in the rate of kidnappings, which were a war tactic heavily used by both the ELN and Farc. Reducing both massive-random kidnappings (e.g. ELN pescas milagrosas) and individual-extortive kidnaping (practiced by both ELN and Farc) require investing in intelligence, tactical and operational capacity on the ground, patrolling roads, cutting illegal groups' logistics and communications, and sustaining offensive operations so that no illegal 'safe heavens' can endure. As PC's official and academic sources testify these were the types of investments that PC emphasized, so it is reasonable to argue that kidnappings decrease is correlated with PC execution.

Nevertheless, during PC-CCAI's execution or aftermath, the Colombian state improved its tax collection as well as the deployment and enforcement of military


capacity; one state's competitor – the AUC- was partially disbanded-, and another – FARC and ELN- partially weakened, are all signs of positive state building effects in coercion and extraction stateness indicators (proxys).

Finally, if one takes electoral participation as a proxy for stateness' political binding there is another angle to analyze PC state building national effects. National elections in 1998 were heavily contested between the conservative candidate, Andrés Pastrana, and the Liberal, Horacio Serpa. Serpa was the successor and favorite candidate of President Samper, who defeated Pastrana in 1994, by a small margin (amidst the narco financial scandal of his campaign); as a result, the bitterness of the 1998 campaign was memorable. Along with the national context explained in the initial sections of this paper, this polarization increased the level of electoral participation from 43% in the second electoral round (it was 33% in the first round) of 1994 to 52% in the first electoral round on 1998. According to Colombia's Constitution if no candidate achieves a super majority 51% of the vote share in the first round, there has to be a second round between the two most voted candidates. In the second round in 1998 electoral participation increased up to 59%, and Pastrana was elected with 50.39% of the vote share, compare to a 46.53% of Serpa. Pastrana then introduced Plan Colombia, as the centerpiece of his foreign and national peace policies.




With a failed peace process, violence raising, illegal armed groups massively interfering in politics, economic downturn and a massive outrage against the Farc,

Alvaro Uribe won the Presidency in 2002 with a super majority 53% vote share in the first round (versus 32% of his closest competitor, Horacio Serpa of the Liberal Party). Uribe was the first President since the Constitutional reform in 1991 to win the Presidency in the first round. Even though, polarization and bitterness was not lower in 2002 than in 1998, the level of electoral participation decreased from 59% to 46%. After another Constitutional reform in 2004, Uribe was also de first President to be sequentially re-elected in 2006, once again with a super majority vote share of 62% in the first round and an electoral participation of 45%. The DSP popularity and the competitive advantages attached to the incumbent candidate made the rising tide that took Uribe towards his reelection.



Uribe's 2002 and 2006 national super majority vote shares distributed heterogeneously across Colombian municipalities; for example, in 2002 Uribe obtained less than 25% of the vote share in 216 municipalities, while in other 89 municipalities won by and more than 76% of the vote share. In 2006 this proportions of electoral dominion reversed; in 65 municipalities Uribe obtained less than 25% of the vote share, while in other 365 municipalities won with more than 76%. The following maps compare Uribe's electoral dominion across municipalities in 2002 and 2006 elections; the darker the color, the higher the dominion; last map showed the location of PC-CCAI's intervened regions.



On the one hand, Uribe's supermajority vote shares can be interpreted as a responsive relationship between an electorate demanding state protection and offering support towards the candidate who offered to curb violence, increase security and to defeat illegal armed groups. Uribe's electoral results are compatible with public opinion polls in which reiteratively security ranked as the number one topic for voters in both elections (Semana, 2002, 2006) both in largest urban centers and small rural towns. Yet, studies about the electoral interference of illegal armed groups in 2002 elections found that paramilitaries presence significantly correlates with higher electoral participation and higher vote shares in favor of their preferred candidates (López Hernández, 2005) (López Hernández, 2010ii).

This type of effects are statistically significant for at least 25 Congressional candidates elected in 2002 and also for Uribe in small and mid size towns, in particular in the Caribbean region, where Uribe was not the strongest candidate, but paramilitaries were the strongest armed group (Acemoglu, Robinson, & Santos, 2013). There could be a quit pro quo relationship between a candidate and illegal armed groups, in which candidates received electoral support and illegal armed groups tend to endure in regions where they support candidates who win (Acemoglu, Robinson, & Santos, 2013). On the other hand, Farc armed presence significantly correlates with municipalities having much lower electoral

participation and higher number of acts of electoral sabotage (Gallego, 2011). Thus, for example, Uribe obtained majority vote shares on average of 55% in largest urban centers, on average of 78% in paramilitary dominated municipalities in the Caribbean, and lost, with average vote shares lower than 30%, in municipalities of El Caguan region, considered Farc's strongholds, in which electoral participation is, on average, half (25%) of the national average (45%). (MOE, 2007), (MOE, 2010 (MOE, 2011) (López Hernández, 2010ii)

In addition to the difficulty of interpreting preferences through aggregate electoral results, these myriad and conflicting influences and results makes difficult to get certain conclusion about electoral results as proxy for state building as political binding. Yet, regardless of the motivations and means (clearly some legal and some illegal, some violent and some pacific), strengthening state led security was endorsed at the polls in Uribe's Presidential elections, including controversial policies such as the tax levied for security. This preference of the electorate sustained during three consecutive presidential elections. In 2010, Uribe's candidate, his former Minister of Defense, Juan Manuel Santos, campaigning on a platform vowing to continue Uribe's DSP, won the Presidency with a supermajority vote share of 67% in the second round, and a level of electoral participation of 44%.

After decades in which powerful regional political elites, narcos, some state officials and sectors of the Army strongly coalesced in supporting private paramilitary groups, fragmenting rather than monopolizing coercion, (Lopez, 2012) electoral support towards policies and candidates offering strengthening public, state led security is a reasonable strong sign of political binding towards state building.

PC-CCAI's effects at the subnational level

PC-CCAI causal effects at the subnational level can be estimated by comparing stateness' proxys in the 78 municipalities selected for PC-CCAI's intervention to a control group of similar municipalities that did not receive this intervention.

Unfortunately between 1999 and 2002, there is no specific information about municipalities selected for Plan Colombia intervention. The only clear target during this period was the Province of Putumayo (6 municipalities), where 90% of coca eradication by aerial spraying took place. In 2003, Plan Patriota targeted some municipalities in Guaviare, Caqueta and Meta Provinces, which were included since 2004 in PC-CCAI's repertoire, as well as the ones intervened previously in Putumayo. Thus, only since 2004, PC-CCAI has a known (and sufficiently large N) list of 78 municipalities targeted for its intervention.

Consequently, to assess PC-CCAI stateness' effects at the subnational level this paper scale down the unit of analysis to the municipal level (Snyder, 2001) and continues breaking stateness out into its three dimensions, defined as the state constitutive attributes: means of coercion, extraction, commitment and their administration.

This paper uses the Genetic Matching method to calculate the Average Treatment Effect of the PC-CCAI by selecting a control group with similar covariates' distributions and estimating the significance of the covariates' variation among the treated and control groups, before and after the PC-CCAI treatment. Matching select samples of both the treated and control groups that are balance –only randomly different and having the same distribution- on all the observed covariates. Matching methods rely on the assumption that achieving balance in the observed covariates implies also balance in the non-observed (Sekhon & Grieve, 2008) (Sekhon J. S., 2011) (Sekhon & Diamond, 2012).

To do the matching, this paper includes variables selected as proxys for the three dimensions of stateness (coercion, extraction, commitment and their administration) at the subnational level indicated in table 1. For example, means of coercion is tested through municipal rate of state led offensive attacks, rate of illegal armed groups' led offensive attacks, and violence indicators such as the rate of homicides, forced displacement, kidnappings and massacres. The expectation is that PC-CCAI must increase state led attacks and reduce illegal armed groups' attacks; it

must also reduce violence indicators. The per capita number of hectares of coca crops tests both illegal armed presence and alternative sources of taxing accruing to these groups. The expectation is that PC-CCAI must reduce it.

To test if a process of strengthening the state means of extraction is happening also at the subnational level, the matching model includes municipal indicators of fiscal capacity, such as level of local tax collection (on land and economic activity) as percentage of local resources and a municipal indicator of institutional performance. The expectation is that PC-CCAI must improve these indicators. Finally, for territorial and political binding matching tests the level of national cash transfers towards municipalities as percentage of local resources, and the level of electoral participation in local elections for Mayors. The expectation is that PC-CCAI must increase both. Additionally, measures of population density and proxys for municipal poverty indicators, such as the Index of basic necessities-NBI, are included as controls.

Genetic Matching method uses an algorithm that improves the covariate balance of the variables included in the model. This reduces the bias of selection on the observable variables as well as in the selection of the control group. After estimating the algorithm, Genetic Matching uses it to estimate the covariate balance for each of the variables (stateness proxys + controls) included in the model. High p-values and high KS bootstrap p-values during the pretreatment period (2000-2002) indicates that the treated and control groups achieved covariate balance and have not only comparable means, but also similar distributions; these in turn indicates that the two groups are actually pairs or matches, and so comparable. The following table shows the variables included in the matching to find a comparable control group for each PC-CCAI municipality; it also shows that Genetic Matching achieves statistical covariate balance in all the variables, both in their means (p-values) and distributions (KS p-values).

PRE TREATMENT- PROXY VARIABLES FOR STATENESS		2 SPECIFICATIONS CONTROLLING FOR REGION				2 SPECIFICATIONS CONTROLLING FOR TREATMENT DURATION			
		M1. average no regional control		M2. controlling for region		M3. 7 years in treatment		M4. 3 years in treatment	
		T-test p-value	KS p-value	T-test p-value	KS p-value	T-test p-value	KS p-value	T-test p-value	KS p-value
Coercion proxys (armed conflict) (rates per 100.000 inhabitants)									
athomicidios	average rate of homicides 2000-2002	0.2981	0.516	0.44257	0.297	0.33886	0.722	0.49553	0.663
atsecuestro	average rate of kidnappings 2000-2002	0.22942	0.383	0.20532	0.289	0.18656	0.702	0.46012	0.429
ptdesplazados	average rate of forced displacement 2000-2002	0.2771	0.308	0.2099	0.291	0.21886	0.984	0.32199	0.454
alcoca	log average number of coca Ha 2000 - 2002	0.51287	0.417	0.31985	0.52	0.16017	0.843	0.23803	0.702
atfarc	average rate of Farc' attacks (FACR) 2000 - 2002	0.36823	0.914	0.56615	0.824	0.23956	0.805	0.64173	0.847
ataeln	average rate of ELN' attacks (ELN) 2000 - 2002	0.95903	0.681	0.48857	0.669	0.98202	0.938	0.24564	0.636
otparamilitares	average rate of paramilitares' attacks 2000 - 2002	0.45134	0.458	0.57163	0.342	0.23597	0.858	0.22816	0.322
ptestatales	average rate of state led attacks 2000 - 2002	0.40098	0.68	0.36403	0.712	0.44027	0.787	0.33594	0.794
amasacres	average rate of masacres 2000-2002	0.26105	0.416	0.90548	0.695	0.2321	0.506	0.65822	0.316
Coercion proxys (judicial protection)									
juzgados.pcmh	Number of Local Tribunals per 1.000 inhabitants 2003	0.27743	0.875	0.32693	0.886	0.66355	0.703	0.20572	0.895
Extraction proxys (subnational fiscal capacity)									
Txpredial	average \$ Land Tax collection 200-2002	0.51036	0.965	0.63958	0.761	0.27051	0.23	0.23369	0.68
Txindycm	average \$ Economic Activity Tax collection 200-2002	0.65046	0.642	0.48144	0.889	0.23324	0.976	0.17112	0.275
SSGP	average \$ Transferred by central government 2000-2002	0.4717	0.291	0.27912	0.531	0.71286	0.973	0.79496	0.887
Extraction proxys (subnational administrative capacity)									
pidemun	indicator of municipal institutional efficiency 2000 - 2002	0.3196	0.778	0.42393	0.292	0.47799	0.23	0.88618	0.143
coberturaegsubs	average % population affiliated to subsidized health 2000-2002	0.75668	0.498	0.82385	0.638	0.71387	0.886	0.71214	0.881
Political Resp. Proxys (electoral indicators)									
part. Alc. 2000	average % electoral participation in 2000 Mayor's election	0.49673	0.387	0.32822	0.472	0.71208	0.972	0.63236	0.275
part. Senado 2002	average % electoral participation in 2002 Senators' election	0.31201	0.652	0.20736	0.272	0.8937	0.99983	0.17431	0.671
part. Camara 2002	average % electoral participation in 2002 House of Reprs' election	0.91774	0.381	0.65553	0.892	0.82625	0.716	0.76942	0.277
Socioeconomic controls									
pop density	average population density 2000-2002	0.53531	0.506	0.78028	0.898	0.94361	0.977	0.75427	0.7
nbi cabecera 2005	poverty indicator at municipal center NBI 2005	0.60044	0.523	0.29295	0.511	0.84188	0.977	0.81122	0.869
nbi resto 2005	poverty indicator at municipal rural area NBI 2005	0.4455	0.65	0.31777	0.309	0.17497	0.348	0.62765	0.67
ccalregions	13 regions			0.25983	0.616	0.57936	0.541	0.28041	0.699

Finally, the Genetic matching model estimates mean differences between the treated and control groups for each of the variables and test how statistically significant these differences are after the treatment, in the year 2011. The standard for a significant difference is set at 0.1 in this research. Thus, p.values equal or under 0.1 during the post treatment period (2011) indicates significant differences between the treated and control groups' means, and so the average treatment effect of PC-CCAI.

PC-CCAI's institutional repertoire is relatively homogeneous and it is applied consistently in the 78 municipalities selected for its intervention, but there are two factors that may cause variation in effects. First not all 78 municipalities entered into the Program at the same time. The Program started intervening 39 municipalities the first year, and ended up intervening 78 the last one. Thus, the number of years (of treatment) into the Program may have differential effects. Second, CCAI groups municipalities into regional clusters for its intervention; there are in total 13 regional clusters, each with a coordinating team. There could be some regional or team's specific factors that may have differential effects. To control for these eventual differential factors, a total of four matching models were run.

Accumulated number of Municipalities intervened by CCAI by year						
2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
39	45	53	61	78	78	78

Model 1 estimates PC-CCAI's average treatment effect for the 78 municipalities based on the average number of years into the treatment (5.6 years); Model 2 includes a variable distinguishing each of the 13th regions in Model 1 to control for regional effects; Model 3 estimates PC-CCAI's average treatment effect for the 39 municipalities that have been the largest number of years into the treatment (7 years); finally, model 4 estimates PC-CCAI's average treatment effect for 17 municipalities that have been the lowest number of years into the treatment (3 years). Model 1 is taken as the average based model for PC-CCAI's effects on stateness at the subnational level. Model 2 to 4 explore heterogeneous treatment effects, controlling for region and length into the treatment. The following table shows the results for the four models.

GENETIC MATCHING MODEL: VARIABLES AND RESULTS

Database: Municipal disaggregated data for 1123 municipalities 2000 - 2011
 Treatment: Plan Colombia-CCAI's repertoire
 # of municipalities treated:78
 pre treatment period: 2000-2002
 period of treatment: 2003, 2004 - 2010
 Post treatment year: 2011

POST TREATMENT outcome variables	AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT Significant or Non significant	2 SPECIFICATIONS CONTROLLING FOR REGION				2 SPECIFICATIONS CONTROLLING FOR TREATMENT DURATION			
		M1. average no regional control		M2. controlling for region		M3. 7 years in treatment		M4. 3 years in treatment	
		T-test p-value	KS p-value	T-test p-value	KS p-value	T-test p-value	KS p-value	T-test p-value	KS p-value
		Estimate	P-value	Estimate	P-value	Estimate	P-value	Estimate	P-value
homicidios 2011	Significant	0.57428	0.00835	0.39714	0.024463	0.084532	0.073602	0.44022	0.13773
tsecuestro 2011	Significant	0.22968	0.031588	0.2217	0.037322	0.23514	0.17257	0.2731	0.1521
tdesplazados2011	NS	0.16896	0.48561	0.00043594	0.99835	0.033167	0.8964	0.55751	0.1548
lcoca2011	NS	0.18471	0.51213	0.041492	0.87194	0.46927	0.3044	0.10416	0.83063
tfarc2011	Significant	0.64325	0.0017609	0.56308	0.0031817	0.78995	0.00040567	0.43791	0.20045
tparamilitares2011	NS	0.081959	0.50176	0.09133	0.44945	0.084372	0.4475	0.1209	0.57438
testatales2011	Significant	0.51475	0.0044968	0.46722	0.011082	0.55558	0.011137	0.79146	0.0029736
tmasacres2011	NS	0.050457	0.24686	0.050457	0.22898	-0.016707	0.6869	0.019717	0.81963
indemun2011	NS	-0.84718	0.39241	-0.46256	0.57848	-1.7274	0.072945	-0.52308	0.7089
cob.regsubs 2011	NS	2.9496	0.12183	4.6704	0.02084	2.3974	0.12148	0.12592	0.95467
part.alc2011	Significant	-2.7848	0.02094	-2.786	0.010042	-1.3397	0.28304	-1.7015	0.3912
Tx predial 2011	NS	9979385	0.20864	-35566533	0.49568	-1160011	0.88193	1541272	0.43844
Tx indycom 2011	NS	6379081	0.89075	-8319173	0.88617	3527914	0.78769	79666689	0.37216
SSGP 2011	NS	-146069422	0.80369	-1035494548	0.058276	-1582879015	0.017769	1238174084	0.16102
popdensity 2011	NS	0.07202	0.61401	0.030321	0.81989	0.024398	0.79399	-0.0064038	0.95309
NBI 2010	NS	1.3113	0.48557	1.8377	0.32851	4.8008	0.033496	3.5158	0.31784

Based on Model 1, PC-CCAI's repertoire has significant effects in the 78 treated municipalities in 5 out of the 16 variables measured in the post treatment period. On average, PC-CCAI treatment significantly increases the rate of homicides, the rate of state offensive attacks, the rate of Farc's unilateral attacks and the rate of kidnappings. PC-CCAI, on average, decreases the level of local electoral participation

in the treated municipalities.

According to Model 1, at the subnational level, PC-CCAI's repertoire causes partial significant effects on only two out of the three dimensions of stateness (coercion and political&territorial binding), but, in general, in directions different to the anticipated. As expected, PC-CCAI treatment increased the rate of state led offensive attacks, but, different from the expected, PC-CCAI also increased the rate of Farc lead attacks, and the rate of homicides and kidnappings. To some extent, the increase in the Farc's rate of attacks could be taken as an expected result if it is interpreted as the consequence of a central government's initiative to attack and eliminate an armed competitor in their regional strongholds, to approach the monopoly of coercion. The competitor, in this case the Farc, is capable of opposing resistance by increasing their number of attacks. Maybe it is a matter of time to see how prevails upon whom, taken into consideration that PC at the most has 12 years of operation (if counted since 1999), and PC-CCAI 7 years.

The increase in the rate of homicides and kidnappings could also be interpreted in the same logic, however, these results could be more problematic for both the coercion and commitment dimensions of stateness; they could be interpreted not only as the incapacity of the state to protect civilians' lives in PC-CCAI's regions, but actually as a cause increasing the risk of being either killed or kidnapped.

On the other hand, contrary to the expected, the level of local electoral participation actually reduced in the municipalities intervened by PC-CCAI, compare to the control group. Based on other studies (García, 2011) (MOE, 2007, 2010) (Gallego, 2011) it was expected that local electoral participation in PC-CCAI regions must be lower due to the influence of large cultivations of coca and Farc.

Recent studies (García, 2011) show that cocaine production and eradication strategies produces multiple collateral damage for state building in terms of political binding. In coca infested municipalities where aerial eradication is intensified trust for the Police –clearly identified as the institution leading the eradication effort-

declines twice as much, 10%, as places where manual eradication is implemented, where for Police declines 5%. In coca infested municipalities electoral participation and trust in the local government drops by 10% on average, and trust in paramilitary groups grow between 10% to 16%, depending on gender and partisan identification: men aligned with the Liberal or Conservative parties trust more the paramilitaries than other partisan or independent voters and women (García, 2011). Thus, the higher the level of coca production in a municipality the higher the influence of illegal armed groups in regulating the social order and political preferences of the population, in particular when illegal groups and traditional bipartisan elites coalesce (García, 2011). These political counterproductive effects not only occurred in Colombia; militarized and aerial spraying campaigns of coca eradication have also had similar collateral political effects in other countries, such as Afganistan and Burma (Felbab-Brown, 2010)

However, the expectation was that PC-CCAI could moderate such influences. On the contrary, PC-CCAI further reduced electoral participation. PC-CCAI has no significant effects in coca cultivation, measured by number of Ha, so it is unlikely that electoral participation decreases due to higher concentration of coca cultivation as Garcia and Felbab-Brown studies suggest (García, 2011) (Felbab-Brown, 2010). Another likely alternative explanation is that Farc is exercising additional pressure upon voters and authorities in PC-CCAI municipalities, as part of their offensive attacks. This could be a temporal phenomenon and so no problematic for long lasting responsive political integration, or it could be a long lasting additional effect of PC-CCAI. If electoral participation keeps reducing or being much lower than the national average, then PC-CCAI's intervened municipalities could have pervasive effects for subnational, responsive political and territorial binding.

On the other hand, PC-CCAI has no effect on the proxys of taxation at the local level; neither tax on land nor tax on economic activity changed significantly in the municipalities intervened by PC-CCAI. Actually PC-CCAI did not include within its

institutional repertoire any concrete action to affect local taxation. DSP-PC-CCAI work under the assumption that after improving security, other dimensions of state institutional performance will improve somehow consequentially; this has not been the case in local taxation, yet.

Based on Model 1, PC-CCAI relates to very different effects on the aggregate national level than at the subnational level. On average, at the national level during PC-CCAI operation the rate of homicides and kidnappings have sharply decreased; while Farc's unilateral attacks decreased on average at the national level, they have increased on PC-CCAI regions. State led attacks increased both at the national level and in PC-CCAI regions. Taxation has improved at the national level and such capacity is being translated into state led security deployment across some territories, including PC-CCAI regions, but nothing comparable is happening within these regions. Although, means of coercion are supposed to be centralized and so it is expected that the big effort is national, its sustainability, in particular for Policing in the decentralized context of Colombia, depends also on local government capacity to provide and extend such service not only on central government willingness or resources. Indeed, one of the struggles of PC-CCAI officers and regional teams is to try to compromise local mayors to match CCAI investments with local public expenditures to make their work sustainable. If no work is done on the extraction dimension of stateness in PC-CCAI regions and more broadly at the subnational level, such sustainability is dubious.

Miguel Garcia's studies show that in Colombia's coca infested municipalities when government, either local, national or both, invest in public goods provision trust in local government increases on average by 10% and when the prospects of economic growth look positive trust in government could increase up to 25% (García, 2011). Considering the political 'collateral damage' that coca eradication programs have, it looks important to take into account the 'collateral benefit' that public goods provision has in these municipalities.

Thus, investing in state capturing of cocaine rents –which as this paper and other studies prove is not the same thing as investing in coca crops eradication- looks critical for state building as means of coercion and extraction, and investing in subnational public goods and development seems critical for state building as political binding. Yet, PC's budget has gone 8.4 out of 10 to coca aerial spraying, the US-Colombian preferred antinarcotic 'state building' strategy, and to anti-Farc operations, the preferred US-Colombian antiterrorist 'state building' strategy.

When controlling for region, in Model 2, all the aforementioned PC-CCAI's effects in Model 1 hold in the same direction, but additionally central government cash transfers towards PC-CCAI municipalities decreased on average compared to the control group. This effect seems rare since central cash transfers are relatively rigorous, legal prescriptions. It means that municipalities in the control group are receiving, on average, higher cash transfers from the central government than municipalities on PC-CCAI regions. Cash transfer formulas are based mainly on population proportions and marginally on fiscal and administrative performance, but since the matching model obtained statistical covariate balance in all 16 variables, including population density, fiscal and administrative performance, the control and treatment groups are comparable in all of them.

Model 3 and 4 control for the number of years receiving the treatment; Model 4 indicates that when a municipality has been only 3 years into the PC-CCAI treatment –the shortest period- only state lead attacks are significantly different in the treated than in the control groups; no other variable has significant differences. On the contrary, when a municipality has been 7 years into PC-CCAI treatment –the largest period- state led attacks, Farc's attacks and the homicide rate increased, as in Model 1 and 2, but the effect on kidnappings disappeared; central cash transfers toward PC-CCAI municipalities are lower than in the control group, as in Model 2; and two new and additional effects appeared: the municipal institutional performance indicator worsen and the Indicator of unsatisfied basic needs-NBI also worsen. NBI is a national indicator of poverty based on a minimum threshold of public goods

access, quality and consumption for a given family. The indicator assess if a family is economically dependent or not, if it inhabits a house of qualified materials, with access to public utilities, such as water, sewage and energy; and if children in schooling age are attending school. If these basic needs are met, NBI index is low, if not it is high; the higher the NBI the worse the poverty situation of families. The institutional performance indicator (Indemun by its Spanish acronym) assess municipalities' social and financial performance according to NBI components, illiteracy rates, schooling rates, fiscal dependency of central cash transfers, per capita local tax collection and per capita public investments (DNP , 2013)

On average, when treated municipalities has been the largest period under PC-CCAI treatment, their municipal institutional performance and their poverty NBI indicators worsen; the former is significantly lower than in municipalities in the control group, and the later is higher.

Model 3 reinforces the conclusion that PC-CCAI related effects at the national level differ substantially from PC-CCAI's effects in the intervened regions. According to Colombia's National Planning Department-DNP, poverty based both on income and public good measures, such as the NBI indicator, has been decreasing during the last decade, on average, at the national level; yet, in largely treated PC-CCAI municipalities, poverty by NBI has worsen. At the national level, institutional performance of governmental agencies involved in PC-CCAI planning and execution has improved, as the data and analysis given about tax collection, coercion deployment and administrative coordination testify. At the municipal level, however, local fiscal collection does not change in treated versus control municipalities, and instead fiscal and social performance is worse in treated versus control municipalities.

Some conclusions.

Vast differences in stateness across Colombia's territory were not caused by PC-CCAI; they have existed since independence and have deep rooted causes. PC-CCAI is having positive signs of state building at the central, national level that does not correlate with its effects at the subnational level. At best, PC-CCAI is not closing the stateness gap between the national and subnational level; at worst it could be deepening it. What could be the implications of this finding for Colombia in particular and for state building in general?

Unevenness of stateness is not simply a Colombian particularity; it is a global phenomena that deserve our intellectual attention beyond the ups and downs of great powers threats or current humans tragedies. If political science has any hope in understanding variation of stateness, and so state building processes, it must consider to take the subnational level vis a vis the national as the appropriate unit of analysis; not as a strategy to increase the N, but as a must to understand the Ns.

It should also take on the methodological challenge that the great Tilly left us: “[to] bridge the chasm between structural and process approaches without falling into the “old structuralism” (Tarrow, 2012, p. 25) and take O’Donnell’s legacy and his warnings about the “illusions of consolidation” seriously and further, beyond imagining blue, green and brown areas.

This paper proposes and applies a framework to advance towards these directions. It argues that to study contemporary state building one should focus on the state three constitutive attributes –coercion, extraction and commitment-, break them out to analyze each separately, and scale them down to the subnational level to analyze their variation across time and space. It argues that state building should be studied by constitutive attributes not by messy adjectives. It argues that within contemporary scope conditions, contentious politics (from the supra to the subnational level) is the independent variable that explains state building strategies.

And it finds heterogeneous state building effects between the national and subnational levels in a particular case.

During DSP-PC-CCAI execution or aftermath Colombian state at the national level improved its tax collection, military capacity, one competitor – the AUC- was partially disbanded- and another –FARC- agreed to start peace negotiations with the government in 2011. These are all signs of state building effects in all three measures of stateness at the central, national level. This indicates that the building process is advancing towards the institutional monopoly and enforcement of the means of coercion and taxation; rather than its fragmentation. However, at the subnational level, this reallocation is not as institutionalized as at the national level, and the direction of the effects vary strongly with regard to the national.

Is this a Colombian particularity? I do not think so. Within the scope conditions of contemporary state building such heterogeneity is the norm rather than the exception. And it is precisely one of the reasons why political science should retake predominance in theorizing and analyzing such heterogeneity beyond the failed indexes and interested recipes.

It is said that studying politics is about studying who gets what and how. Actually studying contemporary state building is about understanding who gets what, from whom, how and where. There is no reason to exclude any of these basic questions.

Bibliography

Tilly, C. (1992). *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992*. Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell.

- Goertz, G. (2006). *Social Science Concepts. A user's guide*. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
- Gerth, H. H., & Wright, M. (Eds.). (2009). *From Max Weber Essays in Sociology*. New York, NY, USA: Routledge.
- Spruyt, H. (1994). *The Sovereign State and its Competitors*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Boone, C. (2003). *Political Topographies of the African State: Rural Authority and Institutional Choice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boone, C. (2012). Política Territorial y el Alcance del Estado: Irregularidad por Diseño. *Revista de Ciencia Política (Santiago)*, 32 (3), 623-641.
- Gibson, E. (2012). Boundary Control: Federalism and Subnational Authoritarianism in Democratic Countries. *Forthcoming*. Cambridge University Press.
- Lopez, C. (2012, May 26). Conflic and State Building in Colombia, 1980-2000. *Manuscript*. Evanston, IL, USA.
- Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2006). *Informal Institutions and Democracy. Lessons from Latin America*. Baltimore, MD, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Poggi, G. (1978). *The Development of the Modern State. A Sociological Introduction*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Centeno, M. A. (2002). *Bood and Debt. War and the Nation State in Latin America*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- López-Alves, F. (2000). *State Formation and Democracy in Latin America 1810-1900*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Kurtz, M. J. (2013). *Latin American State Building in Comparative Perspective. Social Foundations of Institutional Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sekhon, J. S. (2011). Multiariate and Propensity Score Matching. Software with Automated balance Optimization. The Matching Package for R. *Journal of Statistical Software*, 42 (7), 1-52.
- Sekhon, J. S., & Grieve, R. (2008). *A new non-parametric matching method for bias adjustment with applications to economic evaluations*. UC Berkeley.
- Sekhon, J. S., & Diamond, A. (2012). *Review of Economics and Statistics*.

Tilly, C. (2010). *Regimes and Repertoires*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
McAdam, D., Tilly, C., & Tarrow, S. (2001). *Dynamics of Contention*. Port Chester: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, C., & Tarrow, S. (2007). *Contentious Politics*. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
Tarrow, S. (2012). *Strangers at the Gates. Movements and States in Contentious Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, C. (2008a). *Contentious Performances*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, C. (2008b). *Explaining Social Processes*. Boulder: Parading Publishers .

Hewitt, J., Gurr, R., & Wilkenfeld, J. (2012). *Peace and Conflict 2012. Executive Summary*. University of Maryland, Center for International Development and Conflict Management . College Park: University of Mariland.

Philpott, D. (1995). Sovereignty: an introduction and brief history. *Journal of International Affaires* , 353-368.

Clark, I. (1988). Making sense of sovereignty. The basis of international society by Alan James. Sovereignty by F.H. Hisnley. A review by Ian Clark . *Review of International Studies* , 14 (4), 303-307.

Knight, D. B. (1992). Statehood: A Politico-geographic and Legal Perspective. *GeoJournal* , 28 (3), 311-318.

Jackson, R. H. (1987). Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World. *International Organizations* , 41 (4), 519-549.

Ashley, R., & Walker, R. (1990). Conslusion: Reading Dissidence/Writting the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies. *INternational Studies Quaterly* , 34 (3), 367-416.

Aalberts, T. E. (2004). The Sovereingty Game States Play: (Quasi)States in the International Order. *International Journal for the semiotics of Law* , 17, 245-257.

Altman, D., & Luna, J. (2012). Introducción: El Estado Latinoamericano en su Laberinto. *Revista de Ciencia Política* , 32 (3), 521-543.

O'Donnell, G. (1999). On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Post Communist Countries. In G. O'Donnell, *Counterpoints. Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Democratization* (pp. 133-157). Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press .

Mann, M. (2012). *The Sources of Social Power. The rise of classes and nation-states*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Moore, Jr., B. (1993). *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Kalyvas, S. (2006). *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, C. (2005). *Trust and Rule*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kalyvas, S., Shapiro, I., Masoud, T., & Eds. (2008). *Order, Conflict and Violence*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mahoney, J., & Thelen, K. E. (2010). *Explaining Institutional Change*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Brady, H., Collier, D., & Eds. (2010). *Rethinking Social Inquiry. Diverse Tools, Shared standards*. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. .

Migdal, J. S. (2001). *State in Society. Studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Dahl, R. (1961). *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in American City*. New Haven , CT, USA: Yale University Press.

Mahoney, J. (2010). *The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences*. Evanston: Manuscript.

Snyder, R. (2001). Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method. *Studies in Comparative International Development* , 36 (1), 93-110.

Mahoney, J. (2010). After KKV: The NEW Methodology of Qualitative Research. *World Politics* , 62 (1), 120-147.

Rubin , D., & Stuart, E. (2007). Matching Methods for causal inference: Designing Observational Studies. In J. (. Osborne, *Best Practices in Quantitative Methods* . Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage Publishing .

García Villegas, M., García Sánchez, M., Rodríguez Raga, J., Revelo Rebolledo, J., & Espinosa Restrepo, J. (2011). *Los Estados del País. Instituciones municipales y realidades locales*. Bogotá: Dejusticia.

DNP. (2007). *Política de Consolidación de la Seguridad Democrática* . Departamento Nacional de Planeación de Colombia . Bogotá: DNP.

Migdal, J. S. (1988). *Strong Societies and Weak States*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Levy, M. (1988). *Of Rule and Revenue*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Congressional Research Service. (2005, February 17). Plan Colombia: A Progress Report. Washington, US.

DNP . (2006). *Balance Plan Colombia 1999 - 2005*. Bogota: Departametro Nacional de Planeacion.

Mejia, D. (2012). The War on Drugs under Plan Colombia. In E. Zedillo, H. Wheeler, & (eds), *Rethinking the "War on Drugs" through the US-Mexico Prism* (pp. 19-31). New Haven: Yale Center for the Study of Globalization.

DFID Department for International Development. (2008). *States in Development: Understanding State Building* . UK DFID Department for International Development, Governance and Social Development Group. Poicy and Research Division . DFID.

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development . (2008).
<http://www.oecd.org>. Retrieved May 22, 2013, from <http://www.oecd.org>:
<http://www.oecd.org/development/incaf/41100930.pdf>

RAND Corporation. (2007). *The Beginners' Guide to Nation-Building*. Retrieved May 22, 2013, from <http://www.rand.org>:
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG557.pdf

Fukuyama, F. (2004). *State Building: Governance and the World Order in the 21st century* . Ithaca : Cornell University Press.

Giha Tobar, J., Riveros Reyes, H., & Soto Velasco, A. (1999, December). El Gasto Militar en Colombia: aspectos macroecnómicos y microeconómicos. *Revista de la Cepal* (69), pp. 163-180.

Gaviria, A., & Mejía, D. (2011). *Políticas Antidroga en Colombia: Exitos, fracasos y extravíos* . Bogota: Universidad de los Andes.

Chris, P., & Al, W. (1994). Illegal Markets and the Social Costs of Rent Seeking . *Public Choice* (79), 105-115.

Dermot, O. (2009). The political economy of Colombia's cocaine industry. *Papel Político* , 14 (1), 81-106.

García, M. (2011). Cultivos Ilícitos, Participación Política y Confianza Institucional. In G. Alejandro, & M. Daniel, *Políticas antidroga en Colombia: Existos, Fracasos y Extravíos* (pp. 357-386). Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes.

Tokatlian, J. G. (2004, December). El momento preconsular, Latinoamerica después de la reelección de Bush. *Colombia Internacional* (60), pp. 178-185.

Ramírez, M. C. (2001). *Entre el Estado y la Guerrilla: identidad y ciudadanía en el movimiento de los campesinos cocaleros en el Putumayo*. Colciencias . Bogotá: ICANH

Avila Martínez, A. F. (2010). Injerencia Política de los Grupos Armados Ilegales . In C. L. ed, *Y Refundaron la Patria...De cómo mafiosos y políticos reconfiguraron el Estado Colombiano* (pp. 79-213). Bogotá: Random House Mondadori S.A.

López Hernández, C. (Ed.). (2010ii). *Y Refundaron la Patria. De cómo mafiosos y políticos reconfiguraron el Estado en Colombia*. Bogotá, DC, Colombia: Random House Mondadori.

CIDH, Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. (1999). *Tercer Informe sobre la Situación de Derechos Humanos en Colombia*. CIDH-Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Bogotá: Comisión Colombiana de Juristas.

DNP. (2008). *Programa Familias en Acción, Impactos en capital humano y Evaluación beneficio - costo del Programa*. DNP - Departamento Nacional de Planeación. Bogotá: DNP.

Federal Research Division . (2010). *Colombia, a country study* . (R. A. Hudson, Ed.) Washington: Library of Congress.

Ministry of National Defense. (2009). *Gasto en Defensa y Seguridad 1998 - 2011*. Ministerio de Defensa de Colombia. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional de Colombia.
Ministry of Treasury, DIAN. (2013). *DIAN*. Retrieved May 25, 2013, from http://www.dian.gov.co/dian/14cifrasgestion.nsf/pages/Recaudo_tributos_dian?OpenDocument

Felbab-Brown, V. (2010). *Shooting up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution.

Rodríguez-Franco, D. (2012). Internal wars, taxation and state building. Evanston.

Slater, D. (2010). *Ordering Power. Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathan in Southeast Asia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

United States Government Accountability Office . (2008). *Plan Colombia* . Washington : GAO.

Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J., & Santos, R. (2013). The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia . *Journal of the European Economic Association* , 11 (s1), 5-44.

DNP . (2013). *www.dnp.gov.co*. (Colombia's National Department of Planning)
Retrieved May 25, 2013, from DNP web site:
<https://www.dnp.gov.co/Programas/DesarrolloTerritorial/EvaluaciónySeguimientodelaDescentralización/DocumentosdeEvaluación.aspx>