

## **Bad ends, good ends, and everything in between: Secretarial duration and exit in the United States cabinet, 1929-2013**

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### *Abstract:*

Cabinet secretaries lead executive branch departments. As public administrators they manage employees, set policy, and oversee services. Yet unlike managers who serve in relative anonymity, cabinet secretaries are executives who are very much in the public eye. Their successes or failures have consequences for the president and can help define how successful or unsuccessful the president appears. Cabinet secretaries have had widely varying tenures and exit strategies. What distinguishes those who leave early – either voluntarily or in disgrace – from those who switch to a different post and from those who remain for the entire term? We examine all United States cabinet secretaries from 1929 to 2013 (Presidents Hoover through Obama). We systematically examine the effect of background (e.g. gender, race, ethnicity, age), prior office-holding experiences, issue network affiliations, and expertise as well as system level conditions such as inflation and presidential popularity to explain why secretaries leave office. Our long time series allows us to assess whether the many changes to the modern presidency have affected the tenure and the exit strategies of cabinet secretaries.

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## **Bad ends, good ends, and everything in between: Secretarial duration and exit in the United States cabinet, 1929-2013**

Studies of U.S. presidents' cabinets have tended to focus on who is appointed, and there are several compelling reasons why. The president, through his appointments, is deciding what kind(s) of leadership to showcase for his government (e.g., connections to issue networks, to congress). As Wyszomirski (1989: 45) writes, "...cabinet appointments are publicly and politically regarded as the most important action of a new president." Appointments are often contested. Most top-level executive branch appointments, including cabinet secretaries, must be approved by the Senate, and it is not uncommon for designees to be rejected or withdraw their nomination to avoid receiving a negative vote. The U.S. president's choice of cabinet secretaries is thus not purely a matter of executive branch decision-making, but must also take into consideration whether a nominee will be viewed as acceptable by the relevant Senate standing committee and by a majority of all Senators. This strategic appointment game with the Senate, combined with policy interests that secretaries themselves may bring into office, plus the possibility of secretary capture by their agency create challenges for selecting secretaries who will be true to the president's policy agenda (Andeweg 2000: 390-1; Edwards 2001). Another reason for the focus on who is appointed is the growing pressure over time regarding diversity. Though still small, the number of women and the number of secretaries of color has gradually increased as presidents have responded to pressure that a cabinet composed entirely of white males is not reflective of the population. Increased descriptive diversity in the cabinet as a whole has prompted questions about whether there is genuine integration occurring in the cabinet, or if diversity appointees are likely to be placed in posts that do not fit with their qualifications or where they are expected to buffer the

president from a sector of society that is not of great interest to the administration (Borrelli 2002, 2010, Martin 1989).

Who is appointed to these top posts in the executive branch is a very important topic for research. However, it is not the only important question regarding cabinet secretaries. This paper looks beyond who is appointed, and examines how or why cabinet secretaries *leave* their post. This is a crucial question for representation of interests. It can have consequences for the cabinet, the entire presidential administration, and possibly even for the institution of the presidency. Is the exit of a secretary a loss for the president (i.e., lost political capital), or is an exit an opportunity to bring in new political resources?

US presidents' cabinets in general are characterized by stability (see Figure 1). Yet some secretaries are moved to other posts, some choose to leave the cabinet before the end of the administration, and others resign due to a crisis or are pressured to leave or even fired. This *instability* creates opportunities for the president to appoint new secretaries (albeit again constrained by the requirement of Senate approval) who may bring different types of skills or political capital to the government. For example, initial appointees are often viewed as building linkages to key constituencies or paying campaign debts, while replacement appointments are viewed as helping the president to implement his policy agenda so administrative skill may become more valued (Borrelli 2002: 42; Cohen 1988: 113-6; Mann and Smith 1981; Nicholls 1991; Wyszomirski 1989: 47). But instability in the cabinet, particularly more than what is considered to be normal turnover, can call into question the president's ability as a manager and leader. If the president appoints people who become embroiled in conflicts with Congress or with the

president, who are hounded by the press, or who become mired in a scandal, it can tarnish the president as well as the trouble-causing secretary. If secretaries leave the cabinet (to retire, work in the private sector, to run for office or manage a campaign) it can lead to questions about why highly qualified people are leaving the administration – are they jumping ship? Through press releases at the time of these voluntary exits typically praise the secretary for a job well done, the apparently voluntary exit can still raise questions of “is something wrong?” Too many such questions may cause the media, the public, or the opposition party to question the capability of the president. In sum, the exits of cabinet secretaries are important political events, so in this paper we examine how and why secretaries leave the cabinet.

< Insert Figure 1 about here >

### **Secretary traits and links to how they exit: Literature and hypotheses**

Cabinet secretaries are described as bringing different types of resources that bring political capital to the president: “policy expertise, administrative competence, political operations skill, and political interest group support” (Wyszomirski 1989: 58; also see Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008). The president may have some of these resources on his own; for example LBJ entered the White House with extensive experience in Congress and felt that he already knew how to manage executive-legislative relations. Presidents may also have different “staffing strategies”, such as preferring an intellectual approach rather than a political approach to pursuing their policy agenda (Wyszomirski 1989: 56). Yet cabinet secretaries can be categorized based on the type(s) of skills they bring to the

administration. Here we use that literature as the basis for developing hypotheses about what aspects of secretary backgrounds may be associated with different types of exits.

One of the components of decision-making about cabinet nominees is the need to build bridges to key constituencies of the administration. Who the key constituencies are will vary from one administration to another, and likely across parties, but presidents need support for their agenda, and high profile appointments are one way to build those linkages. As Wyszomirski (1989: 64) explains, “political support capital” can come “through the appointment of interest group representatives.” Yet secretaries with strong links to department clients may be the most likely to engage in policy clashes with the president if they are more interested in pursuing client goals than the president’s goals (Andeweg 2000; Edwards 2001; Bäck et al. 2012: 4). In addition, as time passes – and presidents face the inescapable need to produce results before the next election or the end of the second term – administrative capacity may become more important than bridge building. Therefore we expect:

H1A: Secretaries with links to agency clienteles will be likely to leave the cabinet voluntarily as the administration’s needs change over time.

H1B: Secretaries with links to agency clienteles will be likely to meet a bad end if the policy preferences of the group to which they have links conflict with the president’s agenda.

Yet a competing hypothesis is that strong client links may raise the cost to the president of forcing out a secretary, and thus:

H1C: Secretaries with links to agency clienteles will be likely to survive in their post until the end of the administration.

Many US cabinet secretaries come from the private sector. One of the challenges US presidents face is getting people to leave lucrative private sector jobs to join their government, which is discussed as posing a particular challenge for Republican

presidents (Wyszomirski 1989: 52). In addition, service in the cabinet often creates opportunities to enter the private sector in high pay, high prestige, high profile jobs (Wyszomirski 1989: 52). In parliamentary systems cabinet ministers are typically career politicians for whom appointment to the cabinet is the apex of their career, and thus they are expected to want to stay in post as long as possible, with the exception in generalist systems such as Britain where they hope to move to more prestigious cabinet posts (Berlinski et al. 2007: 245). By contrast, many US cabinet secretaries are not career politicians, or career bureaucrats. They often come from the private sector and have attractive opportunities outside of government. Some secretaries may even have made a deal with the president that they will serve for X amount of time and then depart.

Consequently we expect:

H2: Secretaries with business links will be more likely to exit voluntarily than to either stay in post until the end of the administration or to switch posts.

Also unlike parliamentary systems, politicians who enter the US president's cabinet have to resign their seat in Congress (and also state government leadership). With the seniority norm of the U.S. Congress, that can represent a major career sacrifice. But the flip side of that sacrifice for the potential secretary is that he or she can bring extensive political capital or know how with them into the cabinet. Political skills in the US arena are expected to come from serving in Congress, as a state governor or mayor of a large city, director of a large government agency that must frequently deal with Congress, and also from holding top party posts (Wyszomirski 1989: 59 and 61; Edwards 2001: 84-5). While career politicians can have a policy area for which they have well known expertise (e.g., U.S. Representatives Melvin Laird and Rogers C.B. Morton

becoming Secretary of Defense and of the Interior, respectively) their political acumen could make them valuable in various posts. For this combination of reasons we expect:

H3A: Secretaries with government sector careers will be likely to switch posts.

In addition, we also expect the political skills of party leaders to be transferable:

H3B: Secretaries who have been party leaders will be likely to switch posts.

Cabinet secretaries in the United States are generally expected to be highly qualified. These appointments are viewed as too important to be made simply to pay back political favors, and the pool is broad enough that qualified candidates can be selected (Burstein 1977; Dogan 1989: 5; Edwards 2001; Mann and Smith 1981). However, “qualifications” can have many dimensions, e.g., political, group links, technical policy expertise, and as the above hypotheses indicate, different types of qualifications may have different implications for how and why secretaries exit the cabinet. Technical policy expertise may not be a requirement because career agency officials can provide technical background. Still, many secretaries, while they are political appointees, do also have extensive education and/or work background that gives them technical qualifications for their post. We anticipate that technical expertise is likely to be post-specific. Thus:

H4: Secretaries with a high level of policy expertise will be unlikely to switch posts.

In addition to the background of the secretaries, we also explore how conditions faced by the president and his entire administration are related to cabinet secretary turnover. Presidents regularly receive information about their popularity with the public. Changes in the president’s public approval receive much attention in the press and can influence the likelihood of cooperation by Congress. Information about the state of the

economy is also regularly transmitted to the public (e.g., statistics about inflation, unemployment, the balance of payments, information about the size of the government's debt and the performance of the stock market). These data too receive much attention in the media. Especially when one or both types of data indicate trouble the president may want or need to respond to try to manage the problem and show that he is taking action. One way the president can respond is by shuffling his cabinet. If the news is particularly bad it may even be necessary for some member of the cabinet to take responsibility and resign. Accordingly we hypothesize:

H5A: More cabinet secretaries will leave in disgrace (bad end) when presidential approval scores decrease or economic data is negative.

H5B: More cabinet secretaries will survive in post when presidential approval scores or economic data are positive.

We expect all the above hypotheses to apply equally to all cabinet secretaries, regardless of sex, race/ethnicity, or party of the president, and whether the secretary holds an “inner” or “outer” cabinet post (Weisberg 1987).<sup>1</sup> However, these are empirical questions that we wish to investigate. We also begin with a null hypothesis that the dynamics of secretary tenure and why/how secretaries exit are constant over time. Yet this may be a naive hypothesis since US politics has changed in several ways over the time period of the “modern presidency”. While US scholars debate the beginning of the “modern presidency”, the broadest definition goes back to Herbert Hoover (Republican 1929-33). If we go back that far one obvious change over time in US politics is the role of the media in politics, including the types of media in existence, the speed of news transmission, and whether the media observes a norm of treating the president with

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<sup>1</sup> In the U.S. the “inner cabinet” is commonly agreed to be the department's of State, Defense, Treasury, and the Attorney General.



deference (see, for example: Weko 1995: 154-6).<sup>2</sup> Another change is the type of people appointed to the cabinet, both in terms of increasing gender and racial/ethnic diversity, and in the types of political capital presidents seem to want to bring to their cabinets (Wyszomirski 1989). In addition, the long period of Democratic Party dominance of Congress that began with FDR's formation of his New Deal coalition came to an end in 1994, even if the US party system may still be described as overdue for a party realignment. Thus, we also explore if there are time period effects, periods when some of the above hypotheses apply, and other times when they do not, or during which the impact on type of exit of a secretary background trait shifts.

### **Description of data**

Case selection. Our analysis covers the administrations that constitute the “modern presidency” in U.S. government. We begin with the Herbert Hoover administration, as this is the earliest of the modern presidential administrations, identified as such because it is the first administration in which the president had more than one aide or assistant (Hult and Walcott 2004). In so doing, we work with the most generous definition of the modern presidency, offering a more rigorous test of our hypotheses by including in our dataset all cabinet secretaries – both initial and replacements – appointed through Barack H. Obama's first term (2009-2013). The resultant dataset contains 458 cabinet secretaries. However, due to very sparse data about presidential approval before the mid-1930s, the analysis presented here begins with Franklin Roosevelt's second administration (1937-41).

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<sup>2</sup> Weko (1995: 155) argues that the presidency became “plebiscitary” or “post modern” in the final quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Data sources. Information about the cabinet secretaries was drawn from a wide range of public sources, including national press coverage of the presidential selection process, the secretaries-designate, and the Senate confirmation process; White House press releases, presidential speeches, and secretaries' remarks; Senate confirmation reports; departmental biographies, and online biographical resources. These sources were cross-referenced for accuracy.

Dependent variable – ways secretaries exit the cabinet. We code cabinet secretaries as leaving office for one of three reasons.<sup>3</sup> One category is secretaries who switch posts – “*switchers*” (31 of the total 422 secretaries in our dataset or 7.35%). These are people who leave the post they held, but who remain in the administration. A secretary can be coded as a switcher by moving from one cabinet post to another, or by moving from a cabinet post to another high-level appointed post (e.g. White House chief of staff).

A second category is secretaries who meet a “*bad end*” (43 of the total 422 secretaries or 10.2%). They leave the cabinet under adverse conditions, which could include a scandal in the secretary's department or a scandal involving the secretary; a president-centered scandal (such as Watergate or Iran-contra); intense and ongoing conflict with the president or high-level administration officials; or a high profile policy failure. Outright firing of cabinet secretaries is extremely rare, so most of the people in this category resigned, but reportedly did so under pressure and/or due to their own intense dissatisfaction with the job.

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<sup>3</sup> Ultimately there were only two cabinet secretaries for whom we were unable to identify exit strategies using the full range of sources described above.

The third category is secretaries who “*retire*” from their post voluntarily (62 of the total 422 secretaries or 14.7%). Occasionally this is because they genuinely retire from the working world, but the much more common path in this category is for the secretary to take a post in a private sector corporation (27 of the total retiring secretaries), or to leave the cabinet to work on a campaign or to campaign for office themselves (25 of the total retiring secretaries).

It is important to note that cabinet reshuffles, which are often seen in other countries, particularly where there is a norm of coalition cabinets, have no real parallels in the U.S. case. Thus secretaries who change posts we code as switchers, those who leave voluntarily (even in what in another country might appear to be a cabinet reshuffle) are coded as retiring, and those who might be viewed as contributing to the need for a cabinet reshuffle are coded as meeting a bad end.

We compare the secretaries in these three categories to those who stayed in their post until the end of a presidential term or until the president left office (“*survivors*”), which in the United States is the majority of secretaries (272 of 422 or 64.5%). Twelve cabinet secretaries (2.6%) died while in office or retired because of severe medical problems. We exclude these cases from our analysis because they are not reflective of political decision-making, as are all other cases. We also drop from the analysis the two secretaries whose reasons for leaving office could not be determined.

Independent variables – secretary background, experience, connections. We operationalized numerous aspects of the background and experience cabinet secretaries bring to their post. As a reminder, these are *publicly known* credentials – information

people make available through their own autobiographies, or that is disclosed in press releases, news reports, or published biographies.

To test H1A, H1B and H1C regarding linkages to agency clienteles, we coded secretaries as “1” if they entered office with “known links to department clients,” (i.e. if they were publicly reported to have pre-appointment associations with a dominant client of their department). To test H2, we also coded whether secretaries have “known links to business groups”, as 1 if a person had been an active member or officer in business groups (including business organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce, and corporate boards of directors). In all instances, the coding for secretarial associations was highly conservative, focusing upon the secretaries’ active participation and engagement in the issue networks. For example, campaign donations to former elected officials did not, in and of themselves, result in a coding of “1.” Since issue group linkages are not mutually exclusive, for both of the linkage variables the comparison is having no links to that group.

To test our H3A requires data on a secretary’s past career. We collected data on a secretary’s primary career before they entered the cabinet. A secretary was coded as having a “government career” if they built their primary career in the public sector (national, state, local, or at multiple levels of government, including elected and appointed posts). The government category also includes those secretaries coded as having a “revolving door career” or working in multiple sectors (e.g., government and private, moving back and forth between the two). Those coded as private sector careers come from a variety of backgrounds but by far the most common are business or law.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Most cabinet secretaries (74 of the 136) who come from the private sector in the U.S. have built careers in business and 19 in law, but 6 had union backgrounds, and 26 came from careers in education or academia.

To test H3B we collected data on which secretaries had held high party office at the local, state, or national level.

We expected that secretaries which high policy expertise related to the issue jurisdiction of their department would be less likely to switch (H4). We measure this with a variable for whether the secretary had a “high level of experience.” This is defined as significant educational credentials and work experience related directly to the policy jurisdiction of the secretary’s department. For example, a degree in international relations and prior experience in foreign affairs, either through a legislative committee or through an executive branch post, would cause a secretary of state to be coded as possessing a high level of experience. Madeleine K. Albright exemplifies such an individual: She holds a Ph.D. in international relations from Columbia University and has had a lengthy teaching career in this discipline; she served as a member of Senator, later Secretary of State, Muskie’s staff; and was the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations immediately prior to her own appointment as Secretary of State.

Finally we include different variables to capture factors in the external environment that might affect the ability of all secretaries to hold their posts: inflation and presidential approval (H5A and H5B). Presidential approval is measured as the president’s approval rating in the month in which the secretary left office, which means it is NOT constant for all secretaries within a president’s term. Public opinion data was obtained from the Roper Center Public Opinion Archives; and inflation data was drawn from the U.S. Inflation Calculator. Unfortunately approval data is only available beginning with Roosevelt’s 2<sup>nd</sup> administration, which is why we lose information on Hoover’s and Roosevelt’s 1<sup>st</sup> administration secretaries. Inflation is measured as the

inflation rate in the month the secretary left office and again is not constant across the administration.<sup>5</sup>

We include several control variables. “Female” is coded 1 for women secretaries, and 0 for men. “Person of color” is coded 1 for secretaries who are self-identified as African-American, Latino/a, or Asian-American, regardless of gender. A secretary is coded 1 for “inner cabinet post” if he or she is secretary of State, Defense, Treasury, or Attorney General. The people who hold these high prestige cabinet posts not only receive much attention in the national and global media, but they are also recognized as having issue jurisdictions that advance the national interest and have correspondingly higher prestige (see, for example, Weisberg 1987). For all of these reasons, inner cabinet secretaries may have more access to the president than outer cabinet secretaries.<sup>6</sup> Table 1 summarizes the number and percentage of secretaries possessing each characteristic.

< Insert Table 1 about here >

## **Models and Results**

In the United States there is a relatively strong norm that the entire cabinet submits their resignations to the president at the end of his term even when he has been re-elected. This is intended to allow the president flexibility in building his second term administration to his likes. For this reason we treat each presidential term separately.

Thus, the observations in our dataset are person-posts. To be clear, a secretary who

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<sup>5</sup> We were not able to test whether unemployment had a similar negative effect to inflation or if the combination of the two (the so-called “misery index”) mattered because unemployment data were unavailable for the Hoover administration and all four of Roosevelt’s terms, so including an unemployment variable in the analysis would have meant we lost a significant number of observations.

<sup>6</sup> There are some exceptions to this rule, especially when the president clashes with an inner cabinet secretary. For example, President Nixon was known to have marginalized his Secretary of State, William Rogers, and to instead have relied heavily on his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger.

serves for the full eight years of a two-term president would be coded as a survivor for the first term and as a survivor for the second term, contributing two observations to the dataset.<sup>7</sup>

Given that our data are organized as person-posts and that our dependent variable represents four, mutually exclusive, unordered categories (survive to end of term, switch posts, retire, or meet a bad end) we fit our data using a multinomial logit model. The multinomial logit model has the advantage of allowing us to compare not only if each of the background characteristics make it more (or less) likely that the secretary exits in that way rather than remaining until the end of the term, but also allows us to compare their effect on the chances that they exit early one way versus another. The results of this estimation are presented in Table 2.

< Insert Table 2 about here >

The results in Table 2 indicate that, at least in the United States, different background characteristics seem to predict different types of exit, at least when compared with the propensity to remain in post until the end of the term. Before discussing the results, however, two important caveats are in order. First, the coefficients reported in Table 2 are log-odds coefficients and thus are not directly interpretable beyond sign and significance. To aid in interpretation we transform them into odd ratios or calculate percent change in the odds and use those in our discussions in the text and in the

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<sup>7</sup> A secretary who switches from one post to another without a break in time would, similarly, have two rows in the dataset. The secretary would be coded as exiting the first post as a switcher and then exiting the second post under whatever circumstances prevailed. For example, Eliot Richardson was appointed HEW secretary in Nixon's first term; Richardson was subsequently appointed Defense Secretary in January 1973 and Attorney General in May 1973. He resigned from this third post in October, during the Watergate-related "Saturday Night Massacre," refusing to follow the president's command to fire Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. (So he contributes three observations to the dataset.) As a HEW and as a Defense Secretary, Richardson was coded as a "switcher;" he was coded as coming to a "bad end" as Attorney General due to his policy conflict with the president.

subsequent comparative analysis. The second relevant caveat for the models reported in Table 2 (and beyond) is that we introduce only limited controls for presidential administration or type of post. Because we do not have a situation where post type perfectly predicts type of exit, we collapse post together into the inner-outer cabinet variable. However, the literature on ministerial duration (i.e. time in post) has argued very strongly for the need to control for the myriad factors in the economic and political environment that may affect all members of the cabinet. In duration modeling this is either done via administration fixed effects (see Berlinski et al. 2007) or random effects (as in the shared frailty duration models used by Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008). We do neither of these. Given the very large number of parameters we are already estimating and the relatively small size of our dataset we encountered difficulties in estimating a model that included fixed effects for every term or even every president and we have more parameters than degrees of freedom preventing us from estimating robust standard errors or clustering by administration.<sup>8</sup>

In addition to analyzing the full dataset, we also split our dataset two different ways to assess whether the impact of political-economic context and background was the same under different conditions. First, we considered whether different variables were more or less salient at different points in time by dividing the dataset into three time periods. The first time period includes all presidential administrations from Franklin Roosevelt's 2<sup>nd</sup> term up to and including Lyndon B. Johnson. The second time period begins with Richard Nixon's 1<sup>st</sup> term and includes presidencies up to and including that of George H.W. Bush. The final time period includes the most recent presidencies,

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<sup>8</sup> The authors welcome suggestions on either the necessity of and strategies for accounting for possible administration level effects.



specifically the two terms served by Presidents William Clinton and George W. Bush, and President Barak Obama's 1<sup>st</sup> term. Grouping the presidential administrations in these fashions reflects widely shared judgments about notable changes across the administrations: Hoover inaugurated the practice of having multiple aides to the president; Nixon recast the White House Office through departmentalization and functional specialization, and refined mechanisms to control the administrative presidency; and Clinton brought greater descriptive representation – at least for women – to the cabinet (Walcott and Hult 1995, Hult and Walcott 2003, Borrelli 2010). These are reported in Table 3. Second, we divide the dataset into Republican presidencies and Democratic presidencies which are reported in Table 4. In both Tables 3 and 4 we list the specific exits which are significantly different from each other (at the .10 level) and report the percentage change in the odds for each although all coefficients were included in the model. We repeat those comparisons found to be significant in the full dataset in the first column for comparison purposes (full models are provided in the paper's appendix).

< Insert Tables 3 & 4 about here >

Our first set of hypotheses (H1A, 1B, and 1C) all postulated that a secretary's linkages with interest groups – and specifically interest groups known to be clients of the department – could make them more likely to leave as needs changed (H1A) or to survive because they were too costly to remove (1C) or might bring them into conflict leading to a bad end (1B). Interestingly, one of the most consistent findings is the insignificant effect of interest group connections. In only one instance – under Democratic presidents – is there a statistically distinguishable rate of exit one way versus another for those with

these connections and that is not even in a way hypothesized! In short, it appears that interest group linkages neither insulate nor expose secretaries.

Second, we anticipated that secretaries with business links would leave early rather than remaining to the end or switching (H2) because those business connections would open other opportunities for them. In general, our model results bear out this expectation. In the full sample, secretaries who have linkages to business groups have a 99.6% increase in the odds of retiring rather than remaining until the end of the term. This is true in both the most recent time period (when secretaries with business links are also more likely to retire than meet a bad end) and the middle time period, but we do not find any effect in the earliest administrations. We find that this holds under Republican presidents as well. However, under Democrats the opposite is true! Links to business networks seems to fairly consistently increase the probability a secretary will meet a bad end rather than retire, switch posts, or remain to the end and these effects are substantively very large. Further research is necessary, but early indications are that these individuals do not succeed in establishing themselves as team players in the administrations with which they are associated. Despite this rather puzzling finding we think there is good indication that H2 is confirmed, though context (in terms of the party in power) does appear to condition the relationship.

Our third pair of hypotheses expected that political experience is a broadly applicable skill and thus might contribute to the secretary's ability to move from one post to another. In particular we expected that government careers (H3A) and high party office (H3B) would increase switching rather than other modes of exit. Reflecting on the results in Tables 3 and 4, our conclusions are somewhat mixed, though they do seem to

point to the value of political experience in contributing to switching. However, it appears that this is more true for those coming out of careers in government than for party leaders. Secretaries whose primary career was in government were more likely to switch than to meet a bad end or retire at least in the full dataset and the former is true in the earliest period while the later is true in the middle period. Both are also true among Republican presidents (along with switching being more likely than surviving), but not among Democrats. Government careers do not distinguish modes of exit among secretaries serving in Democratic administrations nor do they do so in the last time period.

While our results points to qualified support for H3A (with the utility of this hypothesis varying over time and with party in power), there is less support for H3B. Secretaries who previously held high party office seem more prone to retirement than anything else, in the dataset as a whole, and for the earlier two eras and for Republicans, but notably not for Democrats and not during the most recent presidencies. This leads us to conclude that the evidence points against H3 being correct.

Our fourth expectation was that policy expertise should decrease switching (H4). Very consistently (although there are two exceptions), secretaries with a high level of experience related to their post or portfolio are less likely to switch posts than to exit in any other way. In the full dataset, experience increases the odds of retirement rather than switching by 500%, of meeting a bad end rather than switching by 281% and of surviving to the end of the term rather than switching by 321%. We observe the same pattern (in terms of sign and significance) for the intermediate period (Nixon through George H.W. Bush) and Republican presidents. Experience is not a significant predictor at all for the

most recent presidents (Clinton to Obama) nor for Democrats; in the earliest period (Roosevelt to Johnson) it increases the odds of retiring rather than switching by 584%. We think this provides moderate evidence of support for H4.

The last pair of hypotheses moved away from theorizing about how individual background affected a secretary's exit to how the political and economic environment in which they served might contribute to their longevity or early demise. We expected that adverse political conditions (declining approval of the president) and adverse economic conditions (rising inflation) should both make secretaries less likely to survive (H5B) and more likely to meet a bad end (H5A) perhaps as they were sacked as a scapegoat. As presidential approval rises secretaries do seem to be less likely to meet bad ends (H5A) in the full dataset and the earliest period (Roosevelt through Johnson) and also very much so for Democratic presidents. We also see limited effects of increasing presidential approval decreasing the odds of bad end exits during Republican presidencies and for secretaries in the most recent period (Clinton to Obama). While these effects might appear modest (based on the percent changes in the odds reported in Table 3 and 4), they can in fact be quite significant considering the range and scale of this variable. In the dataset as a whole each one percentage point increase in presidential approval increases the odds that a secretary will survive rather than meet a bad end by 4.2%, this would translate into an 81.4% increase in the odds for a 1 standard deviation increase (14.5) in the value of presidential approval which is not at all unheard of. While presidential approval appears to – for the most part – dampen the odds of meeting a bad end, it does not appear to have a uniformly positive effect in terms of increasing survival (H5B).

Thus, it may be that it is more a possible negative that secretaries must deal with than a positive they can turn to their advantage.

The story with regard to inflation appears to be almost the opposite. Inflation seems to decrease the odds of secretaries remaining until the end of the term, although again there are some exceptions. In the dataset as a whole each one percentage point increase in inflation raises the odds a secretary switches rather than survives by 19.6%, and raises the odds they meet a bad end rather than survive by 13.5%. These findings suggest that presidents either may engage in cabinet shuffles (switching) or scapegoating (bad ends) when dealing with rising inflation. Of course we also observe that inflation increases the odds of switching rather than retiring, perhaps providing further evidence of the effect of inflation in increasing the risk of cabinet shuffles. However, rising inflation does not seem to affect survival relative to all other forms of exit (which would provide the strongest and most compelling evidence for H5B). Instead, it increases only the risk of bad end relative to survival for Democrats, while increasing the odds of switching for Republicans; it increases the odds of bad ends and retirement both relative to surviving (by substantial amounts!) in the most recent period and for switching versus surviving in the earliest period, but has no effect in the intermediate. Again our evidence is somewhat mixed, but points to modest support for both 5A and 5B.

## **Discussion and Conclusion**

First, presidential approval scores and inflation both have predictive value for how cabinet secretaries exit. As mass public evaluations of the president improve cabinet secretaries are more likely to survive until the end of the term and less likely to meet a

bad end (supporting H5A and H5B), though not in all time periods and not across both Democratic and Republican presidents. Increases in inflation are consistently a predictor of cabinet change: more switching posts, more retirements, and more secretaries meeting bad ends. The type of exit associated with higher inflation varies across time periods, but in all time periods when inflation is high secretaries are less likely to survive through till the end of the term (supporting H5A).

In addition, our statistical analysis shows that some secretary background traits are associated with higher or lower probabilities of exiting in a certain fashion. For example, as predicted in H4, secretaries with a high level of post-related experience are unlikely to switch posts. But this does not apply to the most recent time period (Clinton through Obama I) or for Democratic presidents. In support of our H3A, we find that secretaries with a career in government are more likely to switch than to retire, although this is not always true. And contrary to H3B, secretaries who had held high party office are not more likely to switch around, when we expected that party leadership experience would be a “transferable political skill” rather like the political skill that comes from extensive experience in government. Probably our most striking negative finding is about links to department clients: Contrary to H1A and H1B, we find that relatively consistently secretaries with links to department clients are not statistically distinct from those without client links. Secretaries with business network links are more likely to retire than to survive, supporting our H2, but it is interesting that we do not observe this connection as significant for Democratic presidents.

In addition, and something on which we had not developed a hypothesis, secretaries who hold inner cabinet posts are more likely to meet a bad end. While we

adopted the naive expectation that all of our hypotheses should work equally regardless of whether a secretary held an inner or outer cabinet post, an explanation for this finding could be suggested by the agency loss literature regarding parliamentary cabinets.

Indridason and Kam (2008) expect that the PM will be most likely to dismiss a “drifting” minister who holds an important post because those are the ministers who can really take the government off track. We speculate that because the inner cabinet posts are some of the most visible and because they include Treasury, those posts may be especially sensitive to changes in public opinion and/or economic indicators. This suggests that an important avenue for future research is better understanding the way in which type of post intersects with background to shape secretary exit. Finally, while we predicted that all hypotheses would apply equally for women and men, we found that women were more likely to retire than to switch in the overall sample and to retire rather than exit in any other way in the middle time period. This finding for women is especially interesting in light of the fact that there is no significant effect for secretaries of color.

Finally, some factors that predict type of cabinet secretary exit are different for Democratic vs. Republican administrations, while some factors apply in the same way for both parties. Strong presidential approval benefits cabinet secretaries in both Republican and Democratic administrations, but under Democratic presidents it is associated with a reduced chance of meeting a bad end, while under Republican presidents it is associated with increased likelihood of switching posts. Inflation, however, is only bad for cabinet secretaries in Republican administrations, where it is associated with cabinet shuffles and post switching. A high level of post-related experience benefits secretaries in only Republican administrations where it reduces post switching. But in Democratic

administrations holding an inner cabinet post is associated with a higher probability of meeting a bad end. The party of the administration is quite interesting with respect to secretaries who have business network links, as during Democratic administrations those secretaries are more likely to meet a bad end, while in Republican administrations they are more likely to retire. This finding definitely merits further investigation. Finally, as with the comparison across time periods, secretaries with a career in government are more likely to switch posts in Republican administration, but neither government career nor holding party office matters for secretaries in Democratic administrations.

The administration's highest elites are coming and going, and exits and the manner in which they exit may matter for the administration as much as who is appointed, because it can impact the reputation of the president and his ability to run the government. Cabinet secretaries can be like comets when they exit: they have tails, and those tails can be positive or negative. A secretary who leaves the cabinet (to truly retire, or to move on to other job opportunities, private sector or electoral) but who is broadly recognized to have done a good job, builds capital for the administration. A secretary who leaves due to a policy clash (with Congress, the president, interest groups) or a scandal can lessen the political capital of the president and the administration overall. Even if secretaries do not leave due to scandals or political clashes, and even if turnover is interpreted to not exceed the norm, it can create the impression that something may be wrong in the administration. Such a situation was seen in President Carter's "cabinet purge" in 1979, when the president requested the resignations of all his cabinet secretaries and accepted five, and a sixth was moved from one department to another. Media coverage speculated whether the administration was failing, asking whether the



president was an ineffectual leader or an incompetent manager. This administration lost many of its high profile connections with business. Further questions to pursue about this and similar presidential actions include the following: Is the president able to rebuild the lost relationships or is policy compromised in those areas? If a particular department is unstable relative to the norm for the cabinet overall, does instability contribute to explanations of low policy productivity or administrative effectiveness or lead to policy capture by entrenched groups within the agency in that policy area?


In sum, turnover may have a feedback effect on an individual agency, on the entire administration, or on the institutional bureaucracy. However, before we can explore possible feedback effects of cabinet instability, we need to understand how and why cabinet secretaries exit. Beginning that systematic and empirical exploration has been the purpose of this paper, and our work has produced several very interesting findings, some of which are consistent across the entire dataset, others that appear to be linked to specific time periods, and still others that depend on the party of the administration.

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**Figure 1: Types of Exit by Presidential Administration**



**Table 1: Overview of the Dataset**

|  | <b>Republican Presidents</b> | <b>Democrat Presidents</b> | <b>Roosevelt to Johnson</b> | <b>Nixon to GWHBush</b> | <b>Clinton to Obama</b> | <b>Totals*</b> |
|--|------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|----------------|
| H1A - H1C: Links to departmental or agency clients           | 153 (77%)                    | 176 (85%)                  | 141 (85%)                   | 100 (71%)               | 77 (85%)                | 329 (81%)      |
| H2: Links to business or business networks                   | 128 (64%)                    | 106 (51%)                  | 79 (48%)                    | 86 (61%)                | 64 (70%)                | 234 (57%)      |
| H3A: Primary career in government sector                     | 112 (56%)                    | 160 (77%)                  | 119 (72%)                   | 78 (56%)                | 72 (79%)                | 272 (67%)      |
| H3B: Held high office in the party                           | 31 (16%)                     | 29 (14%)                   | 34 (21%)                    | 18 (13%)                | 4 (4%)                  | 60 (15%)       |
| H4: Extensive prior experience related to department or post | 149 (75%)                    | 165 (79%)                  | 131 (79%)                   | 102 (73%)               | 73 (80%)                | 314 (77%)      |
| H5A - H5B: Presidential approval rating in month of exit     | Avg = 51.6%                  | Avg = 55.1%                | Avg = 59.7%                 | Avg = 49.6%             | Avg = 49.3%             | Avg = 53.5%    |
| H5A - H5B: Inflation in month of exit                        | Avg = 3.3%                   | Avg = 3.5%                 | Avg = 2.4%                  | Avg = 6.3%              | Avg = 2.4%              | Avg = 3.3%     |
| Secretary is Female  | 18 (9%)                      | 20 (10%)                   | 6 (4%)                      | 13 (9%)                 | 19 (21%)                | 38 (9%)        |
| Person of Color  | 19 (9.5%)                    | 21 (10%)                   | 1 (1%)                      | 9 (6%)                  | 30 (33%)                | 40 (10%)       |
| Inner Cabinet Post   | 70 (35%)                     | 86 (41%)                   | 75 (45%)                    | 47 (34%)                | 28 (31%)                | 156 (38%)      |
| Observations   | 200 (49%)                    | 208 (51%)                  | 165 (40%)                   | 140 (34%)               | 91 (22%)                | 408 (100%)     |

\*Numbers in this column include the Hoover and Roosevelt 1 administrations, but not the Obama 2 administration.

**Table 2: Predicting Mode of Exit**

|  | <b>Switch</b>        | <b>Bad End</b>        | <b>Retire</b>        |
|--|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| H1A - H1C: Links to departmental or agency clients           | 0.35<br>(0.554)      | -0.176<br>(0.522)     | -0.244<br>(0.447)    |
| H2: Links to business or business networks                   | 0.465<br>(0.459)     | 0.238<br>(0.392)      | 0.691**<br>(0.337)   |
| H3A: Primary career in government sector                     | 0.873<br>(0.535)     | -0.24<br>(0.407)      | -0.266<br>(0.342)    |
| H3B: Held high office in the party                           | 0.911*<br>(0.508)    | -0.333<br>(0.677)     | 1.043***<br>(0.396)  |
| H4: Extensive prior experience related to department or post | -1.438***<br>(0.506) | -0.102<br>(0.553)     | 0.353<br>(0.430)     |
| H5A - H5B: Presidential approval rating in month of exit     | 0.00321<br>(0.017)   | -0.0412***<br>(0.014) | 0.0111<br>(0.012)    |
| H5A - H5B: Inflation in month of exit                        | 0.179***<br>(0.068)  | 0.126**<br>(0.051)    | 0.0297<br>(0.057)    |
| Secretary is female  | -1.856<br>(1.132)    | -1.699<br>(1.119)     | 0.185<br>(0.528)     |
| Person of color  | 0.245<br>(0.734)     | 0.479<br>(0.628)      | 0.175<br>(0.516)     |
| Inner cabinet post   | 0.168<br>(0.473)     | 0.714*<br>(0.394)     | 0.137<br>(0.337)     |
| Constant   | -3.423***<br>(1.267) | -0.356<br>(0.991)     | -2.769***<br>(0.919) |
| Observations   | 367                  |                       |                      |
| Pseudo R-squared   | 0.1                  |                       |                      |
| AIC  | 727.4                |                       |                      |

Comparison category is survive to end of term

Standard errors in parenthesis.

\* p<.1, \*\* p<.05, \*\*\* p<.01

**Table 3: Comparisons across presidential administrations**

| <i>Secretary is more likely to ___ vs. ___ if they have or are:</i> | <b>All Cases</b>  | <b>Clinton through Obama 1</b>                         | <b>Nixon through GHWBush</b>  | <b>Roosevelt through Johnson</b>  |
|---|---|--|---|---|
| <b>links to department clients</b>                                  |   |  |   |   |
| <b>links to business networks</b>                                   | retire v. survive (99.6%)   | retire v. survive (707%)<br>retire v. bad end (1610%)  | retire v. survive (292%)  |   |
| <b>a government rather than private sector career</b>               | switch v. bad end (204%)<br>switch v. retire (212%)                                 |  | switch v. retire (360%)   | survive v. bad end (1135%)<br>switch v. bad end (1442%)<br>retire v. bad end (846%) |
| <b>held high party office</b>                                       | switch v. survive (149%)<br>retire v. survive (184%)<br>retire v. bad end (296%)    |  | retire v. survive (397%)  | retire v. survive (202%)  |
| <b>a high level of experience</b>                                   | survive v. switch (321%)<br>bad end v. switch (281%)<br>retire v. switch (500%)     |  | survive v. switch (1066%)<br>bad end v. switch (1460%)<br>retire v. switch (572%) | retire v. switch (584%)   |
| <b>Presidential Approval in month secretary exits increases:</b>    | survive v. bad end (4.2%)<br>switch v. bad end (4.5%)<br>retire v. bad end (5.4%)   | survive v. bad end (19.9%)<br>survive v. retire (9.5%) |   | survive v. bad end (13%)<br>switch v. bad end (10.1%)<br>retire v. bad end (13.5%)  |
| <b>Inflation in month they exit increases</b>                       | switch v. survive (19.6%)<br>switch v. retire (16.1%)<br>bad end v. survive (13.5%) | bad end v. survive (551%)<br>retire v. survive (268%)  |   | switch v. survive (30%)<br>bad end v. survive (30.6%)                               |
| <b>Female</b>   | retire v. switch (670%)   |  | retire v. survive (666%)<br>retire v. switch (2203%)<br>retire v. bad end (1901%) |   |
| <b>Person of Color</b>  |   |  |   |   |
| <b>Inner Cabinet Post</b>   | bad end v. survive (104%)   |  |   | bad end v. survivor (689%)<br>bad end v. retire (809%)                              |
| <b>Observations</b>   | 367   | 91   | 139   | 137   |
| <b>Pseudo R-square</b>  | 0.100   | 0.3682   | 0.1604  | 0.1837  |

**Table 4: Comparison between Republican and Democratic Administrations**

| <i>Secretary is more likely to ___ vs. ___ if they have or are:</i> | All Cases   | Democrats only  | Republicans only   |
|---|---|---|--|
| <b>links to department clients</b>                                  |   | switch v. bad end (1990%)   |  |
| <b>links to business networks</b>                                   | retire v. survive (99.6%)   | bad end v. survive (1438%)<br>bad end v. switch (1267%)<br>bad end v. retire (900%) | retire v. survive (197%)<br>retire v. bad end (353%)                               |
| <b>a government rather than private sector career</b>               | switch v. bad end (204%)<br>switch v. retire (212%)                                 |   | switch v. survive (630%)<br>switch v. bad end (942%)<br>switch v. retire (896%)    |
| <b>held high party office</b>                                       | switch v. survive (149%)<br>retire v. survive (184%)<br>retire v. bad end (296%)    |   | retire v. survive (274%)<br>retire v. bad end (825%)                               |
| <b>a high level of experience</b>                                   | survive v. switch (321%)<br>bad end v. switch (281%)<br>retire v. switch (500%)     |   | survive v. switch (1318%)<br>bad end v. switch (1642%)<br>retire v. switch (2335%) |
| <b>Presidential Approval in month secretary exits increases:</b>    | survive v. bad end (4.2%)<br>switch v. bad end (4.5%)<br>retire v. bad end (5.4%)   | survive v. bad end (15%)<br>switch v. bad end (13.6%)<br>retire v. bad end (17.8%)  | switch v. survive (7.2%)<br>switch v. bad end (10%)                                |
| <b>Inflation in month they exit increases</b>                       | switch v. survive (19.6%)<br>switch v. retire (16.1%)<br>bad end v. survive (13.5%) | bad end v. survive (17.7%)  | switch v. survive (89.5%)<br>switch v. bad end (72.5%)<br>switch v. retire (97.1%) |
| <b>Female</b>   | retire v. switch (670%)   |   |  |
| <b>Person of Color</b>  |   |   |  |
| <b>Inner Cabinet Post</b>   | bad end v. survive (104%)   | bad end v. survive (390%)<br>bad end v. retire (373%)                               |  |
| <b>Observations</b>   | 367   | 180   | 187  |
| <b>Pseudo R-square</b>  | 0.100   | 0.1756  | 0.1512   |



**Table A1: Roosevelt to Johnson ONLY**

|  | Switch             | Bad End              | Retire             |
|--|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| H1A - H1C: Links to departmental or agency clients           | 1.14<br>(1.226)    | -1.446<br>(1.257)    | -0.876<br>(0.734)  |
| H2: Links to business or business networks                   | -0.616<br>(0.832)  | 0.0954<br>(1.060)    | 0.756<br>(0.536)   |
| H3A: Primary career in government sector                     | 0.222<br>(1.002)   | -2.514*<br>(1.311)   | -0.266<br>(0.549)  |
| H3B: Held high office in the party                           | 0.695<br>(0.789)   | 1.724<br>(1.238)     | 1.106**<br>(0.546) |
| H4: Extensive prior experience related to department or post | -0.928<br>(0.931)  | -0.125<br>(1.148)    | 0.994<br>(0.728)   |
| H5A - H5B: Presidential approval rating in month of exit     | -0.0264<br>(0.025) | -0.122***<br>(0.044) | 0.00422<br>(0.019) |
| H5A - H5B: Inflation in month of exit                        | 0.262**<br>(0.123) | 0.267**<br>(0.127)   | 0.140<br>(0.106)   |
| Secretary is Female  | -12.38<br>(1562.9) | -9.314<br>(1666.9)   | 1.694<br>(1.1131)  |
| Person of Color  | -0.57<br>(9125.7)  | 1.865<br>(10539.1)   | 17.7<br>(3026.7)   |
| Inner Cabinet Post   | 0.572<br>(0.792)   | 2.066*<br>(1.138)    | -0.141<br>(0.517)  |
| Constant   | -1.895<br>(2.109)  | 4.067<br>(2.588)     | -2.295*<br>(1.394) |
| Observations   | 137                |                      |                    |
| Pseudo R-squared   | 0.184              |                      |                    |
| AIC  | 284.6              | .                    | .                  |

Standard errors in parenthesis

\* p<.10, \*\* p<.05, \*\*\* p<.01

**Table A2: Nixon to GHW Bush ONLY**

|  | Switch               | Bad End            | Retire             |
|--|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| H1A - H1C: Links to departmental or agency clients           | 0.556<br>(0.776)     | -0.636<br>(0.713)  | 0.343<br>(0.803)   |
| H2: Links to business or business networks                   | 1.271<br>(0.777)     | 0.397<br>(0.533)   | 1.365*<br>(0.758)  |
| H3A: Primary career in government sector                     | 1.045<br>(0.744)     | 0.0465<br>(0.535)  | -0.48<br>(0.692)   |
| H3B: Held high office in the party                           | 1.041<br>(0.788)     | -15.01<br>(897.6)  | 1.604*<br>(0.823)  |
| H4: Extensive prior experience related to department or post | -2.456***<br>(0.794) | 0.291<br>(0.808)   | -0.551<br>(0.786)  |
| H5A - H5B: Presidential approval rating in month of exit     | 0.00753<br>(0.035)   | -0.0296<br>(0.029) | -0.0436<br>(0.036) |
| H5A - H5B: Inflation in month of exit                        | 0.126<br>(0.144)     | 0.0277<br>(0.116)  | -0.182<br>(0.156)  |
| Secretary is Female  | -1.101<br>(1.275)    | -0.965<br>(1.248)  | 2.036**<br>(1.034) |
| Person of Color  | -1.213<br>(1.395)    | 0.0101<br>(1.186)  | -14.8<br>(1200)    |
| Inner Cabinet Post   | -0.0922<br>(0.737)   | 0.277<br>(0.548)   | 0.819<br>(0.651)   |
| Constant   | -3.356<br>(2.599)    | -0.0169<br>(2.09)  | 0.342<br>(2.638)   |
| Observations   | 139                  |                    |                    |
| Pseudo R-squared   | 0.16                 |                    |                    |
| AIC  | 322.6                | .                  | .                  |

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.10, \*\* p<.05, \*\*\* p<.01

**Table A3: Clinton to Obama ONLY**

|  | Switch              | Bad End              | Retire              |
|--|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| H1A - H1C: Links to departmental or agency clients           | -1.327<br>(10231.4) | 16.72<br>(4072.9)    | -0.753<br>(1.575)   |
| H2: Links to business or business networks                   | 17.19<br>(4550.2)   | -0.751<br>(1.302)    | 2.088*<br>(1.224)   |
| H3A: Primary career in government sector                     | 15.16<br>(6021.9)   | -0.157<br>(1.178)    | -0.486<br>(0.874)   |
| H3B: Held high office in the party                           | -12.88<br>(21714.1) | 0.729<br>(2.964)     | -18.35<br>(8885.4)  |
| H4: Extensive prior experience related to department or post | 14.81<br>(7586.8)   | 1.179<br>(2.674)     | 0.492<br>(1.473)    |
| H5A - H5B: Presidential approval rating in month of exit     | -0.114<br>(0.085)   | -0.181***<br>(0.062) | -0.0916*<br>(0.048) |
| H5A - H5B: Inflation in month of exit                        | 1.621<br>(1.655)    | 1.874***<br>(0.617)  | 1.303**<br>(0.537)  |
| Secretary is Female  | -5.297<br>(14447.6) | -17.84<br>(3530.2)   | -1.576<br>(1.358)   |
| Person of Color  | 16.75<br>(3707.2)   | -0.729<br>(1.401)    | 1.079<br>(0.878)    |
| Inner Cabinet Post   | -9.037<br>(15372.7) | 0.687<br>(1.115)     | -0.0215<br>(0.925)  |
| Constant   | -62.28<br>(11014.4) | -15.04<br>(4072.9)   | -1.651<br>(2.356)   |
| Observations   | 91                  |                      |                     |
| Pseudo R-squared   | 0.368               |                      |                     |
| AIC  | 155.5               | .                    | .                   |

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.10, \*\* p<.05, \*\*\* p<.01

**Table A4: Model for Democratic Presidents ONLY**

|  | Switch             | Bad End              | Retire              |
|--|--------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| H1A - H1C: Links to departmental or agency clients           | 1.281<br>(1.194)   | -1.759<br>(1.195)    | -0.362<br>(0.656)   |
| H2: Links to business or business networks                   | 0.118<br>(0.637)   | 2.733**<br>(1.064)   | 0.43<br>(0.471)     |
| H3A: Primary career in government sector                     | 0.476<br>(0.875)   | 0.714<br>(0.893)     | -0.405<br>(0.515)   |
| H3B: Held high office in the party                           | 1.016<br>(0.770)   | 1.065<br>(1.051)     | 0.945<br>(0.578)    |
| H4: Extensive prior experience related to department or post | -1.207<br>(0.830)  | -1.619<br>(1.101)    | 0.164<br>(0.629)    |
| H5A - H5B: Presidential approval rating in month of exit     | -0.0126<br>(0.025) | -0.140***<br>(0.044) | 0.0237<br>(0.019)   |
| H5A - H5B: Inflation in month of exit                        | 0.103<br>(0.090)   | 0.163**<br>(0.081)   | 0.104<br>(0.073)    |
| Secretary is Female  | -1.607<br>(1.342)  | -16.57<br>(646.1)    | -0.719<br>(0.855)   |
| Person of Color  | 1.243<br>(0.880)   | 1.56<br>(1.462)      | 0.645<br>(0.700)    |
| Inner Cabinet Post   | 0.543<br>(0.703)   | 1.589*<br>(0.848)    | 0.0346<br>(0.494)   |
| Constant   | -2.988<br>(2.021)  | 2.797<br>(2.131)     | -3.084**<br>(1.378) |
| Observations   | 180                |                      |                     |
| Pseudo R-squared   | 0.176              |                      |                     |
| AIC  | 348.4              | .                    | .                   |

Standard errors in parenthesis

\* p<.10, \*\* p<.05, \*\*\* p<.01

**Table A5: Model for Republican Presidents ONLY**

|  | Switch               | Bad End            | Retire              |
|--|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| H1A - H1C: Links to departmental or agency clients           | 0.804<br>(0.914)     | -0.0519<br>(0.686) | -0.126<br>(0.666)   |
| H2: Links to business or business networks                   | 0.81<br>(0.816)      | -0.424<br>(0.490)  | 1.088*<br>(0.600)   |
| H3A: Primary career in government sector                     | 1.988**<br>(0.925)   | -0.356<br>(0.529)  | -0.311<br>(0.504)   |
| H3B: Held high office in the party                           | 0.45<br>(0.765)      | -0.906<br>(1.108)  | 1.319**<br>(0.587)  |
| H4: Extensive prior experience related to department or post | -2.652***<br>(0.848) | 0.205<br>(0.728)   | 0.541<br>(0.545)    |
| H5A - H5B: Presidential approval rating in month of exit     | 0.0695*<br>(0.038)   | -0.0256<br>(0.017) | 0.00403<br>(0.016)  |
| H5A - H5B: Inflation in month of exit                        | 0.639***<br>(0.233)  | 0.0936<br>(0.085)  | -0.0394<br>(0.102)  |
| Secretary is Female  | -15.31<br>(1225.9)   | -0.704<br>(1.139)  | 0.922<br>(0.764)    |
| Person of Color  | -15.62<br>(1066.0)   | 0.121<br>(0.736)   | -0.363<br>(0.847)   |
| Inner Cabinet Post   | -0.242<br>(0.738)    | 0.474<br>(0.497)   | 0.373<br>(0.486)    |
| Constant   | -9.601***<br>(3.672) | -0.45<br>(1.309)   | -2.941**<br>(1.346) |
| Observations   | 187                  |                    |                     |
| Pseudo R-squared   | 0.151                |                    |                     |
| AIC  | 396.3                | .                  | .                   |

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.10, \*\* p<.05, \*\*\* p<.01