

THE HISTORY OF TODAY'S BRAZIL

A historical contextualization of national identity, foreign policy and state behaviour

Gillian Giwa¹

A man's memory may almost become the art of continually varying and misrepresenting his past, according to his interests in the present.

(Reasons and Places I - George Santayana)

Abstract

Socio-cultural, historical and geo-political peculiarities are crucial to understanding state behaviour and vital for successful regional integration. To evaluate this claim within the context of Brazil's protagonism of Mercosul and its pro-South America regionalism, a review of international relations (I.R.) theories on the determinants of state behaviour first creates the basis for discussion. This is then followed by the contextualization of Brazil's national-historical identity, regional distinctiveness and integration with Latin America. The research suggests that Brazil's protagonism of regional integration initiatives was not historically or culturally motivated. Said initiatives were Brazil's strategic attempts at attaining regional and hemispheric power.

Introduction

During the period that spanned from Brazil's independence (1822) to the middle of the 20th century, Brazilian foreign policy fluctuated between its relationship with The United States and the restricted economic and political relations it maintained with its continental Spanish neighbours. That however changed after World War II at which time changes in the global political order provoked significant modifications in Brazil's national and regional identity and relationship with Spanish America.

The objective of this paper is twofold; to contextualize Brazil's integration with Latin America based on the western hemisphere's colonial, political and diplomatic history, and to instigate reflections on Brazil's protagonism of the Common Market of

¹ Is a 2012-2014 PEC-PG/CNPq Masters' research scholarship student at the Institute of International Relations, University of São Paulo, Brazil; developing thesis on the cultural implications and public opinion of international trade.

the South (Mercosul) and South America regionalism. The claim herein proposed suggests that variables such as socio-cultural, historical and geo-political peculiarities are both crucial to understanding state behaviour as are vital for successful regional integration.

Leslie Bethell's work, "Brazil and Latin America"², is used as the backdrop for both the construction of this paper as well as the foundation upon which many arguments and conclusions will be deduced. In laying the foundations for the discussion on state behaviour, the first section of this paper presents a confrontation of traditional and contemporary international relation (I.R.) theories with regards to their differing perspectives on the determinants of state behaviour. This theoretical platform will provide the necessary framework for objectively analyzing Brazil's 20th century Latin American integration initiatives and its pro-South American regionalism discourse of the 21st century.

The second section contextualizes Brazil's national and historical identity and its relationship with '*América Latina*' and The United States. Here we observe that the social, political and cultural identity of '*América Latina*' created a hemispheric division of three territorial blocs comprising Spanish America, The United States and the "other America"- Brazil. This regional distinctiveness was initially embraced by Brazil and reflected strongly in its foreign policies.

The third section looks at Brazil's integration with Latin America, and its ratification and protagonism of regional integration initiatives. The concluding argument suggests that Brazil's post World War II (WWII) foreign policies of Latin and South American regionalism are merely strategic attempts at soft power balancing, contingent on its aspirations for regional leadership and global power.

² Published in the Journal of Latin American Studies; ed. 42, 457-485; Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Section I – Determinants of State Behaviour: a theoretical perspective

The concept of what determines state behaviour differentiates significantly among I.R. theories given their distinct ideological perspectives. For the classic (traditional) realist, state behaviour is determined by human nature. Realists attribute an innate power lust characteristic as the driving force behind state decisions.

On the other hand, neo-realists apply a structural explanation for state behaviour on the premise that “structures encourage certain behaviors and penalize those who do not respond to the encouragement” (Waltz, 1979)³. Waltz’s concept of “structure” (here used to represent the neo-realist’s perspective of same), attributes pride of place to the dynamics of the international arena in explaining state behaviour. As such, he contributes no value to the domestic variables’ influence on state behaviour. According to Waltz, “failure to examine international structural factors first leads to misattribution of the causes of states’ behavior [...] *and* leads to infinite proliferation of variables as explanatory factors”⁴.

John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism likewise suggests that it is the “structure of the international system, not the particular characteristics of individual great powers [that] cause them to think and act offensively” (Mearsheimer, 2001)⁵. This view additionally posits that the principal motivating factor behind state behaviour is survival. For the offensive realist, precedence in the analysis of state behaviour is given to state dominance, incrementing advantageous balance of power which guarantees survival and potential state hegemony. According to Mearsheimer (2001),

It is the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to arrive at a condition of perpetual peace by conquering the whole world, if that were possible [...] because one state’s gain in power is another state’s loss, great powers tend to have a zero-sum mentality when dealing with each other [...] and that states are disposed to think offensively toward other states even though their ultimate motive is to survive.

In other words, “great powers have aggressive intentions” (Mearsheimer, 2001). The fact that these realist theories primarily view states as unitary actors eliminates the consideration of socio-political and culturally determined interests and preferences as crucial underpinning elements to understanding the causality of state behavior. In order

³ Waltz, K. **Theory of International Politics**, Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979

⁴ Milner, H. **Interests, Institutions and Information: domestic politics and international relations**, Princeton, 1997

⁵ Mearsheimer, J. **The Tragedy of Great Power Politics**, W.W Norton & Company, New York, 2001

to adequately analyze Brazil's behaviour within the context of its relationship with Latin America, contemporary I.R. theories that incorporate the more complex dynamics of the domestic and the international arenas will be required.

Milner (1997) affirms that domestic politics and international relations are "inextricably interrelated" and contradicts Waltz (1979) view that examination of domestic variables would result in the proliferation of variables by suggesting that,

If the internal characteristics of nations have important systematic effects on their behaviour, assuming these characteristics away leads to fundamental misunderstanding of the causes of their behaviour [and] failure to examine them also leads to the infinite proliferation of variables.

Milner provides a differentiation between the main actors involved in domestic politics and policy decisions (executives, legislature and interest groups) and based on the assumption that said groups are rational and unitary establishes that it is the power distribution among these groups (where the decision making authority lies) and how they interrelate that determines domestic preferences, policies and by extension dictates coalition formation and cooperation. In other words, "how power is shared affects whose preferences are most likely to dominate policy making" (Milner 1997).

Similarly to the approach taken by Milner, Alexander Wendt's theory of social constructivism⁶, embraces a cultural structure to international politics. For Wendt (1999:141-142);

Culture is not a sector or sphere of society distinct from the economy or polity, but present wherever shared knowledge is found that is both common and connected between individuals [...] and exemplifies shared knowledge to take the form of discourse, norms, and ideology.

Wendt is keen to distinguish between what denotes shared private knowledge and common knowledge. By his definition,

Private knowledge consists of beliefs that individual actors hold that others do not. In the case of states, this kind of knowledge will often stem from domestic or ideological considerations (Wendt, 1999:140-141).

Crucial to the contextualization of his point of view is the issue of the relationship between individuals and the structure. Based on Wendt's matrix of "the faces of structure" the two structures, micro-structure and macro – structure, represent the level

⁶ Wendt, A. **Social Theory of International Politics**; Cambridge University Press, 1999.

of states at the domestic level and at the level of the international system respectively. He indicated that,

constructivists tend to be interested in macro-level structures and within that the constitutive effects of structure on identity and interests (properties) [...]but the primary value added of a constructivist approach to culture lies in the analysis of constitutive effects at the micro and especially at the macro – levels (Wendt, 1999:144).

With regards to how, and to what extent “unit-level”⁷ culture is a causal element in state behavior Wendt refers to Ringmar (1996)⁸ who alleges;

What we see are only individuals and their behavior. Individuals may say they belong to some organization, and engage in collective action to prove it, but we never actually see the state. What we see is at most government, the aggregate of concrete individuals who instantiate a state at a given moment. State action depends on the actions of those individuals, since social structures only exist in virtue of the practices which instantiate them. The challenge for realists is to show that state action is anything more than the sum of these individual government actions.

Based on this literature review, Wendt’s approach to constructivism provides the better theoretical framework for analyzing and making explanatory deductions regarding Brazil’s relationship with Latin America and its influence on regional integration initiatives. Though Wendt’s attempt at an ideational social structure doesn’t thoroughly explain the ontology of interests and the cultural processes at the unit-level, his theory does provide the necessary basis to substantiate the hypothesis that socio-cultural, historical and geo-political contexts do contribute to state’s behaviour, policies and preferences.

In this regard, Brazil’s national identity and regional history with ‘*América Latina*’ will be analyzed within the construct of Wendt’s social constructivist perspective in order to evaluate the aforementioned hypothesis.

⁷ Concept used by Wendt to explain those outcomes for which the causal factor relates to characteristics and/or “interaction” at the national or individual level.

⁸ Ringmar, E. *Identity Interests and Action: a cultural explanation of Sweden’s intervention in the thirty years war* (1996) apud Wendt, A. **Social Theory of International Politics**; Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Section II – Brazilian National Identity and the Concept of Latin America

For some, the notion of a “Latin America” originated from the French ‘*l’Amérique Latine*’, used by French intellectuals to justify “French imperialism in Mexico under Napoleon III” (Bethell, 2010). For said intellectuals *l’Amérique Latine* represented,

[...] a linguistic and cultural affinity, a unity of ‘Latin’ peoples for whom France was the natural leader [...] and defender against Anglo-Saxon (mainly U.S.) influence and ultimately domination.

Other historians however, contend that it was Spanish American intellectuals residing in Paris in the early 19th century who were responsible for first utilizing the expression ‘*América Latina*’ in their works years before the French did. Irrespective of the original authorship, the rationale that substantiated this concept remained unchanged. The term ‘*América Latina*’ was synonymous with,

Spanish American consciousness and identity [*and*] was stronger than local and regional ‘nationalisms’ [...] *and* was fundamentally different from the United States and the ‘other’ America (Bethell, 2010).

From this common identity among the (ex) Spanish colonies of the Americas came the notion of a Latin race, ‘*a raza latina*’, which served the purpose of not only distinguishing between the Spanish and non-Spanish territories, but also emphasized the “common European roots of the ‘white’ post-colonial *criollo* elites of Spanish America [...] from the mass of Indians, *mestizos* and blacks” (Mignolo, 2005)⁹.

In light of these distinctions, it is clear that though territorially predisposed neither the French nor the Spanish considered Brazil part of ‘*América Latina*’. The concept of ‘*América Latina*’ “was simply another name for ‘*América Española*’ (Bethell, 2010). According Manoel Bomfim (1929)¹⁰:

América Latina [Latin America] was no more than *uma designação geográfica* [a geographical designation] within which there were unbridgeable historical, cultural, and political differences between, on the one hand Brazil, and on the other *os chamados latino-americanos* [the so called Latin Americans].

By this means the western hemisphere was divided into three regions, namely, The United States, Latin America and the “other” America – Brazil. While the undeniable commonality of Iberian colonialism and catholic religious orientation shadowed both Brazil and its Spanish speaking neighbours, Brazil’s perspective on this

⁹ Mignolo, W. *The Idea of Latin America* (Oxford, 2005) apud Bethell, L; **Brazil and Latin America**. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 42, 457-485, Cambridge University Press, (2010).

¹⁰ Bomfim, M. *O Brasil na América: caracterização da formação brasileira*, Rio de Janeiro, 1929 apud Bethell, L. **Brazil and Latin America**. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 42, 457-485, Cambridge University Press, (2010).

matter of continental identification and its separateness from the Spanish speaking and the northern Americans was captured through the published works of its authors and intellectuals. According to Bethell (2010),

[...] insofar as Brazilian writers and intellectuals thought about the world beyond Brazil, it was not to Spanish America they looked – they certainly did not see themselves as part of ‘América Latina’ – but to Europe, especially France, or in rare cases to America as a whole, including the United States.

The most prominent characteristics that justified Brazil’s non-identification with its regional neighbours were related to geography, history, an economy and society based on plantation agriculture and African slavery, language, culture and political institutions. This Brazilian stance of regional isolation was further echoed in the republican manifesto of 1870 in which the then republicans voiced that, Brazil was “*um país isolado*” (an isolated country).

The commencement of the 20th century however, saw “the beginning of the ‘*americanização*’ (Americanization) of Brazilian foreign policy” (Bethell, 2010) in which Brazil sought to strengthen its alliance with the United States. For Brazil,

The United States was regarded not only as offering the best defense against European imperialism, which for Brazil remained a greater threat than U.S. imperialism, but as providing order, peace and stability in Latin America – that is to say Spanish America (Bethell, 2010).

Notwithstanding, Brazil also proposed initiatives geared at creating proximity with the Latin America territories. This is evidenced in Itamaraty’s¹¹ 1909 creation of the ‘*Revista Americana*’ a publication “whose aim was to deepen political and cultural interchange between Brazil, Latin America and The United States.

Additionally, Brazil firmly supported political and economic initiatives proposed by the United States such as the Monroe doctrine and Pan-Americanism, even though such initiatives were met with skepticism on the part of its continental neighbours. In the case of Pan-Americanism for example, the Latin American territories feared it was “simply a weapon with which to assert US economic and political hegemony for the further exploitation of the region” (Bethell, 2010).

The Pan-American Conferences also known as The International Conferences of American States were in fact borne out of a United States led initiative aimed at

¹¹ Name to which the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations is commonly referred.

“creating an informal alliance of the ‘nations of America’, under U.S. leadership, which would promote the peaceful settlement of disputes and inter-regional trade” (Bethell, 2012)¹², which would consequentially secure markets for U.S industrial and agricultural products. For Brazil (the only non-republic invited to the first conference in 1889) the strategy at the time was to “follow the ‘*espírito americano*’ (American spirit)” (Bethell, 2012).

Though Brazil had established a distinctiveness from its Spanish American neighbours and had adopted foreign policies of diplomatic and political alliance with The United States, it was only at the end of the First World War that “the idea of Brazil, the roots of Brazil (indigenous peoples, the Portuguese, Africans) and Brazil’s racial, social and cultural miscegenation” (Bethell, 2010) became main concerns of its elite. This gave rise to a Brazilian national identity within the Americas, referred to as the ‘*brasilidade americanista*’, which even further reinforced Brazil’s regional distinctiveness.

Section III - Brazil and Latin American Regionalism

Traditional theories of regional integration that have been successful in adequately capturing the integration process of the European Union (used as the standard for successful regional integration) have encountered difficulties in their application to the integration initiatives of Brazil with its Latin American neighbours. As evidenced by Malamud (2004)¹³, “European oriented theories turned out to be insufficient to account for regionalization in the Western hemisphere”. Given the specificity of the European Union and its marked differences from the west, Malamud calls our attention to the fact that “existing integration theories must be revisited in order to fit the Latin American experience”. Malamud likewise identifies variables such as, type of democracy, level of development and homogeneity of development as crucial though “frequently over-looked factors that contribute to shape regional integration”.

Mercosul was “born as a consequence of the democratization and the removal of old hypotheses of conflict between Argentina and Brazil” (Malamud, 2004).

¹² Bethell, L., **O Brasil e as Conferências Pan-Americanas**, in Alzira Alves de Abreu (org.), Dicionário Histórico-Bibliográfico da Primeira Republica (1889-1930) 3 vols. Rio de Janeiro, 2012/13

¹³ Malamud, A. **Regional Integration in Latin America - Comparative Theories and Institutions**. Sociologia, Problemas e Práticas, 2004.

Regarded as “one of the most notorious members of the third wave of integration throughout the Americas” (Malamud, 2004)¹⁴, intra-regional trade among Mercosul members tripled within the first ten years of the bloc’s inauguration and had,

[...] strongly increased the direct foreign investment in its member countries [becoming] a growing international actor both for business and foreign governments (Nofal, 1997; Bouzas, 1998 apus Malamud 2004).

Inquisitions regarding Mercosul’s structural depth soon surfaced in light of its tardiness in establishing regional institutions. In reference to this, Malamud suggested that this behaviour was merely replicating “a rooted Latin American tradition of lip-servicing”. Is it to be understood then, that Brazil was already part of Latin America prior to Mercosul? According to Mercosul’s constitution, also known as The Asuncion Treaty (1991)¹⁵ (*Tratado de Assunção*) the participating states¹⁶ are,

conscious that the present treaty must be considered a new advance in efforts towards the **progressive development of Latin American integration**, in accordance with the objectives of the Montevideo treaty of 1980. (*emphasis added by author*)

The use of the term Latin America with regards to regional identification / distinction began “when The United States and by extension Europe and the rest of the world, began to regard Brazil as an integral part of a region called Latina America” (Bethell, 2012). Though evidence exists of its use as early as in the 1920s, Brazils association with Latin America became prominent during World War II (WWII) and the Cold War, coinciding with “Spanish American governments and intellectuals including Brazil in their concept of *América Latina*” (Bethell, 2010).

The majority of Brazilians did not identify with Latin America however, and their perspective on this matter was adequately captured in a statement by Edwin V. Morgan, the U.S. ambassador to Brazil during the period 1912-1933. Morgan noted,

[...] this country never forgets that it is of Portuguese and not Spanish origin, that like the United States, it is built on non-Spanish foundations, and that it has

¹⁴ According to Malamud (2004) Latin American integration occurred in three waves, commencing in the late 1950s with the ratification of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Central American Common Market. The second wave began at the end of the 1960s when the Andean Community and the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM) were formed.

¹⁵ The Common Market of the South (Mercosul) constitutional treaty; accessible via: http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/4002/1/tratado_de_asuncion_pt.pdf

¹⁶ Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay are the founding member states of Mercosul.

a special political and economic relationship with the United States different from that of the Spanish American republics”¹⁷.

The end of WWII confirmed the U.S as a dominant global power. By way of an initiative to “provide structure around which to organize policy and through which to develop education and research” (Bethell, 2010) the U.S Ethnographic Board proposed world continental divisions. In the western hemisphere there was to be The United States and Latin America, not the Americas, or North and South America. Bethell (2010) however makes the argument that,

When the board later moved to dividing the world into regions with a degree of geographical, geopolitical and cultural homogeneity, Latin America presented itself as one of the most cohesive in terms of religion, language and culture, history and economic, social and political structures. The differences between Spanish America and Brazil in all these respects, except to some extent religion and the huge disparities in size and population between Brazil and all the other countries in the region, except perhaps Mexico, were simply ignored.

During the post WWII era, Brazil remained the main U.S. ally in Latin America and in light of this politically strategic regional division Latin America now presented an important economic and geopolitical recourse for The United States, “because it initially represented the biggest single voting bloc in the United Nations General Assembly” (Bethell, 2010). The international repercussions for Brazil and Latin America were however not favorable. According to Bethell (2010),

Latin America as a whole, now including Brazil, was not only seen as different from the United States, but also as a problem area, part of what was now called the ‘Third World’ – economically, socially and culturally backward, politically violent and unstable.

On the contrary, Samuel P. Huntington in his theory entitled ‘Clash of Civilizations’¹⁸, makes the argument that “Latin America, with Brazil its leading state, was a separate civilization, with a distinct identity which differentiates it from the West”.

Brazil’s involuntary identification with Latin American is a possible root cause for the aforementioned “lip service” with regards to Mercosul, and also confirms the hypothesis that socio-historical, economic, cultural and geo-political similarities in

¹⁷ Edwin V. Morgan apud Bethell, L. **Brazil and Latin America**. Journal of Latin American Studies, 42, 457-485, Cambridge University Press, (2010).

¹⁸ Huntington, S, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York, 1996 apud Bethell, L. **Brazil and Latin America**. Journal of Latin American Studies, 42, 457-485, Cambridge University Press, (2010).

national identity facilitate integration and the lack thereof may result in limited integration with questionable success.

Huntington's argument however presents a plausible justification for the 21st century Brazilian political discourse armored in pro-Latin and pro-South American integration. In his speech at the closing ceremony of a Brazil - Colombia business seminar¹⁹, President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva reiterates that,

Regional integration also involves the consolidation of South America as a peaceful and democratic zone. [...]

Obviously, when President Alfonsín and President Sarney thought about creating Mercosul, in this process of integration that afterwards culminated with governor Collor, they provided for us an important step. Afterwards, we thought that we were failing and we resolved to return to strengthening Mercosul.

What really happened? What happened is that we began to comprehend that we have an extraordinary possibility to conduct business in South America, that we haven't yet explored what we have to explore. And it is a country the size of Brazil, with Brazil's economy, with the technological potential that Brazil has, with the financial institutions that Brazil has, it is Brazil that has to take the lead to facilitate business happening.

It's Brazil that has to finance part of the development for regional integration; it's Brazil that has to help in the construction of highways, hydroelectric, bridges, telecommunications that are needed in the continent. Either Brazil recognizes that it is a big country; that it is the largest economy of this continent and resolves to exercise its role, not of hegemony, but its role in strengthening partnerships and integration, or things will not happen".

While President Lula's foreign policy simultaneously promoted a social-democratic agenda, evidenced in his attempted dismissal of talks regarding Brazil as a regional hegemony, he also promoted a model for strengthened / deepened regional integration. Each head of state develops his/her foreign policy objectives and strategies which are subsequently reflected in state behaviour. There has been however, relative consistency in Brazil's post war agenda which undoubtedly transpires aspirations towards international recognition and power.

Brazil's protagonism in Mercosul and insistence on a South America regionalism maybe interpreted as a tentative soft power balance against The United States. To substantiate this point of view, Bethell (2010) proposes that "regional power

¹⁹ Seminar entitled: Brazil – Colombia: new frontiers for economic - commercial relations". São Paulo, 2009. Complete speech accessible via: <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/discursos-artigos-entrevistas-e-outras-comunicacoes/presidente-da-republica-federativa-do-brasil/821998472463-discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-inacio/?searchterm=discurso%20presidente%20Luis%20Inacio>

is a necessary condition for global power". U.S. commercial and military dominance in the northern region is evidenced by The North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); Guantanamo Bay and the various other U.S. military satellite bases across Central America; sustained foreign direct invest in the Caribbean nations, etc. In order for Brazil to attain global power recognition there will need to be an established Brazil lead South American equivalent to the U.S. prevalence in the north.

Conclusion

Within the historical context of the development of Brazilian international relations, its socio-cultural, colonial and geo-political nuances provided insight for analyzing its foreign policy choices, strategies and integration initiatives within Latin America.

An initial contextualization of state characteristics and determinants of their behaviour was essential to the development of this analysis. Traditional realist theories suggest that power is the key motivating factor behind state behaviour. However, culture is presented in constructivist I.R scholarship as an important element in the social structure of international relations and as such an important determinant of state behaviour. In this paper, variables such as comparable size and resources, economic potential and cultural affinity, are argued to be indispensable vehicles through which successful policy strategies and regional integration initiatives can be optimized.

The U.S. instigated continental division which resulted in Brazil's involuntary Latin American identity provided an opportunity not only for strengthened economic and political relations with Latin America, but also provided the context for Brazil's emergence as a regional leader. The restructured Latin America founded several regional trade agreements and integration initiatives from the mid to late 20th century, however said initiatives report questionable success.

The Common Market of the South (Mercosul) founded in 1991, on the contrary presented observable success during its first decade, evidenced by significant trade flow increases among its members. Notwithstanding, it neither replicated the EU model of regional integration nor demonstrated the typical characteristics of regionalism proposed by traditional theories. As a result, Mercosul has been heavily criticized, especially as it relates to its tardiness in undertaking steps to institutionalization.

As it relates to this paper's initially proposed claim, Brazil's protagonism of Mercosul and South American regionalism were not based on historical, cultural and / or geo-political affinity. The evidence suggests that Brazil's regional protagonism started as a post war strategy and has stemmed into a policy posture that provides the regional leverage necessary for its hemispheric soft power balancing coherent with its aspirations towards regional and global power.

Bibliography

Bethell, L. **O Brasil e as Conferências Pan-Americanas**, in Alzira Alves de Abreu (org.), *Dicionário Histórico-Bibliográfico da Primeira Republica (1889-1930)*, Rio de Janeiro, 2012/13.

Bethell, L. **Brazil and Latin America**. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 42, 457- 485, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Huntington, S, **The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order**. New York, 1996

Malamud, A. **Regional Integration in Latin America – Comparative Theories and Institutions**. *Sociologia, Problemas e Práticas*, 44; 2004.

Mearsheimer, J. **The Tragedy of Great Power Politics**, W.W Norton & Company, New York, 2001.

Milner, H. **Interests, Institutions and Information: domestic politics and international relations**, Princeton, 1997.

Waltz, K. **Theory of International Politics**, Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979.

Wendt, A. **Constructing International Politics**; *International Security*; Vol. 20; no. 1; 1995, pp. 71 – 81.

Electronic References

Business Seminar, **Brazil – Colombia: new frontiers for economic - commercial relations**; São Paulo, 2009. Accessible via: <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/discursos-artigos-entrevistas-e-outras-comunicacoes/presidente-da-republica-federativa-do-brasil/821998472463-discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-inacio/?searchterm=discurso%20presidente%20Luis%20Inacio>

The Common Market of the South (Mercosul) constitutional treaty. Accessible via: http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/4002/1/tratado_de_asuncion_pt.pdf