

**CAMPAIGNING WITH EMPTY POCKETS:  
 WHY THE LIBERAL PARTY WINS REGIONAL ELECTIONS IN COLOMBIA**

Since the 1950's, the Liberal and Conservative parties controlled the electoral arena in Colombia. For more than fifty years, they won the presidency and together held 90 percent of seats in congress. In 2002, they lost for the first time when Alvaro Uribe Vélez –running as an independent– became president. Not only was he reelected in 2006, but the newly formed Partido Social de Unidad Nacional (Partido de la U) won most of the seats in the Upper House. Four years later, this party attained the presidency and kept its majorities in the House and Senate.

Some scholars believed that these results signaled the irreversible decline of the traditional parties. Subnational evidence, however, suggest otherwise. Despite its defeat at the national level, within the regions, the Liberal Party (LP), still gets more seats in the elections for Regional Assemblies than any other organization. Why has been the LP able to consistently win a plurality of the seats at the regional level while being increasingly unable to attain control of national legislative bodies?

In order to answer that question, I focus on the goods politicians provide and the consequences they have on the clientelistic networks they develop. I argue that in Colombia<sup>1</sup>, within the regions, old patronage networks, based on goods that do not depend upon the central state, help provide votes to those candidates who have been in politics the longest and thus know how to access such networks. Because of their long trajectory, these politicians are also those most likely to enjoy privileged positions within the LP regional hierarchies. Therefore, they have little incentives to move to newer organizations. Because the goods provided are independent from the national government, these politicians do not have incentives to promote national candidates either. Consequently, the Liberal Party wins within the regions but is unable to attain control of national offices. As long as the party members remain in control of regional legislative bodies, the LP is unlikely to disappear.

---

<sup>1</sup> Although the Conservative Party is still present on the political arena, its process has been quite different. It weakened throughout the 1980s and the 1990s. Even when Andrés Pastrana –from this party– won the presidency, their performance in legislative elections was very poor. Different from what has happened with the LP, Uribe's presidency has not undermined, but strengthened the CP.

In order to sustain these claims I test two hypotheses. First, if Colombians vote for regional politicians based on the favors they provide, I would expect subnational candidates' votes to be concentrated in specific municipalities (i.e. those where they have better networks). If citizens vote for national politicians on a different basis, then I would also expect lower house congress members, who are elected in the same district, to have a more homogeneous vote across municipalities. Second, if long standing regional politicians do not have incentives to move into new parties, I would expect the LP's politicians to have longer political trajectories than their counterparts in new political parties.

In this paper, I first overview recent electoral events in Colombia; I detail the arguments that have been used to explain them, and show that they remain unsatisfactory. Second, I describe the type of goods that regional politicians provide: why people need them, and why politicians distribute them. I use electoral data to show that people use distinct logics to elect national and subnational politicians. Third, I use semi-structured interviews to explain the logic behind politicians moving from one party into a different one. I measure politicians' careers across parties in order to show that in fact long-standing politicians remain in the LP. In the conclusion I wrap up the argument and draw final remarks.

## 1. **The Puzzle:** **Liberal Party's Electoral Performance in the Early 2000s**


In 2002 the Liberal and Conservative parties lost the presidential elections against an independent candidate for the first time in history. Not only did Alvaro Uribe Vélez –running under the label of “Primero Colombia”<sup>2</sup>– win the presidency, but in 2006 he was reelected and his coalition won

---

<sup>2</sup> Primero Colombia was built when Uribe Vélez was unable to win the Liberal Party nomination. It was created with the only purpose of supporting his candidacy. It did not present candidates to any other organism, nor did it act in between elections. Uribe used it again to run for reelection in 2006. Today it remains dormant.

most of the seats in Congress<sup>3</sup>. For the first time in Colombia’s modern political history neither traditional party controlled one of the chambers.

As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the elections of 2002 and 2006 signal a major turn in Colombia’s politics. Not only did an outsider<sup>4</sup> win the presidency, against the candidate endorsed by the Liberal Party in 2002, but for the first time since the early 1900s the Conservative Party (CP) did not present a candidate<sup>5</sup> (Figure 1). In 2006 the Liberal nominee placed third in the presidential election and in 2010 it placed sixth; he did not even get 5% of the votes (Figure 1 and 2).




SOURCE: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil Colombia  
 NOTES: MPC: Movimiento Primero Colombia (Alvaro Uribe), PL: Partido Liberal (Horacio Serpa 2002, 2006, Rafael Pardo 2010), PDA: Polo Democrático Alternativo (Luis Eduardo Garzón 2002, and Carlos Gaviria 2006, Gustavo Petro 2010), SC: Si Colombia (Noemí Sanín), PV: Partido Verde (Anatanas Mockus), PU Partido de la U (Juan Manuel Santos), CP: Cambio Radical (Germán Vargas Lleras), PC (Noemí Sanín) Other: Every other group who obtained less than 5% of the votes.

<sup>3</sup> The Partido Social de Unidad Nacional (Partido de la U) won most of the seats in the Senate. Although the Liberal Party got the majority of the seats in the House it is effectively outnumbered by Uribe’s coalition represented by the Partido de la U, Cambio Radical and other minor parties.

<sup>4</sup> Some do not think of Alvaro Uribe as an outsider because, until his candidacy, he was a member of the Liberal Party. However he ran as an independent, with no support of any party whatsoever and has kept his distance of any party since then (even from those that declared loyal to him.)

<sup>5</sup> In the 2002 presidential race, the conservative candidate, Juan Camilo Restrepo, withdrew himself from the elections. The Conservative Party supported Uribe’s candidacy instead. In 2006 they openly backed him up again, and have been part of his coalition since then.




SOURCE: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil  
 NOTES: For 1994, 1998 and 2010 I am showing only the first round

The LP's performance in presidential elections was mirrored by its performance in legislative elections. In 2006 the LP lost its majorities in the Senate to the recently formed Partido de la "U". In 2010 it placed third after the same party and the Conservative Party (Figure 3) both in the Upper and Lower house.


Based on the national electoral outcomes described above, political scientists, politicians, and journalists forecasted that the traditional parties would become irrelevant (Pizarro 2006, Gutiérrez 2007). Subnational electoral outcomes, however, tell a different story. While an independent candidate and non-traditional parties have won in the highest governing bodies of the country, up to 2011 the Liberal Party has won the largest number of seats across Regional Assemblies (Figure 4), and still controls the legislative bodies of several regions. In 2003 the LP won a plurality of the seats in 19 out of the 32 Regional Assemblies; in 2007 it won in 16; and in 2010 it won 13 (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil).<sup>6</sup> Although these numbers show some decline<sup>7</sup>, after eight years of losing control of the national political arena, the LP still has a good showing<sup>8</sup>.

---

<sup>6</sup> The Conservative Party also remains alive. However their process is slightly different. Throughout the 1980's and 1990's they faced enormous electoral defeats both within the regions and nationwide. In 1998, they won the presidency, but the congress and subnational legislative bodies remained controlled by the LP. Since they have remained close to Uribe, his presidency has not weakened them, but strengthened their position in national and regional legislative bodies.



SOURCE: Registraduria Nacional del Estado Civil  
NOTES: PU=Partido Social de Unión Nacional (Partido de la U), PL=Partido Liberal, PC=Partido Conservador, PDA=Polo Alternativo Democrático, CR=Cambio Radical, CC=Convergencia Ciudadana, EC=Equipo Colombia, PIN: Movimiento de Integración Nacional, Coal: coalitions, Others=parties that attained less than 5 seats.



SOURCE: Registraduria Nacional del Estado Civil.  
NOTES: PL= Partido Liberal, PU=Partido de la U, PC= Partido Conservador, PCR = Cambio Radical, PV=Partido Verde, PDA = Polo Democrático Alternativo, MNal=Movimiento Nacional, CC=Convergencia Ciudadana, IR=Movimiento Integración Regional, EC=Equipo Colombia, CD= Movimiento Colombia Democrática, NP = Movimiento Nacional Progresista, NL=Nuevo Liberalismo., MPU=Movimiento Popular Unido, AL=Apertura Liberal

<sup>7</sup> While in 2007 the LP almost doubled the PU in seats for Regional Assemblies, in 2011 it only got 4 more than PU. Given the LP's support for President Juan Manuel Santos' government it is unclear if this declining trend will continue in 2015.

<sup>8</sup> This is hard to evaluate in other offices at the subnational level because of inconsistent outcomes. I do not include Governorships in this analysis because governors are as hard to reach as congressmen/women. In 2007 the Conservative and Liberal Party won most of the mayoralties across the country --242 and 206 respectively--; in 2010 they were beaten by Partido de la U which won 258. Still the traditional parties attained: 194 (PC) and 181 (PL). In 2007 the LP and the Conservative Party won most of the seats in the local councils: 2236 and 2129 respectively. In 2010 they were beaten by Partido de la U which won 2054. Still, the traditional parties attained: 1989 (PC) and 1983 (PL).

If the LP were disappearing like AD and COPEI in Venezuela or APRA in Perú—where the traditional parties lost control of governorships and municipal councils short after Hugo Chávez and Alberto Fujimory became presidents—this party would be losing elections at the national and the subnational level at the same pace. It is not. Despite its poor performance in congressional elections, the LP has managed to remain fairly strong within the regions. Why?

Present studies of the traditional parties in Colombia do not explain the Liberal Party's resilience at the regional level (Gutiérrez 2002, Bejarano and Pizarro 2005, Pizarro 2002, 2006). With few exceptions<sup>9</sup>, most scholarly work on the subject does not take into account regional electoral outcomes at all (Archer 1995, Pizarro 2002, 2006, Gutiérrez 2002, 2006, 2007, Taylor 2009). As a result they elucidate the reasons behind the LP's poor performance at the national level, but fail to explain its electoral success within the regions.

Common approaches to party competition cannot account for the LP's resilience at the regional level either. Social cleavages theory suggests that parties are shaped according to major divisions in society (Lippset and Rokan 1976). To some extent, Gutierrez (2007) subscribes to this hypothesis. He suggests that the National Front<sup>10</sup> deemphasized partisan cleavages, and led the Liberal and Conservative parties to rely more on patronage than programmatic appeals. While initially successful, this strategy failed once society organized along a more left-right division surrounding the armed conflict. Instead, clientelism hindered the LP's ability to readjust along the new cleavage<sup>11</sup>.

His argument is convincing, however, it does not explain why the LP prevails at the subnational level. A new cleavage explains the LP's poor performance at the national level, however, it cannot

---

<sup>9</sup> Hoyos (2007), Dávila and Corredor (1998) and Querubín, Sánchez and Kure (1998) have cross-time analyses of local and regional elections since the 1980s. Botero (1998), García (2003) and Gutiérrez (2000) have analyzed mayor and council elections in Bogota

<sup>10</sup> Period between 1958 and 1974 during which the Liberal and Conservative parties share all public offices. The presidency was to be alternated for sixteen years, and all mayoralties, governorships and legislative bodies in the country were equally divided among the Liberal and Conservative Party.

<sup>11</sup> The reason why the traditional parties weren't able to readjust and keep their officers is because they had adopted practices that increased electoral performance, but hindered party organization. When the cleavage changed, it became profitable and easier to jump ship than reorient the party's orientation.

account for its simultaneous success in regions across the country. If cleavages had changed and the LP was unable to represent them, why would a person vote for its candidate for the regional assembly? Even if there were different cleavages at the national and subnational level, it does not explain how it is that different regions across the country would share the same regional cleavage.

The institutional approach could also explain why a party has poor performance under given electoral rules (Cox 1999). Scholars have suggested that a series of institutional reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Colombia created incentives for parties to become highly personalistic and weak (Pizarro 2006, Bejarano and Pizarro 1999, Cox and Shugart 1995, Archer and Shugart 1997, Shugart, Moreno and Fajardo 2007.) They provided incentives for politicians to disregard party labels and build personal rather than party reputations (Shugart and Carey 1995). These new electoral rules would then explain the traditional parties' weakness and their decline.

However, even if these reforms increased party systems fragmentation, and created incentives to disregard parties and cultivate personal vote, such an approach does not account for different electoral outcomes at the national and subnational level. These electoral rules were implemented both at the national and subnational level. Thus they cannot explain divergent performance within the same party at each of these levels. If the LP were disappearing, existing arguments imply that it should be doing so both at the regional and at the national level. Instead, two different dynamics within the same party seem to be at play and these theories cannot account for both of them.

I argue that the LP's performance at the national and subnational level is explained by the nature of clientelistic networks. Regional clientelistic networks, based on goods that do not depend upon the central state, help provide votes to those candidates who have been in politics the longest. The latter are likely to be liberal politicians, with privileged positions within the party. They get nominated, thus, they have no reason to defect. Because they distribute goods that are independent from the national state, they also have little incentive to promote national candidates. Consequently the LP wins within the regions but it is unable to attain control of national offices.

## 2. The Goods Regional Politicians Provide to their Clienteles

For a long time, scholars have argued that the exchange of votes for patronage is a common practice in Colombia (Archer 1990, Leal and Dávila 1990, Martz 1997, Escobar 2002, Gutiérrez 2002, Dávila and Varela 2002, García 2003). Existing analyses posit that client-patron relationships<sup>12</sup> in this country have evolved from “traditional clientelism” –strong asymmetrical and affective relationship in which the patron uses his own resources to provide goods and services to their clienteles- to “broker clientelism” –where the local patron becomes a member of a larger network and depends upon national patrons to access state resources with which he feeds his clientele (Archer 1990). Some suggest that this practice has further evolved into market clientelism –in which the patron, who does not depend upon national politicians, uses resources other than those from the central state, to feed clienteles within geographically restricted networks (Dávila Ladrón de Guevara and Delgado Varela 2002) where his socio-economic position is not as important as his political trajectory and his presence. (Gutiérrez 1998, García 2003)

Following this idea, I suggest that the goods provided by regional politicians to their constituencies do not necessarily depend upon the material resources of the national state. In Colombia, deputies are usually asked to supply access to jobs and speed up bureaucratic procedures, what is known in México as “gestión social” and in Brazil as “jeitinho.” More than commodities’ providers, they work as intermediaries between their clientele and the local public administration, granting effective access to state institutions. They provide “errand-boy services to solve individual constituents’ problems with government bureaucracy” (Shugart and Carey, 1995: 419)

As Mainwaring (1999) points out for Brazil, some state services that are formally guaranteed to all citizens are only effectively provided through political intermediaries:

... Many people depend on the state and politicians for personal favors. Getting an opening in a public school, receiving retirement benefits, obtaining a concession to open a gasoline station, and getting a permit for a radio or television station often

---

<sup>12</sup> Defined as those in which politicians exchange private and club goods in exchange for votes (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007)



require a politician's intermediation...Access to day-care centers and schools, public housing, medical services, retirement benefits, and scholarships similarly can depend on political favors...In return for the services and favors they provide, politicians hope to win the allegiance, votes, and financial contributions of those whom they help (1999: 183).

The same holds for Colombia. Although the Colombian state is supposed to provide welfare benefits for its citizens who need them, its inability to do so encourages those in the greatest need to enter into clientelistic relationships with politicians. Public and subsidized health, education, pension, clean water services, targeted social programs, and the like can only be obtained after long and cumbersome procedures. Whereas some people have the time to wait, others are in immediate need and cannot wait until the paperwork goes through. In order to attain the services in a timely manner, people ask regional politicians for help. Subnational politicians, who often lack material patronage, have contacts and knowledge that they use to aid people to navigate the state bureaucracy and obtain what they want, in exchange for their political support.

The Identification System of Potential Beneficiaries of Social Programs (*Sistema de Identificación de Potenciales Beneficiarios de Programas Sociales - SISBEN*) is a good example of this. SISBEN is the office in charge of identifying who is entitled to use subsidized state services in Colombia. It uses neighborhood stratification and face-to-face interviews to determine the level of need of an individual or a family. Those entitled to receive welfare get a membership card, which they have to show in order to get subsidized health, education, or other kind of services.

While the evaluation process seems simple, it can take up to a year between the moment a citizen applies for SISBEN membership and the moment a citizen gets the card. In the meantime, she will have access to emergency health care but she will not have access to other long-term services or targeted programs. According to the rules specified by SISBEN's Guide of Use and Support (2008), once a person applies for the card in the municipal office, it takes three days for an interviewer to visit her house. During that time, the person should not leave home. After the interview, it should take up to three months to get the card that certifies your affiliation.

In regular circumstances then, it requires at least three months to get full access to welfare services. However, non-official accounts suggest that in reality the waiting time is significantly longer (Author Interview July 2009). To begin with, SISBEN's interviewers often fail to go to the applicant's house within the stipulated time; they can take up to a month to show up. Since applicants cannot wait in their house for this long, they are often away when the interviewer finally arrives. As a consequence, they have to start the process all over again. Moreover, even though the card should arrive within three months, some users relate that they had to wait between eight months to a year before they got it (Author Interview July 2009).

A phone call by a local politician can speed up the process. The politician's favor will reduce the waiting time from three months to fifteen days (Author interview July 13, 2009). Consequently, most citizens obtain what is nominally their right as an individual favor from a deputy to whom they promise political support.

The fact that these exchanges of votes for favors take place is well known by the authorities. In an ill attempt to avoid the clientelistic practices described above, national directives of the SISBEN prohibited sectional and regional entities from delivering membership cards or granting specific aids within fifteen days before and a week after the elections of 2010:

*Keeping in mind we need to guarantee the transparency of the actualization and identification processes within the SISBEN and the delivery of subsidies to improve households and perform health brigades, we suggest that—without undermining fundamental rights— regional, municipal and district authorities should not perform these activities fifteen days prior, and a week after any popular election (Directiva Unificada No. 003 of February 24, 2010 from the Procurador General de la Nación)<sup>13</sup>.*

---

<sup>13</sup> Author's translation. The original reads as follows: "El Procurador General de la nación, en ejercicio de sus funciones constitucionales y legales...teniendo en cuenta que es necesario garantizar la transparencia en los procesos de actualización del SISBEN y de la carnetización de la población que se incorpore a ella, la entrega de subsidios para el mejoramiento de vivienda y la realización de brigadas de salud, se recomienda a las autoridades departamentales, municipales y distritales que, sin menoscabo de los derechos fundamentales se abstengan de efectuar tales actividades durante los 15 días anteriores y una semana después de cualquier elección de carácter popular" (Directiva Unificada No. 003 del 24 de febrero de 2010, de la Procuraduría General de la Nación)

The SISBEN illustrates the difficulties that Colombia's ordinary citizens—those without connections—face when accessing state bureaucracy. They have long waiting periods, many requirements to fulfill, and no assistance in doing so. They act as “supplicants of favors” rather than “bearers of a right” (O'Donnell 1999). In order to avoid cumbersome processes that hinder their basic wellbeing, these citizens ask the regional politicians they know to help them. The latter then use their contacts to go around the bureaucracy and speed up the processes.

Regional politicians in turn provide these “favors” because they have no resources to provide anything else. As illustrated by García (2003) in his analysis of clientelistic networks in Bogotá, popularly elected officials with little access to material resources need to work more like “tramitadores” of the basic needs of their clientele in order to attain votes. They help the citizens navigate the public system. In the absence of other resources, they cannot provide material goods, but effective access to welfare and other institutions of the state.

The process of decentralization that took place during the 1990s made mayoralties and governorships popularly elected positions. It gave the regions a democratic basis and a flow of fiscal resources (O' Neal 2006). However, access to such resources did not flow into legislative bodies. The Regional Assembly is the one that authorizes the Governor to spend the region's resources. However the initiative on how, when and where to invest those resources, is the Governor's only (Art. 300, Chapter II, National Constitution). The deputies of the Regional Assemblies are thus officials with little access to material resources. To citizens, these deputies matter because they have access to key members of the regional bureaucracy and the local elites and, therefore, they can provide effective access to the services like SISBEN.

Accordingly, deputies use favors as patronage. As García (2003) and Davila and Varela (2002) point out, politicians without resources become intermediaries with the bureaucracy for their clientele. Colombia's state bureaucracy is hard to navigate (Davila and Varela 2002, García 2003), as the example of SISBEN illustrates. Local politicians can help their clientele in doing so. They can use their knowledge and their contacts within institutions and elites to aid citizens go through state institutions.

People have a strong incentive to vote for these politicians because it provides them with a known representative to whom they can approach whenever they need access to state welfare services or other institutions. As long as the deputy remains an effective “intermediary”, he or she is likely to retain those votes. The better the contacts, the more reliable this politician becomes in feeding his clientele. This, along with a steady relationship within specific groups of the population, makes the regional candidate trustworthy and people are more likely to vote for him.

Citizens are reluctant to ask national politicians for similar favors because congressmen live faraway and are less accessible than their regional counterparts. As a result, the relationship between national politicians and citizens is different. For a common citizen, it simply does not pay off to make a long trip to try to meet a national representative that is hard to access. In other words, national and subnational officers serve a different purpose for their constituencies. Whereas people seek regional politicians to help them navigate the regional bureaucracy, they look for different assets in their national representatives.

There is no subnational public opinion data available in Colombia that would allow us to directly test this assertion. However, if citizens vote for national and subnational offices on a different basis, we should expect them to have different vote patterns within the same district. If connections are important when electing regional representatives, we should observe that their votes are concentrated in those areas where they have built better networks. At the same time, if these connections are not that important at the national level, national politicians should have their votes more spread out throughout the district. Thus, I hypothesize that, within the same district, national politicians will have a more homogeneous vote than their subnational counterparts.

In Colombia, lower house representatives and regional assemblymen and women are elected within a region. Each region (*departamento*) is divided into several municipalities. I suggest that regional deputies will have their votes more concentrated in few municipalities, while lower house representatives will have their votes more homogeneously distributed across municipalities.

To test this hypothesis, I use electoral data from the national legislative elections of 2006 and the regional elections of 2007<sup>14</sup>. I compare the concentration of votes of regional deputies and the concentration of votes of lower house representatives and show that lower house congressmen and women have a more homogenous distribution of votes than their regional counterparts.

In order to measure concentration of votes I use Mainwaring and Jones (2003) technique to attain the Party Nationalization Score (PNS), but instead of measuring party nationalization, I assess lower house representatives and deputies' vote shares in different municipalities across the same region. I will refer to it as vote concentration.

The PNS departs from the logic of the Gini coefficient—  $G_i = (X_i Y_{i+1})(X_{i+1} Y_i)$  <sup>15</sup>— as a way to measure the distribution of votes across a country. It calculates “...the extent to which a party wins equal vote shares across all the sub-national units” (Mainwaring and Jones, 2003: 4). The Gini Coefficient ranges from 0 to 1. 0 means that parties receive the same vote share in all subnational units and 1 means that they receive all of their votes from one specific subnational unit. In order to get the PNS, Mainwaring and Jones subtract the Gini coefficient from one. Since I am measuring concentration, I will stick to the Gini instead. If the Gini is low, then politicians' votes are spread out and homogeneous across the *departamento*. If the score is high, then their votes are concentrated in few municipalities.


I chose all candidates who participated in regional assembly and the lower house elections and calculate the Gini coefficient for each of them. As shown below (Figure 5), the data confirms my hypothesis. Albeit concentrated, the average vote concentration for congressmen (0.55) is smaller than

---


<sup>14</sup> Unfortunately the data available online for the national and subnational elections of 2010 and 2011 is not in a usable format. The raw reports available do not allow us to do a similar test for the 2010 and 2011 elections.

<sup>15</sup> This formula is an adaptation. The more common formula—an approximation to the Lorenz curve for discrete data—  $G = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^n (X_i - X_{i-1})(Y_i + Y_{i-1})$  where  $X_i$  is the cumulative proportion of a candidate's vote share and  $Y_i$  is the cumulative proportion that the  $i$ th municipality represents on the total number of municipalities—provides very similar results.

that of the deputies (0.71). Moreover, as shown in Figure 6 in every single district, but one, regional deputies had a higher vote concentration than assemblymen and women.<sup>16</sup>



SOURCE: My own calculations based on data from the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.



SOURCE: My own calculations based on data from the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil

<sup>16</sup> Regional Assemblies and the Lower House have different district magnitudes (for each region, there are more seats for Regional Assemblies, than there are for the Lower House), however, different district magnitude should not impact this result. If anything, a higher district magnitude should increase the number of candidates and thus reduce vote shares for each candidate. If that were so, we should expect a better distribution (lower Gini Coefficient) in Regional Assemblies compared with the Lower House.

In other words, liberal regional deputies obtained their votes from fewer municipalities than the national counterparts, despite the fact that both types of politicians represent the same geographic areas. This fact supports the idea that people vote differently for these two positions. They vote based on networks and connections for their regional representatives, but they have different appeals when choosing national officials. It strengthens the argument outlined above: regional politicians distribute favors using their knowledge and networks within local and regional bureaucracy. Citizens vote for them because they need to have a representative whom they can approach when they need access to state services.

In the absence of subnational survey data, vote dispersion is one way to test the argument that national and subnational politicians get their votes in a different manner. The first ones distribute to clientele with whom they have steady face-to-face relationships, while the second ones have a harder time doing so. This test, however, has its limitations. Other alternative explanations might account for the phenomenon as well. For example, it might be the case that national politicians have the ability and resources to campaign throughout the region whereas their regional counterparts do not. Furthermore, national candidates might be better known on a regional basis, while the deputies might have a harder time getting themselves in municipalities other than the one they come from.

Within the specific constraints of this paper, it is impossible to account for all these explanations. However, complementary information supports the argument outlined above. During different interviews with citizens and community leaders, it became evident that they voted for regional politicians based on how confident they felt asking them for favors. When asked why did she voted for candidates of different parties for national and subnational bodies, an interviewee answered that she wasn't going all the way to Bogotá, just to ask a congressman to get her son a place in school (Author's Interview, July 28, 2009). She implied that she had more "flexibility" when voting for national officials. Moreover, when asked about the reasons to support a given regional candidate, a community leader in César answered that he had to "perform social activities"; work with the leaders so that they can "solve their [community's] needs" (Author's Interview July 23, 2009).

In sum deputies in Colombia get elected based on their ability to provide access to state bureaucracy. Such capacity depends upon their contacts within local institutions and elites. As a consequence they obtain most of their votes from few areas within the region. National politicians have other kinds of appeals; therefore, their votes are more homogeneous across the same district.

### 3. Long Serving Politicians are Usually Affiliated with the Traditional Parties

If local networks are important to win regional elections, then those candidates with better contacts will be the ones who have a better chance to attain office. Networks are built with time. It follows that those politicians who have been in politics the longest will be the ones with better contacts within local bureaucracies and elites. This section shows that, for the most part, the LP holds candidates with longer political trajectories than their counterparts. These politicians are better equipped to win seats in the regional assemblies, than members of other parties.

Colombia's politicians are office-seekers (Gutiérrez 2007). They will look for parties that will help them win office, with little regard for their policy position. During the interviews I conducted in the summer 2009—with the exception of the PDA and ASI<sup>17</sup>—most politicians showed little concern about the party they joined, as long as it gave them access to nominations and, to a lesser extent, helped them attain office.

For instance, Jorge Tafur—deputy of the regional assembly of Bolívar for Apertura Liberal—suggests that *“the objective is to get the nomination.... It is a mathematical strategy: to calculate that, once inside,*

---

<sup>17</sup> The PDA is a coalition of leftist parties. Its members are hardcore ideologues, who have been active in legal (i.e. Communist and Socialist parties) and illegal associations (i.e. the guerrilla movement M-19). They have been persecuted by state and non-state actors, which has made them hardcore ideologues. During the interviews conducted during the summer 2009, they identified themselves as ideologues, and were recognized as such by other politicians as well.

ASI (Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia) Built to defend indigenous communities, this party is composed mostly by indigenous leaders who remain closely attached to their ethnic groups. They believe in politics as a way to advance indigenous demands, rather than their own career.



*you are not left out.... Parties are happy to accept you.*” (Author interview July 21<sup>st</sup>, 2009)<sup>18</sup>. In the same line Luis C. Fuentes –deputy of the regional assembly of Bolívar for the PDA—points out that: *“the traditional parties have no prestige. They do not represent. They are disunited. Personal interests rule them. There is no discipline. There is no program. They became a group of negotiators.”* (Authors’ interview July 21<sup>st</sup>, 2009)<sup>19</sup>.

It is ultimately a matter of nominations. As suggested by Javier Alonso Durán –deputy of the Regional Assembly of Santander for Cambio Radical—politicians then chose smaller parties over larger ones, because *“they have a better option to get elected with nascent parties that open up spaces for those that cannot reach them within the traditional parties”* (Authors’ interview July 30, 2009)<sup>20</sup>

#### WHY THE LP BECAME UNATTRACTIVE FOR MANY POLITICIANS

Before the late 1990s and early 2000s the LP was an attractive choice for most politicians. Despite people’s weak partisanship due historical legacies of the National Front<sup>21</sup>, it still helped politicians advance their career. It had a strong label, and provided good economic and logistic support. Moreover, until 2003 electoral rules allowed parties to present as many lists as seats available in legislative elections. Therefore, for the most part, Liberal politicians did not have to compete for nominations. With high benefits, and low costs, the LP was then a good strategic choice for an office-seeker.

---

<sup>18</sup> The quote reads as follows: “El objetivo es capturar la credencial...Es una estrategia matemática calcular que dentro del partido no quede fuera.” “Los otros movimientos [diferentes al Polo] se mueven de manera particular. Por intereses individualistas.”

<sup>19</sup> The quote readas as follows: “Los partidos tradicionales están desprestigiados. No representan. Sin cohesión. Impera el apetito personal. No hay disciplina/sometimiento. Plataforma. Se volvieron un grupo de negociadores.”

<sup>20</sup> The quote reads as follows: “Porque hay más opción de salir elegido con partidos nacientes y que abren sus espacios para los que en los partidos tradicionales no alcanzan.”

<sup>21</sup> The National Front is a bipartisan agreement signed in 1958 according to which all public offices had to be distributed equally among the Liberal and Conservative Parties. The presidency rotated for sixteen years, and up to 1986 all legislative bodies and nonelected executives were equally occupied by both parties.

However, in 1994 specific historical events and new electoral laws hampered the LPs label and increased candidates' access to alternative –legal and illegal- resources. The absence of competition throughout the National Front (1958-1970), drug related scandals during the presidency of Ernesto Samper (1994–1998)<sup>22</sup>, and the inability to solve the most pressing socioeconomic and security problems in Colombia discredited the Liberal Party in the eyes of voters (Archer 1995, Gutiérrez 2006, 2007)

On top of that, new electoral rules made it easier for politicians to build or move into new parties. The Law 30 of 1994 on political parties depreciated large parties' endorsements. It reduced the requisites needed by a party to be recognized by the National Electoral Council. Accordingly, a person only needed to be backed by fifty thousand signatories – including a legislator—or fifty thousand votes in order to be recognized as a party and have access to state resources (Article 3, Law 130 of 1994). Therefore, after 1994, several mini-movements were able to present candidates to elections. The funds guaranteed by the state assured most of them at least one seat in a legislative body (Pizarro and Bejarano 1999, Pizarro 2006).

Furthermore, in Colombia, legislative seats were distributed using the Hare electoral formula, also known as single quota largest remainders. Since a party could win seats with remainders, small parties could attain representation with a relatively small amount of votes. This also prompted candidates to build their own party, or join small parties, rather than competing for endorsements inside the LP (Pizarro 2006).

Whereas the LP lost its attractiveness during the 1990s, most liberal politicians did not defect from it until 2003. While the LP offered few benefits, until then, there was little competition for nominations as well. The Hare electoral formula rewarded candidates who won seats with reminders and Colombia's law allowed parties to present as many lists as seats available. Therefore, parties had incentives to present many lists, instead of a big one. Several lists gave them more seats through the remainders than a single large list (Shugart, Moreno & Fajardo 2007). This, in turn, allowed the LP to

---

<sup>22</sup> Ernesto Samper was accused of receiving money from the Cali drug cartel in order to fund his presidential campaign. While the scandal was not enough to impeach him, it did touch many of his ministers and Liberal congressmen.

endorse a large number of candidates. In 1994 and 1998, the LP presented 134 and 148 lists to the Senate, winning 56% and 49% of the seats respectively, despite having only 52,8% and 47.3% of the votes (Vélez, Ossa & Montes 2006).

Although, the Hare electoral formula depreciated party endorsements, and hindered party discipline (Pizarro 2006), it allowed the LP to solve its coordination problem. Because the law permitted every party to present many lists, and the electoral formula granted seats with reminders, most politicians in the party were able to present themselves to elections. As long as they obtained a remainder large enough, they could assure their seat. Even if there were few incentives to stay inside the LP, the costs of being affiliated to it were not particularly high. As a consequence, politicians remained attached to the LP.

In 2003, however, being affiliated to the LP became costly for many politicians. An institutional reform prohibited parties from presenting more than one list for each legislative body. The LP could not endorse as many candidates as it used to, which rendered it unable to solve its coordination problem (e.g. many candidates seeking few nominations). With a steep competition for nominations, given that the LP did not offer much more benefits than other parties, it became costly for politicians to remain attached to it, and many of them defected.

In other words, by the end of the 1990s the LP had no more benefits to offer than any other party. Not only was its label widely discredited, but liberal candidates had access to resources other than those funneled through the party. Moreover, a series of institutional reforms had lowered down the costs of moving from a large party into a smaller one. As evidenced by Alvaro Uribe in 2002, by the end of the 1990s presenting yourself to elections under the LP did not provide much more advantages than presenting under other labels.

#### WHY DO REGIONAL JOUNGER POLITICIANS JOIN SMALLER AND NEWER PARTIES

If the LP provides little benefits to its politicians (relative to other parties), the decision to remain attached to it or not, depends upon how good is the opportunity to get the party's endorsement. In fact,

politicians move into new and smaller parties because they provide them a better opportunity to get nominated. When asked why they or their colleagues left the Liberal or the Conservative Party, 25 out of 34 deputies referred to the candidate's ability to win a nomination. In their words: *"people just go to [the party] that hands out nominations. They don't look for large parties, because they want associations with less names."* (Author's interview, July 15, 2009.)<sup>23</sup> It *".. is an issue of how much would it cost me to escalate... The Liberal and Conservative parties are 'streets' with too much traffic."*(Author's interview, July 16, 2009)<sup>24</sup>

Two seemingly opposite notions support this attitude. Most of the politicians interviewed believe that parties play an important role: they provide a structure and a label that reduce costs and gain votes. However, most of them also agree that the label behind a candidate does not outweigh his personal attributes.

According to Colombia's legislation a candidate can register to elections without a party's endorsement if he is backed up by, at least, 50,000 signatures (Article 9, Law 30 of 1994). When asked about the advantages of registering for elections using a party's endorsement instead of signatures, most of the interviewees (24 deputies) highlighted that parties provide logistic support and reduce costs of information. Guillermo Cuartas, deputy of Antioquia's regional assembly for the Conservative Party, for example, observed that:

*People who register with signatures are 'lost souls'. They don't fit. The signatures are costly; you have to have a different type of platform. There is the risk that during revisions some signatures are going to be ruled out. Besides, nobody denies a signature, but there is no compromise.* (Author interview, July 16, 2009)<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>23</sup> The quote reads as follows: "La gente simplemente se mueve a donde dan avales. No buscan partidos grandes porque buscan agrupaciones con menos nombres..."

<sup>24</sup> The quote reads as follows: "La gente cambia de partidos por los avales y conveniencias políticas...Es un tema de cuánto me cuesta escalar. El Partido Liberal y el Partido Conservador son 'calles' con mucho tráfico"

<sup>25</sup> The quote reads as follows: "La gente que se inscribe por firmas son como 'almas en pena'. No encajan. Las firmas son más costosas, tienes que tener una plataforma diferente. Existen muchos riesgos de que en las revisiones se quemen las firmas. Además una firma no se le niega a nadie, pero no hay compromisos"

In other words, in Colombia, a regional politician is unlikely to run without a party because it is costly and risky. Furthermore, getting a party's endorsement is not a complicated endeavor: as observed by a deputy from Risaralda's regional assembly "...nobody denies a nomination. If a party denies me a nomination, then I can go to another one." (Author's Interview, July 13, 2009)<sup>26</sup>. Therefore there is no reason for a candidate to undertake the costs of running without it.

Despite their agreement on the importance of parties to run for elections, when asked how to win an electoral contest politicians fared parties low in their priorities. Most deputies highlighted the importance of the individual's assets vis-à-vis those of the party they belonged to<sup>27</sup>. For example, for Gilberto Bustamante, deputy of Antioquia's regional assembly "...party endorsements are just a requisite [and] people do not pay attention to the party. One can grab and own the party's platform when one builds one's own path" (Author's interview, July 15, 2009)<sup>28</sup>. Even long standing members of the traditional parties suggested that "...the community is the most important and running without a party is viable." (Author's Interview, July 15, 2009)<sup>29</sup>

At the end, parties do have important assets for most politicians interviewed. They provide economic and logistic support and their label can help a candidate win votes. No regional deputy ran using firms and most of the interviewees dismissed this system as cumbersome, costly, and risky. However, when asked about a successful campaign, most politicians emphasized personal traits. Some openly suggested that the party did not contribute to their campaign and that it was possible to win without being affiliated to one.

---

<sup>26</sup> The quote reads as follows: "Conseguir un aval no es difícil. Un aval no se le niega a nadie. Si me lo niegan me voy a otro partido"

<sup>27</sup> The exceptions were candidates of indigenous parties (ASI) and the leftist coalition PDA, whose members were characterized by the deputies as more attached to their ideologies, and less concerned with winning office.

<sup>28</sup> The quote readas as follows: "...el aval es un requisito, la gente no le para bolas al partido. Las banderas se arrebatan cuando uno labra su propio camino."

<sup>29</sup> The quote reads as follows: "La política no es de partidos sino de amigos, porque los partidos se han ido desdibujando lo que importa es un buen proyecto, una hoja de vida clara."

In sum, regional politicians value parties. However they disregard party labels because they are not considered to be strong enough to outweigh personal assets. Consequently regional politicians are likely to change from a large party into a small one, based mostly on the costs that party entails. If it takes a long time to get endorsed in a large party, a candidate is likely to consider moving into a smaller party in which he will be nominated.

#### WHY LONG-SERVING POLITICIANS REMAIN IN THE LIBERAL PARTY

Regional politicians chose to move from the LP party into smaller and newer parties, after weighting the possibility of winning a nomination. Accordingly, I argue that the politicians who remain in the LP are long-serving politicians with a high position in the regional party structure. They do not have to fight for their nomination as hard as newer candidates and therefore, they have fewer incentives to leave. Consequently, I expect the LP to have members with a longer political trajectory than members of other parties.

Gutiérrez (2007) states that the LP is an “old party”. Based on the personal files of the candidates the LP endorsed, he shows that the age of those who receive party endorsements, on average, is high and few young people run for public offices with the party (Gutiérrez 2007: 424). I further examine this assessment by measuring the length of Liberals’ political career and comparing it with that of the members of other parties.

The data for my analysis comes from three different regional assemblies (Antioquia, Santander and Cesar). It was collected through interviews to their deputies in the summer of 2009, and complemented with biographical information online, articles in newspapers and magazines. Unfortunately the information available for other regions was insufficient and it was impossible to include other deputies in the analysis.

I measured political trajectory using the years that each deputy has spent in a public office (local councils, mayoralities, regional assembly, congress and other non-elective offices). Using these, I calculated an average of years in office for each party.

<b>PARTY</b>	<b>No. DEPUTIES</b>	<b>YEARS OF SERVICE IN AVERAGE</b>
<b>LP</b>	14	11.1
<b>CR</b>	6	9
<b>CP</b>	9	6.9
<b>P de la U</b>	5	6.8
<b>Alas</b>	9	5.2
<b>C.C.</b>	5	4.4
<b>PDA</b>	2	1
<b>C.D.</b>	1	0
<b>ASI</b>	1	0

SOURCE: [www.asambleadeantioquia.gov.co](http://www.asambleadeantioquia.gov.co), [www.asambleadesantander.gov.co](http://www.asambleadesantander.gov.co), [www.asambleadecesar.gov.co](http://www.asambleadecesar.gov.co), [www.congresovisible.org](http://www.congresovisible.org), [www.eltiempo.com](http://www.eltiempo.com), [www.semana.com](http://www.semana.com) and interviews by the author (July 2009).

NOTES:

CR=Cambio Radical, C.C.=Convergencia Ciudadana, PDA=Polo Democrático Alternativo, CD=Colombia Democrática, ASI=Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia

As shown in Table 1, the LP's average is the greatest. Albeit closely followed by Cambio Radical's, it has a three years difference with the average age of Partido de la U's members. This supports my hypothesis: the members of the LP are those with the longest political careers. However, only in Antioquia and Santander, (Table 2) the LP's deputies are, in average, the oldest politicians. In César, the only deputy from the Partido de la U has 18 years of political trajectory, which surpass the average of 4.33 of the LP in that region.

	<b>ANTIOQUIA</b>		<b>SANTANDER</b>		<b>CESAR</b>	
	<b>No. DEPUTIES</b>	<b>YEARS IN SERVICE (AVERAGE)</b>	<b>No. DEPUTIES</b>	<b>YEARS IN SERVICE (AVERAGE)</b>	<b>No. DEPUTIES</b>	<b>YEARS IN SERVICE (AVERAGE)</b>
<b>LP</b>	7	12.8	5	13.5	3	4.3
<b>CR</b>	4	9.5	1	7	No Deputy	
<b>P. De la U</b>	3	1		12	1	18

<b>U</b>						
<b>CP</b>	3	7.3	3	9.6	3	3.6
<b>Alas</b>	6	5.8	No Deputy		3	4
<b>PDA</b>	1	2	1	0	No Deputy	
<b>CD</b>	1	0	No Deputy		No Deputy	
<b>ASI</b>	1	0	No Deputy		No Deputy	
<b>CC</b>	No Deputies		5	4.75	1	3

SOURCE: [www.asambleadeantioquia.gov.co](http://www.asambleadeantioquia.gov.co), [www.asambleadesantander.gov.co](http://www.asambleadesantander.gov.co), [www.asambleadecesar.gov.co](http://www.asambleadecesar.gov.co), [www.congresovisible.org](http://www.congresovisible.org), [www.eltiempo.com](http://www.eltiempo.com), [www.semana.com](http://www.semana.com) and interviews by the author (July 2009).

NOTES:

CR=Cambio Radical, C.C.=Convergencia Ciudadana, PDA=Polo Democrático Alternativo, CD=Colombia Democrática, ASI=Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia

This fact suggests that the party’s intraparty struggles are important as well. Even before the National Front, the LP was internally divided into factions that fought to control it, both at the national and subnational level (Pizarro 2002). Whether a politician is at the top of the LP’s regional hierarchy or not, can depend on these interparty struggles, as well. Even long-standing politicians may see their ability to get endorsed hampered by the fact that they belong to the “wrong” faction. If so, they might look for other alternatives that increase their opportunities of nomination.

Alberto Castro (the Partido de la U’s deputy for Cesar), for example, was a former member of the Liberal Party. Until 2007 he presented himself under such a label. However, in 2007 internal struggles within the party gave control of the regional hierarchical structure to the faction he did not belong to. He then moved into Partido de la U, because it provided him with a better chance to get nominated. In his own words he remains Liberal, but he runs with Partido de la U because “...it provides him with an alternative” (Author interview July 23, 2009)

Such is also the case of Jorge Iván Montoya. Former member of the Liberal Party in Antioquia, Montoya explains that he moved into Cambio Radical because of “his friends” (i.e. political allies). Within the LP, he built the group “Dirección Liberal Popular” with Federico Estrada Vélez, and then he moved into the “Liberalismo Oficial” –another faction—with Bernardo Guerra. He ended up in the “Nueva Forma de Hacer Política”, which later became Cambio Radical. For him, politics is not about parties but about “friends” (Author Interview July 15, 2009).



#### 4. Conclusions

I have argued that strong clientelistic networks at the subnational level account for the LP's contradictory performances at the national and subnational level. The patronage provided by regional politicians to their constituency does not depend upon the state. Deputies use their contacts within the regional and local bureaucracies to provide access to state services in exchange for votes. People who rely on regional politicians to access welfare in a timely manner support well-connected candidates at the subnational level. Well-connected politicians in turn are likely to be those who have been in politics the longest and the ones with few incentives to move out of the LP. They do not have to fight for nominations as hard as other members, and they do not need to move.

The LP's success fails to translate to the national level for two reasons. First national politicians are harder to access, thus, citizens vote on a different basis for them. Second, regional candidates do not rely on material patronage in order to attain votes therefore they have no incentives to promote their national counterparts. Consequently the votes attained at the subnational level do not move up to national legislative elections.

Traditionally, scholars have paid little attention to the type of goods exchanged in clientelistic transactions. Whereas academics acknowledge that services are exchanged as much as other goods, there has been no serious attempt to understand the different consequences of these two types of patronage. The argument developed in this paper is an effort to do so. It focuses on the particularity of services (vs. goods) in order to explain differences in politicians and voters' behavior. In doing so, it moves away from common debates on the literature (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Stokes 2005) paying more attention to the dynamics of stable clientelistic networks.

This paper also draws attention to a particularly "sticky" side of clientelism. Their very nature makes this type of exchanges more pervasive than those that rely on goods. Laws and institutional mechanisms can reduce the unsurveilled access of politicians to state resources. The exchange of votes for services, however, is hard to trim down. Impenetrable bureaucracies have long been a serious problem in Latin America (O'Donnell 1999). The way people go around them is using politicians' favors.

This is not only seen as an acceptable practice, but as the only way to access what is, in theory, a right. It is hard to convince citizens that they should attain these services otherwise.

Moreover this argument is an effort to contribute to a broader debate about Colombia's traditional parties as well. For long now, political scientists have wondered about the Liberal and Conservative Party's resilience. As a consequence of acute economic crises and widespread lack of legitimacy traditional parties, and party systems, have collapsed in neighbor countries such as Venezuela and Peru (Weyland 2002). Despite an equally serious security crisis, and a similar lack of legitimacy, the Liberal and Conservative parties have remained as important players in Colombia. Why?

This paper provides some answers to such a question. It looks at the subnational level to understand how is that the traditional parties have managed to survive this long. Even if recent elections suggest that the LP might be losing its regional support, this subnational resilience has slowed down or perhaps even prevented the full collapse of the party system, thus avoiding regime breakdown.

## References

- Aldrich, John Herbert. 1995. *Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Archer, Ronald P, and Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies. 1990. *The Transition from Traditional to Broker Clientelism in Colombia: Political Stability and Social Unrest*. Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame, Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies.
- Archer, Ronald P. 1995. "Party Strength and Weakness in Colombia's Besieged Democracy.." In *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*, Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, p. 164-199.
- Archer, Ronald P., and Soberg Shugart. 1997. "The Unrealized Potential of Presidential Dominance in Colombia." In *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*, eds. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 110-159.
- Asamblea Departamental de Antioquia. Available at: [http://asambleadeantioquia.gov.co/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=category&sectionid=4&id=68&Itemid=47](http://asambleadeantioquia.gov.co/index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=4&id=68&Itemid=47) [Accessed March 15, 2010].
- Asamblea Departamental de Santander. Available at: <http://www.asambleadesantander.gov.co/> [Accessed March 15, 2010].
- Auyero, Javier. 1999. "'From the Client's Point (s) of View": How Poor People Perceive and Evaluate Political Clientelism." *Theory and Society* 28(2): 297-334.
- Auyero, Javier. 2002. "Clientelismo político en Argentina." *Perfiles latinoamericanos* (20): 33-49.
- Bejarano, Ana María, and Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, eds. 1998. *Elecciones y democracia en Colombia, 1997-1998*. 1st ed. Santafé de Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, Departamento de Ciencia Política.
- Bejarano, Ana María, and Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez. 2005. "From "Restricted" to "Besieged". The Changing Nature of the Limits of Democracy in Colombia." In *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks*, eds. Frances Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 235-260.
- Botero, Felipe. 2006. "Reforma política, personalismo y sistema de partidos ¿Partidos fuertes o coaliciones electorales?." In *La reforma política de 2003 ¿La salvación de los partidos políticos colombianos?*, eds. Gary Hoskin and Miguel García Sánchez. Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales-CESO, Departamento de Ciencia Política, p. 139-156.
- Congreso Visible, and Universidad de los Andes. "Congreso Visible." *Congreso Visible*. Available at: <http://www.congresovisible.org/> [Accessed August 9, 2010].
- Cox, Gary W. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Cox, Gary W. 1999. "Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination." *Annual Review of Political Science* 2(1): 145–161.
- Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, Andrés, and Natalia Delgado Varela. 2002. "La metamorfosis del sistema político colombiano: ¿Clientelismo de mercado o nueva forma de intermediación?." In *Degradación o cambio: evolución del sistema político Colombiano*, Colección Vitral, ed. Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, p. 321–355.
- Departamento Nacional de Planeación, and Republica de Colombia. "Guía para el uso y administración del Sisbén: Documento soporte para las entidades territoriales que administran el Sisbén.." Available at: <https://acrobat.com/#d=7iOGKyUHb7vECETyd6UBfA> [Accessed March 21, 2010].
- Dirección de Gestión Electoral. 2009. *Resultados DVD: Elecciones electorales y consultas de partidos 1997-2008*. Bogotá, Colombia: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.
- El Tiempo: Archivo. *El Tiempo*. Available at: [http://www.eltiempo.com/seccion\\_archivo/index.php](http://www.eltiempo.com/seccion_archivo/index.php) [Accessed August 9, 2010].
- Escobar, Cristina. "Clientelismo y ciudadanía: los límites de las reformas democráticas en el departamento de Sucre." *Análisis Político* (47): 37-54.
- García Sánchez, Miguel. 2003. *¿Ciudadanía avergonzada?: Democracia local y construcción de ciudadanía en Bogotá*. 1st ed. Bogotá: Universidad de Los Andes, CESO.
- García Sánchez, Miguel. 2006. "La reforma electoral y su impacto en las elecciones locales del 2003." In *La reforma política de 2003 ¿La salvación de los partidos políticos colombianos?*, eds. Gary Hoskin and Miguel García Sánchez. Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales-CESO, Departamento de Ciencia Política, p. 109-136.
- Gutiérrez Sanín, Francisco, ed. 2002. *Degradación o cambio: evolución del sistema político Colombiano*. 1st ed. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma.
- Gutiérrez Sanín, Francisco. 2006. "Estrenando sistema de partidos." *Análisis Político* (57): 106-125.
- Gutiérrez Sanín, Francisco. 2002. "Historias de democratización anómala. El Partido Liberal en el sistema político Colombiano desde el Frente Nacional hasta hoy." In *Degradación o cambio: evolución del sistema político Colombiano*, Colección Vitral, ed. Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, p. 25-78.
- Gutiérrez Sanín, Francisco. 1998. *La ciudad representada: política y conflicto en Bogotá*. 1st ed. Santafé de Bogotá: TM Editores.
- Gutiérrez Sanín, Francisco. 2007. *Lo que el viento se llevó?: Los partidos políticos y la democracia en Colombia 1985-2002*. 1st ed. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma.
- Gutiérrez Sanín, Francisco, and Andrés Dávila Ladrón De Guevara. 2000. "Paleontólogos o politólogos: ¿qué podemos decir hoy sobre los dinosaurios?!. (Spanish)." *Revista de Estudios Sociales* (6): 1.

- Hartlyn, Jonathan. 1993. *La política del régimen de coalición: la experiencia del Frente Nacional en Colombia*. Santafé de Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes CEI, Tercer Mundo Editores.
- Hoyos, Diana. 2007. "Evolución del sistema de partidos en Colombia 1972-2000. Una mirada a nivel local y regional." In *Entre La Persistencia Y El Cambio: Reconfiguración Del Escenario Partidista Y Electoral En Colombia*, ed. Diana Hoyos. Colombia: CEPI, p. 21-49.
- Jones, Mark P., and Scott Mainwaring. 2003. "The nationalization of parties and party systems: An empirical measure and an application to the Americas." *Party Politics* 9(2): 139.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 1989. *The Logics of Party Formation: Ecological Politics in Belgium and West Germany*. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.
- Kitschelt, Herbert, and Steven Wilkinson. 2007. "Citizen-politician linkages: an introduction." In *Patrons, clients, and policies : patterns of democratic accountability and political competition*, eds. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson. Cambridge UK ;New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 1-49.
- Latin American Public Opinion Project, and United States. 2008. *La Cultura Política De La Democracia En Colombia*. Bogotá: USAID.
- Leal Buitrago, Francisco. 1990a. *Clientelismo: el sistema político y su expresión regional*. 1st ed. Bogotá, Colombia: Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales.
- Leal Buitrago, Francisco. 1990b. "El sistema político del clientelismo." *Análisis Político* (8).
- Levitsky, Steven. 2007. "From populism to clientelism? The transformation of labor-based party linkages in Latin America." In *Patrons, clients, and policies : patterns of democratic accountability and political competition*, eds. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson. Cambridge UK ;New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 206-225.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan. 1967. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments." In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, eds. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. New York: Free Press, p. 1-64.
- Losada Lora, Rodrigo. 1984. *Clientelismo y elecciones: tres modelos explicativos del comportamiento electoral colombiano*. 1st ed. Bogotá: Programa de Estudios Políticos, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.
- Magaloni, Beatriz, Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, and Federico Estévez. 2007. "Clientelism and Portfolio Diversification: a Model of Electoral Investment with Applications to Mexico Clientelism." In *Patrons, clients, and policies : patterns of democratic accountability and political competition*, eds. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson. Cambridge UK ;New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 182-205.
- Mainwaring, Scott. 1999. *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.

- Mainwaring, Scott, Ana María Bejarano, and Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez. 2006. "The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes: An Overview." In *The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 1-44.
- Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy Scully. 1995. "Party Systems in Latin America." In *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*, Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, p. 578.
- Martz, John D. 1997. *The Politics of Clientelism: Democracy & the State in Colombia*. New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Publishers.
- Middlebrook, Kevin J, and John, C Dugas, eds. 2000. "The Conservative Party and the Crisis of Political Legitimacy in Colombia." In *Conservative Parties, the Right and Democracy in Latin America*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 81-109.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1999. "Polygarchies and the (Un) Rule of law in Latin America: A Partial Conclusion." In *The (Un) Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America*, eds. Juan E. Méndez, Guillermo O'Donnell and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro. Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, p. 303-337
- O'Neill, Kathleen. 2006. "Decentralized Politics and Political Outcomes in the Andes." In *The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 171-203.
- Pachón, Mónica. 2002. "El Partido Conservador y sus dinámicas políticas." In *Degradación o cambio: evolución del sistema político Colombiano*, Colección Vitral, ed. Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, p. 79-130.
- Palacios, Marco, and Frank Safford. 2002. *Colombia: país fragmentado, sociedad dividida: su historia*. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma.
- Pécaut, Daniel. 2006. *Crónica de cuatro décadas de política colombiana*. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma.
- Pizarro Leongómez, Eduardo. 2002. "La atomización partidista en Colombia: el fenómeno de las microempresas electorales." In *Degradación o cambio: evolución del sistema político Colombiano*, Colección Vitral, ed. Francisco Gutiérrez S. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, p. 359-390.
- Pizarro Leongómez, Eduardo. 2006. "Giants with Feet of Clay: Political Parties in Colombia." In *The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 78-99.
- Pizarro Leongómez, Eduardo, and Ana María Bejarano. "From Restricted to Besieged; The Changing Nature of the Limits to Democracy in Colombia." In *The Third Wave of Democratization*, eds. Hagopian and Mainwaring. , p. 243.
- Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. "Resultados." *Organización Electoral: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil: República de Colombia*. Available at: [http://www.registraduria.gov.co/Informacion/elec\\_pre\\_2010\\_histo.htm](http://www.registraduria.gov.co/Informacion/elec_pre_2010_histo.htm) [Accessed August 9, 2010].

- Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. 1992a. *2 Elecciones Senadores, Representantes, Gobernadores: Colombia 1991, Octubre 27*. Santafé de Bogotá: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.
- Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. 1992b. *La Democracia Regional Y Local*. Santafé de Bogotá, Colombia: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.
- Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. 1994. *Resultados De Las Elecciones Del 13 De Marzo De 1994*. Bogotá: Organización Electoral, Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.
- Rodríguez-Raga, Juan Carlos. 2002. “¿Cambiar todo para que nada cambie? Representación, sistema electoral y sistema de partido en Colombia: capacidad de adaptación de las élites políticas a cambios en el entorno institucional.” In *Degradación o cambio: evolución del sistema político Colombiano*, Colección Vitral, ed. Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, p. 221-260.
- Rubio Serrano, Rocío. 2003. *No hay paraísos sino los perdidos: historia de una red clientelista en Bogotá*. 1st ed. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
- Shefter, Martin. 1977. *Patronage and Its Opponents: A Theory and Some European Cases*. Ithaca: Western Societies Program, Center for International Studies, Cornell University.
- Shugart, Matthew Soberg, Erika Moreno, and Luis E. Fajardo. 2007. “Deepening Democracy by Renovating Political Parties.” In *Peace, Democracy and Human Rights in Colombia*, eds. Christopher Welna and Gustavo Gallón. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, p. 202-266.
- Stokes, Susan C. 2005. “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina.” *The American Political Science Review* 99(3): 315–325.
- Tanaka, Martín. 2006. “From Crisis to Collapse of the Party Systems and Dilemmas of Democratic Representation: Peru and Venezuela.” In *The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes*, eds. Scott Mainwaring, Ana María Bejarano, and Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, p. 48-71.
- Taylor, Steven L. 2009. *Voting Amid Violence: Electoral Democracy in Colombia*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- Thoumi, Francisco. 2003. *El imperio de la droga: narcotráfico, economía y sociedad en los Andes*. Bogotá: Instituto de Estudios y Relaciones Internacionales (IEPRI), Editorial Planeta.
- Weyland, Kurt. 2002. *The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.