FRENCH POPULARITY FUNCTIONS: DIFFERENT MEASURES, DIFFERENT DETERMINANTS?*

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ABSTRACT

French popularity functions are under-studied, at least when as compared to vote functions. After a first wave of studies conducted in the wake of Lafay's (1977) pioneering work, scholarly works on French popularity functions have been few and far between in the last two decades. And this, despite the fact that public opinion data on French popularity have been collected systematically for a long time. The few studies that have been conducted since Lafay's first incursion have yet to provide a full understanding of the extent to which the popularity of the executive in France (divided between the President and Prime minister) can be explained by political, economic, and institutional factors. What is more, all the popularity function work conducted to date has made use of either the IFOP measure of satisfaction or the SOFRES confidence measure as its dependent variable. In this paper we build a popularity function for the French executive that compares results obtained with each of these two related, but somewhat different, monthly measures of popularity. We do this comparison for the time period where the two popularity measures overlap (1978-2007). The results indicate that both measures are indeed similar but different and that the conventional determinants of executive popularity have distinct effects on satisfaction and confidence.

There has been considerable interest in vote and popularity functions (VP-functions) in the last 40 years. A recent review by Paldam (2008) identifies close to 300 publications on VP-functions. Although more work has been conducted on vote functions, a great deal of these studies has focused exclusively on popularity functions. Most of the work on popularity functions has examined U.S. presidents (starting with Mueller's (1970) seminal article), but there also has been some notable contributions on France (e.g., Lafay 1977) and the U.K. (e.g., Goodhart & Bhansali 1970), for example.

Most studies in the area have examined the relationship between the economy, wars and other relevant political events and the popularity of the executive (Presidents and/or Prime Ministers). Scholars have been preocuppied about the size and stability of the determinants of the executive popularity over time, about the estimation techniques used to examine popularity functions, and, more recently, about the homogeneity of the effects among subgroups of the population and the consistency of the same effects under varying institutional arrangements (Gronke & Newman 2003). In this paper, we examine yet another question left nearly unexplored: do different measures of executive popularity mean and imply different things?

Not all measures of executive popularity are created equal. Specifically, some polling firms have asked about "job approval"[1], others about "satisfaction with"[2] and still others about "confidence in"[3] the executive office holder. The answers to these questions have all been treated to some degree as measures of popularity, but are they really measuring the same concept of popularity? Are executive approval, satisfaction and confidence affected by the same factors? Surprisingly, very little attention has been given to these differences in wording (and, most likely meaning) despite the extent literature on question wording in public opinion research. Here, we look at two different measures of popularity asked of the French public about their President and Prime Minister and explore these questions.

[1]The Gallup question about U.S. Presidents reads as: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way [NAME OF THE PRESIDENT] is handling his job as President?"

[2]The YouGov satisfaction question about UK Prime Ministers reads as: "Are you satisfied or disatisfied with [NAME OF PRIME MINISTER] as Prime Minister?"

[3]The SOFRES confidence question about French Presidents and Prime Ministers reads as: "Do you have complete confidence, some confidence, not much confidence or no confidence at all in [NAME OF PRESIDENT OR PRIME MINISTER] to solve the problems France is facing nowadays?"

Different Measures of Executive Popularity

To our knowledge, no study has looked systematically at the differences in question wording of measures of executive popularity. This is quite surprising given the large literature on question wording (e.g., Schuman & Presser 1981). Different question wording, form, content and order all can lead to different answers by eliciting different meanings, considerations and offering different alternatives to map one's attitude or preference (Tourangeau, Rips & Rasinski 2000). To our knowledge, the one exception is Cohen (1999) who compares the well-known Gallup presidential approval question with presidential favorability. But, Cohen's study presents an important limitation in that the favorability index is constructed from eight different organizations. Moreover, these organizations have asked similar but not identical favorability questions. The time period considered by Cohen is also relatively short (from October 1991 to December 1998) due to the low frequency of favorability measures before 1991. Cohen's analysis shows that both series are similar but not identical. His conclusions, however, do not stand on solid grounds for the reason just presented.[4]

We present what we belive to be the first systematic comparison of two different popularity questions asked of the same population over a long period of time. The first, and older, question is that of the *Institut Français d'Opinion Publique* (IFOP). Since 1958 and 1959, the French public has been asked about how satisfied or dissatisfied they are with the President and Prime Minister, respectively. The IFOP question reads as: *"Êtes-vous satisfait ou mécontent de [NAME OF PRESIDENT OR PRIME MINISTER] comme président (premier ministre) de la République?"* Much later, in 1978, another French polling form, SOFRES, has started asking the French about their confidence in the President and Prime Minister to solve the current problems facing France. The SOFRES question reads as: *"Faites-vous*

[4]Another contribution worth mentioning is that of Sigelman (1981). Sigelman does not compare different questions, but shows that respondents are less likely to offer "Don't Knows" when the presidential approval question is asked toward the end of the questionnaire as opposed to earlier. This effect is known as a rapport effect where respondents become more willing to express an attitude or preference after a rapport has been established with the interviewer. This effect is equally explained as an intra-individual deliberation effect where respondents benefit from earlier questions to help them *develop* an attitude or preference (Fournier, Turgeon, Blais, Everitt, Gidengil & Nevitte 2011).

tout à fait confiance, plutôt confiance, plutôt pas confiance ou pas du tout confiance à [NAME OF PRESIDENT OR PRIME MINISTER] pour résoudre les problèmes qui se posent en France actuellement?" Thus the IFOP question asks the French about their satisfaction with their President and Prime Minister while the SOFRES question asks about how confident they are in the President and Prime Minister to solve the issues currently facing France.

The IFOP question asks respondents to express their satisfaction with the President and Prime Minister. It does not speficy satisfaction with what, but merely with what people believe are matters of presidents and prime ministers. Presumbaly, this question is an evaluative one and requires respondents to judge whether or not their executives are doing a good job.

The SOFRES question is different. It asks respondents to indicate how confident they are that the President and Prime Minister can solve the problems currently facing France. The question asks about confidence in the President and Prime Minister, as in trusting them. This is different than asking respondents how they evaluate how their president and prime minister are handling their job, as in the satisfaction question. The SOFRES question is also more specific than the IFOP one because: 1) it specifies the time period to consider: the present times; and, 2) it refers to *problems* facing France, excluding, presumably, what is working well and what does not affect France directly.

The IFOP question offers only two options: satisfied or disatisfied. The SOFRES question, for its part, allows four options: complete confidence, some confidence, not much confidence and no confidence at all. The SOFRES question thus affords greater precision because respondents have more options to map their attitude. Overall, we can say that the IFOP and SOFRES questions measure different things (satisfaction vs. confidence) and that the IFOP question, as compared to the SOFRES question, is shorter, more general and consequently less precise.

Although both questions appear to be measuring different things on face value, we do not claim that satisfaction and confidence are not related in some ways. Admittedly, one may have confidence in someone because she has a positive evaluation of his or her past actions. Or, said differently, constant positive evaluations of someone may lead one

to develop confidence in that person. But, it is also conceivable that one has confidence in someone without necessarily having a current positive evaluation of that same person. Similarly, one may lack confidence in an officer holder, despite having a current positive evaluation of the same. But, confidence and satisfaction may also be determined by different factors. Maybe confidence has to do more with traits and satisfaction with performance. To be sure, we have good reasons to believe that the IFOP and SOFRES questions are similar but not equal. It what follows, we examine empirically both series to better gauge how similar or dissimilar they are.

Different Measures Measuring the Same Thing?

Figures 1 and 2 present the percentage of respondents declaring that they are satisfied with the president and the prime minister, respectively, based on the IFOP question. Figures 3 and 4, for their part, present the percentage of respondents declaring complete or some confidence in the president and the prime minister, respectively, measured by the SOFRES question. The figures present values from October 1978 to January 2007, the period for which both measures overlap. We are interested here in comparing the measures and not Presidents with Prime Ministers. For that reason, we will examine both the IFOP and SOFRES measures for Presidents and Prime Ministers, separetely.

[Figure 1 about here.]

[Figure 2 about here.]

[Figure 3 about here.]

[Figure 4 about here.]

Looking first at the Presidential popularity series, we find that average satisfaction with Presidents is slightly lower (44.5%) than confidence in the same (46.8%). Interestingly, confidence is lower during cohabitation (49.5%) than satisfaction (52.1%), but higher (45.6%) than satisfaction (40.9%) during periods of unified government. This is consistent with

the idea that during cohabitation, Presidents are less affected by the ebbs and flows of the economy and day-to-day politics because Prime Ministers are "in charge." On average, confidence shows greater variance than satisfaction (standard deviations of 10.7 and 9.8, respectively), and this is true for both cohabitation and unified gorvenment periods.

The second term of Mitterand shows the lowest satisfaction level at 40.4%, and Chirac's first term shows the highest at 48.9%. But, the confidence level for Mitterand's second term is nearly as high as that for Chirac's first term (47.4% vs. 48.1%). The lowest confidence shown is that for Chirac's second term at 35.5%, and the highest is for Giscard at 53.3%. But, the satisfaction levels for Chirac's second term and Giscard are nearly identical (45.3% and 44.9%, respectively). These preliminary findings indicate that the IFOP and SOFRES popularity questions measure different things. The correlation between both series is a mere .61. It is positive, as one would expect, but it is not very strong, suggesting that both questions measure similar but different things.

Examining now the series for Prime Ministers, we find that average satisfaction with Prime Ministers is also lower (40.7%) than confidence in the same (47.1%). The difference is actually more pronounced and is true of both cohabitation (36.5% vs. 42.8%) and unified government (49.8% vs. 56.2%) periods. On average, confidence in the Prime Minister also shows greater variance than satisfaction with the same (standard deviations of 13.3 and 10.5, respectively), and this holds for cohabitation and unified gorvenment periods.

Edith Cresson shows, by far, the lowest satisfaction level at 20.9%, and Balladur shows the highest at 52.4%. Cresson also shows the lowest confidence at 29.4%, and Jospin, not Balladur, shows the highest at 59.3%. Some Prime Ministers, however, show great discrepancy between their satisfaction and confidence levels. Take Fabius, Rocard and Beregovoy, for example. Fabius average satisfaction is low, at 35.5%, but his confidence is high, at 49.1%. The gap between satisfaction and confidence is even greater for Rocard (40.9% vs. 57.8%) and Beregovoy (33.5% vs. 50.1%). Interestingly, only Raffarin and Villepin show higher satisfaction than confidence. Raffarin's average satisfaction is 42.1% but his confidence level is 39.1%. Villepin's gap is even more pronounced, with an average satisfaction level of 39.7%, but very low confidence (32.6%). Overall, these findings are also somewhat

indicative of important differences between the IFOP and SOFRES measures. The correlation between both series is higher than that found for President, at .78, but still suggests that the IFOP and SOFRES questions do not measure the same thing.

Finally, another question of interest is whether the satisfaction and confidence measures share the same determinants, that is, do fluctuations in the economy and relevant political events affect similarly the variations observed in satisfaction and confidence levels in the French public? We take this question next.

Different Measures, Different Determinants?

We can distinguish among many events as potential determinants of executive popularity. We know from the work done on the U.S. (the most studied case), that presidential popularity is in large part a function of macroeconomic conditions and events of national unrest and wars (e.g. Brody 1991, Edwards 2002, Hibbs, Rivers & Vasilatos 1982, Kernell 1978, MacKuen 1983, Mueller 1971, Mueller 1973, Norpoth & Yantek 1983, Ostrom & Simon 1985, Ostrom & Smith 1992). Good economic performances like low unemployment and inflation and high economic growth lead to increased popularity while bad economic conditions tend to lower it. American presidents are also known to benefit, at least in the short run, from military interventions or attacks against their country as the American public rallies 'round-the-flag' in those times.

The scholarship on the popularity of the French executives is also substantial. Indeed, many have tried to explain the popularities of French presidents and prime ministers (e.g., Anderson 1995, Hellwig 2007, Hibbs 1981, Lafay 1977, Lecaillon 1980, Lewis-Beck 1980), but, with the exception of the recent contributions by Conley (2006) and Boya, Malizard & Agamaliyev (2010), most of the work has focused almost exclusively on the role of the economy, ignoring altogether other known determinants of popularity like wars and domestic unrest. Here, we account for both the economy and other relevant political events.

Economy. Macroeconomic conditions, in France and abroad, have occupied a central role in most studies on executive popularity. The expectation is that executive office hold-

ers should be punished (or rewarded) for bad (or good) economic times. Macroeconomic performance is typically measured in terms of unemployment and inflation. High unemployment is an indication of stagnant or depressing economic conditions and should have a negative impact on the popularity of the executives because the latter are perceived as being responsible for this unfortunate situation. Inflation, on the other hand, affects people's finances negatively by reducing their purchase power and increases in inflation should, therefore, reduce executive office holders' popularity. In the following analysis, we account for both inflation and unemployment.

Political Events. Political events at the domestic and international levels should also affect the popularity of French presidents and prime ministers. We separate political events into three categories. The first one includes all events related to international and domestic terrorism with French targets leading to injury and/or death and those events implicating the French army like troop deployments and attacks against it. The events related to domestic terrorism are limited to those from separatist groups that threaten national integrity. These kinds of events are known to affect the popularity of executives because they stir up nationalistic sentiments and fervor. The second category includes all major strikes. Strikes are not uncommon in France, but major strikes as defined as those disrupting French day-to-day activities are less so. We expect major strikes to negatively affect the popularity of the executives. The third and last category includes events of domestic strife like confrontations between French law enforcement authorities and citizens or riots leading to injury and/or death and terrorist activities motivated by ideological extremism or antisemitism. Like strikes, domestic strife events should negatively affect the popularity of the executive. The complete list of events included in the three categories is reported in Appendix A.

Cohabitation. The distinction between divided and unified government is important because the respective powers of the president and the prime minister are conditioned, in part, by this institutional arrangement (Duverger 1978, Lavroff 1986, Sartori 1997). In periods of unified government, the president is the most powerful actor in both domestic and foreign policy domains. The prime minister, under such circumstances executes the presi-

dent's orders and wishes. Thus the two executives work as one during unified government and should be held equally responsible for "low" and "high" politics. But, there is also the possibility, as argued by Anderson (1995), that responsibility is obscured during periods of unified government, at least over domestic issues, because the public does not know who of the two executive is to be blamed or rewarded for good or bad times. In times of cohabitation, on the other hand, the president's powers are vastly more circumscribed and limited merely to his reserved domains of foreign policy and national security and defense. Rather, it is the prime minister, backed by his own parliamentary majority, who controls the government's domestic actions. The state of the economy and events related to domestic issues should, therefore, nearly exclusively affect prime ministers. Presidents, for their part, should still benefit from events stirring up nationalistic sentiments and fervor because they are guardian and father of the nation. But, prime ministers under cohabitation can also significantly curtail the presidents' "reserved domains" powers of foreign policy and national defense by making numerous important appointments and by controlling the information necessary to conduct foreign policy and national defense that would normally reach the Elysée (Bell 2000).

In light of the preceding discussion, we know that presidents dominate over "high" politics during unified government and that prime ministers, for their part, dominate over "low" politics during cohabitation. Thus attribution of responsibility under those circumstances, and for those particular policy areas, should follow this pattern: blame or credit the president (prime minister) for "high" ("low") politics during unified (divided) government. There remains the 'shared' domains during the other times, that is, domestic policy under unified government and foreign and national defense policies during cohabitation. Here, there exist two possibilities: citizens can attribute responsibility to both executives or to neither. In the first case, the public would perceive their president and prime minister working as a team, and, consequently, hold them equally accountable. In the second case, citizens would be confused and thus unsure about who to hold accountable and decide instead not to blame or credit them.

The above discussion speaks of determinants of executive popularity broadly defined.

Thus there remains the question: do these determinants apply equally to the IFOP satisfaction and SOFRES confidence measures? Tables 1 and 2 present the multivariate analysis for French Presidents and Prime Ministers, respectively. The dependent variables are not the satisfaction and confidence measures in their level, but rather their white noise residuals of their respective ARFIMA models. Time series public opinion data generally exhibit autocorrelation and nonstationarity, leading to invalid inferences if not treated adequately. There is now growing evidence that time series public opinion data are fractionally integrated (Box-Steffensmeier & Smith 1996, Box-Steffensmeier & Smith 1988, Lebo, Walker & Clarke 2000, Clarke & Lebo 2003). The appropriate model, therefore, is the autoregressive *fractionally* integrated moving average process or ARFIMA (p,d,q) where the parameter d measures the level of integration. Following the methodology developed in Box-Steffensmeier, DeBoef & Lin (2004), we estimated ARFIMA models of all four series (the presidential and prime ministerial satisaction and confidence measures) to obtain their stationary series also purged of autocorrelation. The results from the ARFIMA analysis indicate clearly that these four series are indeed fractionally integrated. The details about the ARFIMA models and estimations of each series appear in Appendix B.

The presidential and prime ministerial satisaction and confidence measures are explained by the same set of independent variables: monthly variations in the inflation and unemployment rates and dummy variables for foreign and national security events, major strikes and domestic strife events, as described earlier. The political events series were constructed exclusively from information collected in *L'Année Politique*, a yearly publication that details French political life on a daily basis. The three political events variables, labeled $Foreign - Security$, $Major\ Strikes$, and $Domestic\ Strife$, are dichotomous variables taking the value of 1 for the month in which a particular event occurred and 0 otherwise.The equations also include the lag of these five independent variables because their effects on satisfaction and confidence may be delayed. The model is completed by the inclusion of another dichotomous variable that indicates periods of cohabitation. This last variable is, in turn, interacted with the other five independent variables, including their lags, to account for the conditional role of cohabitation on the determinants of popularity.

The effects of the independent variables for periods of unified government and cohabitation are shown in separete columns to facilitate comparison.[5]

[Table 1 about here.]

[Table 2 about here.]

The results from Tables 1 and 2 are interesting in many regards. Looking first at the resutls for Presidents, we find that international and security-related events affect Presidential satisfaction and confidence positively, as expected, but the effect of those events on satisfaction is immediate while it is delayed on confidence. The effect of international and security-related events is also only observed during periods of unified government, when Presidents are in full charge of "high" politics. Major strikes also affect satisfaction and confidence. Strikes negatively affect satisfaction and confidence, as expected, but strikes lowers satisfaction only during periods of unified government while it lowers confidence only during periods of cohabitation. Inversely, domestric strife events lowers both satisfaction and confidence, also as expected, but, this time, satisfaction is affected only during cohabitation and confidence only during unified government. The effect on satisfaction is also delayed. The results in Table 1 indicate no effect whatsoever for the macroeconomic variables of inflation and unemployment on satisfaction with or confidence in Presidents. Overall, we find that both series are explained equally well, with both R^2s equal to .07.[6] Interestingly, the *same* determinants ($Foreign-Security$, $Major\ Strikes$, and $Domestic\ Strife$) affect presidential satisfaction and popularity, but at different times (immediately or delayed) and under different government arrangements (unified or divided).

The results for Prime Ministers shown in Table 2 tell a different story. First, satisfaction with Prime Ministers is much better explained by our independent variables than is confidence in the same. The R^2 for the satisfaction equation is twice as large (.08) as that

[5]The estimated coefficients listed under cohabitation were computed by summing for each of the independent variable its main effect (the unified government coefficient estimate) and that from its interaction with the variable *Cohabitation* (e.g., $\hat{\beta}_{Inflation} + \hat{\beta}_{Inflation*Cohabitation}$). The standard errors were computed as follows $s.e.(a+b) = \sqrt{Var(a) + Var(b) + 2Cov(a,b)}$.

[6]These $R2$ may seem low at first, but keep in mind that most of the variation in the series has been removed in the previous ARFIMA analysis.

for confidence (.04). The results show that major strikes affect satisfation with Prime Ministers during both periods of unified and divided government. Major strikes, however, exert a stronger effect on satisfaction during periods of cohabitation, as expected. Inflation has a strong effect on satisfaction with Prime Ministers and its effect, as expected, is only significant during periods of cohabitation when Prime Ministers are clearly "in charge" of domestic politics. Note that the effect of these two variables on satisfaction with Prime Ministers is immediate; none of the lagged variables shows statistical significance. Two different determinants affect confidence in Prime Ministers. Specifically, domestic strife and international and national security events both have a negative effect on confidence in Prime Ministers. Their effect is also delayed. None of the independent variables exerts immediate effect on confidence in Prime Ministers. In sum, the results suggest that the determinants of satisfaction with Prime Ministers and confidence in the same are different. Not only are the determinants not the same, but their effect on satisfaction with Prime Ministers is immediate while that on confidence is delayed.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have examined two different measures of executive popularity: satisfaction and confidence. To our knowledge, this is the first systematic analysis of two distinct series of popularity measured over a long period of time (nearly 30 years). We proposed some theoretical reasons to believe that satisfaction with the executive office holder may mean something different than confidence in the same. The two specific questions we looked at, the one by IFOP and the other by SOFRES, do exhibit differences. The IFOP satisfaction question is more general and does not clearly specify time periods. The SOFRES confidence question, for its part, is more specific in that it asks about confidence in the executive to solve problems currently facing France. To be sure, both questions, at face value, are similar but not equal.

Our empirical analysis of the series confirms that both series measure similar but different things. The descriptive results indicate that the series are correlated with one another,

but that the correlation is low for Presidents. We also demonstrated that the French public can exhibit high (low) satisfaction with their executive office holders without having high (low) confidence in them and this is particularly true of Presidents. The analysis of the determinants of satisfaction and confidence also show important differences. While Presidents are affected by the same determinants, their effect occur at different times and under different government arrangements. As for Prime Ministers, satisfaction with and confidence in them are a function of different sets of determinants altogether and their respective effects are immediate for satisfaction and delayed for confidence.

The findings presented above are a first indication that popularity measures are not created equal. This conclusion is important because measures of popularity are frequently treated as if they were measuring the same concept of popularity. The differences in the measures could explain, in part, the inconsistency of the results about the determinants of popularity (Nannestad & Paldam 1994). To be sure, more work is still needed to uncover the differences in these popularity meaures.

Appendix A: France's Major Political Events (10/1978-01/2007)

1. Foreign and National Security-Related Events

02/15/1979 - French parachutists arrive in Chad
01/09/1980 - Attacks in Corsica: 3 dead
04/16/1981 - Bombing in Ajaccio: 1 dead and 8 injured
09/15/1983 - Government official killed in Corsica
09/22/1983 - French aircrafts bomb Syrian artillery in Lebanon
10/23/1983 - Shi'a bombing in Beirut against US and French military bases: 58 French troops dead
11/17/1983 - Aircraft raid in Baalbek (Lebanon)
01/09/1984 - Bombing on the French HQ in Beirut: 1 parachutist dead
01/25/1984 - French aircraft shot down in Chad
02/22/1984 - 1 French troop killed in Beirut
04/07/1984 - 9 troops killed and 6 injured in Chad
06/06/1984 - 1 French observer killed in Beirut
06/14/1984 - 1 French troop killed in Chad
12/02/1984 - Bombing in Bastia: 2 dead
12/05/1984 - Ambush in New Caledonia: 10 dead
12/16/1984 - Criminal fire in New Caledonia: 3 dead
02/18/1985 - 1 Military official killed in Southern Lebanon
03/03/1985 - 5 French troops taken into hostage in Ethiopia
03/08/1985 - Gendarmerie major killed in New Caledonia
12/07/1985 - Bombing in Paris claimed the *Comité de Solidarité avec les Prisonniers Politiques Arabes et du Proche Orient*, linked to the Hezbollah: 42 injured
02/03/1986 - Bombing in Paris claimed by the Hezbollah: 8 injured
02/04/1986 - Bombing in Paris claimed by the Hezbollah: 7 injured
02/05/1986 - Bombing in Paris claimed by the Hezbollah: 32 injured
02/16/1986 - France bombs military airport held by Libya in Chad
03/01/1986 - 150 French troops sent to Chad
03/05/1986 - The Islamic Jihad kills a French journalist in Lebanon
03/06/1986 - The Islamic Jihad kills 4 French hostages in Lebanon
03/17/1986 - Bombing in Paris claimed by the Hezbollah: 5 injured
03/20/1986 - Bombing in Paris claimed by the Hezbollah: 2 dead and 4 injured
09/04/1986 - 3 French troops killed and 1 injured in Lebanon
09/04/1986-09/17/1986 - 6 bombings claimed by Hezbollah: 12 dead and above 160 injured
09/13/1986 - 1 French troop killed and 5 injured in Lebanon
09/18/1986 - French troop assassinated in Lebanon
09/28/1986 - 2 French troops injured in Lebanon
02/20/1987 - 1 French troop killed in Lebanon
03/18/1987 - 5 French killed in a terrorist attack in Djibouti
06/15/1987 - FLNC (*Front de Libération Nationale de la Corse*) attack in Ajaccio: 1 dead
08/04/1987 - FLNC attack in Bastia: 3 dead and 2 injured
10/04/1987 - 2 French troops killed and 2 others injured in Lebanon

12/08/1990 - French troops sent to the Persian Gulf
01/07/1991 - 1 French troop killed in Serbia
10/15/1992 - French troops sent to Bosnia
01/28/1993 - French Ambassador in Zaire dies after military attacks
02/09/1993 - France sends 150 troops to Rwanda
09/21/1993 - 2 French civilians assassinated by the GIA (*Groupe Islamique Armé*) in Algeria
01/02/1994 - 1 French journalist assassinated by the GIA in Algeria
01/15/1994 - 1 French consular worker killed by the GIA in Algeria
02/21/1994 - 1 French civilian killed by the GIA in Algeria
03/23/1994 - 2 French civilians assassinated by the GIA in Algeria
05/08/1994 - 2 French clergymen killed by the GIA in Algeria
06/23/1994 - French troops arrive in Rwanda
08/03/1994 - 2 consular agents and 3 French troops assassinated by the GIA in Algeria
10/08/1994-10/10/1994 - 2 French civilians killed by the GIA in Algeria
10/18/1994-10/23/1994 - 1 French civilian killed by the GIA in Algeria
12/24/1994-12/25/1994 - Air France 8969 (Algiers to Paris) hijacked by the GIA
12/27/1994 - 3 French clergymen assassinated by the GIA in Algeria
03/14/1995 - 9 French UN troops die in Bosnia
05/05/1995 - 2 French killed by the GIA in Algeria
07/25/1995 - Bombing in Paris claimed by the GIA: 8 dead and 86 injured
07/26/1995 - Fighting between the *Mouvement pour l'Autodétermination* (MPA) and the FLNC in Corsica: 3 dead
08/17/1995 - Bombing in Paris claimed by the GIA: 17 injured
08/29/1995-08/30/1995 - 2 French UN troops killed in Bosnia
08/30/1995 - Fighting between the MPA and the FLNC in Corsica: 2 dead
09/03/1995 - Bombing in Paris claimed by the GIA: 4 injured
09/03/1995 - 2 French nuns killed by the GIA in Algeria
09/07/1995 - Bombing in Paris claimed by the GIA: 14 injured
10/04/1995-10/05/1995 - France removes the French missionary from power by force in the Comores
10/06/1995 - Bombing in Paris claimed by the GIA: 16 injured 10/17/1995 - Bombing in Paris claimed by the GIA: 30 injured 11/10/1995 - 1 French nun killed and 1 injured by the GIA in Algeria
05/24/1996 - 7 monks killed by the GIA in Algeria
07/01/1996 - Bombing in Corsica: 1 dead and 15 injured
12/03/1996 - Bombing in Paris claimed by the GIA: 4 dead and 170 injured
05/20/1997 - 2 French civilians killed in Kinshasa
11/30/1997 - 1 French civilian killed in Tadjikistan; another is held as a hostage
03/24/1998 - France sends troops to Kosovo
04/19/2000 - Bombing in Cote d'Armor (Brittany) by the FLB (*Front de Libération de la Bretagne*): 1 dead
08/17/2001 - Head of *Amata Corsa* killed
11/11/2001 - 2 French journalists killed in Afghanistan
12/01/2001 - 40 French troops arrive in Afghanistan
05/08/2002 - Bombings in Karachi: 11 French civilians dead
09/23/2002 - French troops sent to Ivory Coast
12/11/2002 - More French troops sent to Ivory Coast

01/06/2003 - 9 French troops killed in Ivory Coast
07/20/2003 - 2 FLNC bombings in Nice: 16 injured
10/21/2003 - 1 French journalist killed in Ivory Coast
01/06/2004 - 2 French engineers killed in Iraq
03/02/2004 - French troops arrive in Haiti
11/06/2004 - 9 French troops killed in Ivory Coast
01/09/2005 - 1 French officer killed in Lebanon
03/10/2006 - 1 Corsican elected official killed

2. Major Strikes

10/01/1978-10/05/1978 - TRANSPORTATION: SNCF
10/03/1978-10/27/1978 - PUBLIC SECTOR: PTT
11/06/1978-12/09/1978 - PUBLIC SECTOR: EDF, PTT and SNCF
11/14/1978-11/17/1978 - EDUCATION: students
03/07/1979 - TRANSPORTATION: SNCF
05/17/1979 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
08/22/1979-08/24/1979 - TRANSPORTATION: SNCF
09/12/1979-09/15/1979 - TRANSPORTATION: SNCF
10/17/1979 - TRANSPORTATION: SNCF
10/25/1979 - PUBLIC SECTOR: PTT
03/13/1980-03/15/1980 - TRANSPORTATION: SNCF
03/25/1980 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
05/07/1980-05/14/1980 - EDUCATION: Students
06/30/1980 - TRANSPORTATION: RATP
10/15/1980 - PUBLIC SECTOR: PTT
03/26/1981 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
10/21/1982-10/22/1982 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
01/31/1984 - EDUCATION: Secondary school teachers
02/08/1984 - TRANSPORTATION: SNCF
03/08/1984-03/09/1984 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
10/25/1984 - TRANSPORTATION: SNCF and RATP
03/19/1985 - TRANSPORTATION: Train drivers
06/11/1985-06/15/1985 - TRANSPORTATION: SNCF
10/01/1985 - TRANSPORTATION: SNCF
12/20/1985 - TRANSPORTATION: RATP
05/14/1986-05/15/1986 - TRANSPORTATION: SNCF and RATP
05/30/1986 - TRANSPORTATION: SNCF
07/09/1986 - TRANSPORTATION: Air France
09/30/1986 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
10/21/1986 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
12/17/1986 - PUBLIC SECTOR: EDF
12/18/1986-01/14/1987 - TRANSPORTATION: series of strikes by the SNCF and RATP
01/06/1987-01/14/1987 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
01/27/1987-02/13/1987 - STUDENTS: Teachers
04/21/1987-04/30/1987 - TRANSPORTATION: Airline controllers

10/01/1987 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
10/15/1987 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
12/10/1987-12/13/1987 - TRANSPORTATION: Air France
01/20/1989 - EDUCATION: Students
10/06/1989 - OTHER: Farmers
01/31/1990-02/01/1990 - TRANSPORTATION: SNCF
04/03/1990 - PUBLIC SECTOR: PTT
05/09/1990-06/01/1990 - PUBLIC SECTOR: Parisian trash collection workers
09/18/1990-10/05/1990 - PUBLIC SECTOR: Parisian trash collection workers
10/16/1990 - TRANSPORTATION: RATP
10/22/1990-10/26/1990 - EDUCATION: Students
11/05/1990-11/20/1990 - EDUCATION: Students
05/10/1991 - TRANSPORTATION: SNCF
05/17/1991 - TRANSPORTATION: SNCF
05/31/1991 - TRANSPORTATION: RATP
06/21/1991 - TRANSPORTATION: RATP
06/28/1991 - TRANSPORTATION: RATP
09/18/1991 - TRANSPORTATION: SNCF
09/29/1991 - OTHER: Farmers
11/17/1991 - PUBLIC SECTOR: Police and nurses
11/17/1991 - TRANSPORTATION: Truck drivers
12/17/1991 - TRANSPORTATION: SCNF
01/28/1992 - OTHER: Border patrols
01/30/1992 - EDUCATION: Students
04/15/1992 - TRANSPORTATION: RATP
06/29/1992-07/08/1992 - TRANSPORTATION: Truck drivers
11/10/1992 - TRANSPORTATION: RATP
11/17/1992-11/23/1992 - TRANSPORTATION:RATP
11/27/1992 - TRANSPORTATION: Public transports strike (throughout France)
03/09/1993-03/11/1993 - TRANSPORTATION: RATP
12/09/1993 - TRANSPORTATION: SNCF
01/16/1994 - EDUCATION: strikes in favor of public schools
10/10/1995 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
10/25/1995 - TRANSPORTATION: SNCF
11/24/1995 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
11/24/1995 - TRANSPORTATION: SNCF
12/12/1995 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
10/07/1996 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
11/07/1996 - TRANSPORTATION: Truck drivers
11/17/1996 - TRANSPORTATION: Truckers drivers
01/26/1997 - TRANSPORTATION: general strike
02/06/1997-02/18/1997 - TRANSPORTATION: general strike
03/06/1997 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
11/02/1997-11/08/1997 - TRANSPORTATION: Truck drivers
10/05/1998-10/12/1998 - TRANSPORTATION: general strike
10/12/1998-10/20/1998 - EDUCATION: Students
09/01/2000-09/09/2000 - OTHER: Farmers and truck drivers

01/18/2001 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
03/22/2001 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
03/29/2001-04/13/2001 - TRANSPORTATION: SCNF
09/06/2002-09/09/2002 - TANSPORTATION: Air France
11/20/2002 - OTHER: Farmers
11/25/2002-11/26/2002 - TRANSPORTATION: Truck drivers
11/26/2002 - TRANSPORTATION: SNCF
05/06/2003 - EDUCATION: general strike
05/13/2003 - EDUCATION: general strike
05/13/2003 - OTHER: Public and private sector employees strike against governmental reforms
05/19/2003 - EDUCATION: general strike
05/25/2003-05/27/2003 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
06/03/2003 - TRANSPORTATION: general strike
06/04/2003 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
06/05/2003 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
11/20/2003 - EDUCATION: universities
01/20/2004 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
01/21/2004 - TRANSPORTATION: SCNF
03/12/2004 - EDUCATION: general strike
09/21/2004 - PUBLIC SECTOR: Postal services
10/25/2004 - TRANSPORTATION: SCNF
01/18/2005 - PUBLIC SECTOR: Postal services
01/20/2005 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
02/05/2005 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
02/08/2005-03/08/2005 - EDUCATION: Students
03/10/2005 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
04/02/2005-04/05/2005 - EDUCATION: Students
05/03/2005 - PUBLIC SECTOR: general strike
03/13/2006 - OTHER: Suez-GDF strike

3. Domestic Strife Events

03/08/1979 - Confrontations in Denain (Nord): 5 policemen injured
06/12/1980 - *Action Directe* bombing against the Orly airport: 8 injured
10/03/1980 - Synagogue bombing in Paris: 4 dead
11/11/1981 - Separatist riots in New Caledonia
03/02/1982 - Train bombing: 8 dead
04/22/1982 - Roadside car bombing in Paris: 1 dead and 63 injured
09/08/1982 - Antisemite bombing in Paris: 6 dead and 20 injured
05/31/1983 - *Action Directe* members attack police officials: 2 dead and 1 injured
07/23/1983 - An *Action Directe* commando attacks a bank in St Etienne: 1 injured
09/30/1983 - *Action Directe* bombing in Marseille: 1 dead and 26 injured
02/09/1984 - Basque separatist riot after the assassination of 2 ETA leaders
03/27/1984 - An *Action Directe* commando commits a hold-up in a bank in Lyon: 1 dead
08/02/1984 - *Action Directe* bombing against the *Agence Spatiale Européenne* in Paris: 6 injured

10/20/1984 - *Action Directe* bombing in Montrouge: 3 injured
11/30/1984 - Confrontations in New Caledonia: 2 dead
01/25/1985 - An *Action Directe* commando kills an influent official from the *Ministère de la Défense*
03/29/1985 - Bombing against the *Festival du Cinéma Juif* in Paris: 18 injured
04/08/1985 - Teacher killed by rocks during protests in New Caledonia
04/20/1985 - *Action Directe* bombing against the telecommunication company TRT: 1 injured
05/08/1985 - Riots in New Caledonia: 1 dead and about 100 injured
05/09/1985 - *Action Directe* bombing: 1 injured
05/10/1985 - *Action Directe* bombings against *Antenne 2*, the *Haute Autorité de l'Audiovisuel*, and *Radio France*
02/17/1986 - Anti-separatist demonstration in New Caledonia: 9 injured
05/16/1986 - *Action Directe* members attack the Interpol headquarters in Paris: 1 injured
07/09/1986 - Action directe bombing in Paris: 3 dead and 28 injured
11/17/1986 - An *Action Directe* commando kills the CEO of Renault
11/27/1986 - Student riots
12/04/1986 - Student riots: 1 dead
12/15/1986 - Bombing against the *Ministère de la Justice*: 1 dead (driver)
08/26/1987 - Separatist riots in New Caledonia
09/30/1987 - Separatist riots in New Caledonia: 2 dead
02/01/1989 - Separatist riots in Corsica
01/03/1991 - Separatist riots in Corsica
02/13/1991 - Separatist riots in the *Réunion*
06/09/1991 - Suburban riots in Paris: 1 dead
06/30/1991 - Suburban riots in Paris
10/16/1991 - Confrontation between farmers and law enforcement authorities in Moulins (Allier)
11/16/1991 - Confrontation between farmers and law enforcement authorities in Auch (Gers)
01/02/1993 - Violent demonstration to protest the death of 5 homeless people
09/02/1993 - Suburban riots in Paris: 10 injured
03/25/1994 - Violent demonstrations against the CIP (*Contrat d'Insertion Professionelle*)
08/23/1995 - Suburban riots: 1 dead and 1 injured
09/06/1995-09/07/1995 - Riots in French Polynesia to protest against the nuclear test
11/09/1995-12/07/1995 - Student demonstrations and riots
07/23/1996 - CRS (*Compagnie Républicaine de Sécurité*) evacuates a church occupied by illegal immigrants
04/22/2002-04/30/2002 - Anti-fascist riots and demonstrations throughout the country
10/27/2005-12/20/2005 - Wave of suburban riots in Paris
03/23/2006 - Violent demonstrations against the CPE (*Contrat Première Embauche*)
05/30/2006 - Suburban riots in Paris

Appendix B: Estimation of the ARFIMA Models for the Satisfaction and Confidence Measures

Following Box-Steffensmeier, DeBoef & Lin (2004), we estimate the d parameters in OX (Doornik 2002), using the ARFIMA package (Doornik & Ooms 2003), for both the presidential and prime ministerial series by selecting the best model following the Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC) from ARFIMA (0,d,0) to ARFIMA (4,d,4). The estimates of d are presented in Table 3 and indicate that all four popularity series are long-memoried and non-stationary. The table also presents results for various hypotheses about the values of the estimated ds. These results clearly demonstrate that the popularity series are fractionally integrated because the null hypotheses that the ds equal 0 or 1 can be easily rejected. This analysis justifies the use of the ARFIMA model. It is also worthnoting that the correlations between the pre-whitened series and their level and first-differenced series are, as expected (and desired), strongly and positively correlated. The pre-whitened are particularly strongly correlated with their first-differenced series.

[Table 3 about here.]

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Table 1: Explaining Presidential Satisfaction and Confidence Ratings, 1978:11-2007:1

	OLS coefficient estimates (s.e.)			
	$Satisfaction_t$		$Confidence_t$	
	Unified	Cohabitation	Unified	Cohabitation
$Unemployment_t$	1.90	3.59	-1.31	-3.89
	(2.59)	(5.32)	(2.97)	(6.11)
$Inflation_t$	-1.00	-2.69	.95	-1.27
	(1.17)	(1.84)	(1.35)	(2.11)
$Foreign-Security_t$	1.15**	.59	.63	.10
	(.68)	(.88)	(.78)	(1.00)
$Major\ Strikes_t$	-1.12*	-.83	-.81	-2.78*
	(.57)	(1.08)	(.65)	(1.23)
$Domestic\ Strife_t$	-.50	1.68	-1.77*	.83
	(.69)	(1.54)	(.80)	(1.76)
$Unemployment_{t-1}$	-1.21	2.80	.78	7.56
	(2.58)	(5.45)	(2.96)	(6.25)
$Inflation_{t-1}$	.71	.05	-1.21	.10
	(1.17)	(1.79)	(1.34)	(2.06)
$Foreign-Security_{t-1}$	-.23	-.21	1.30**	-.75
	(.68)	(.89)	(.78)	(1.02)
$Major\ Strikes_{t-1}$	-.18	.31	-.05	1.62
	(.56)	(1.05)	(.65)	(1.20)
$Domestic\ Strife_{t-1}$	.58	-2.66**†	-.18	.11
	(.69)	(1.52)	(.79)	(1.74)
$Constant$	-.12	1.33*†	.02	1.13
	(.50)	(.64)	(.57)	(.74)
R^2	.07		.07	
Durbin-Watson	1.97		2.04	
N	338		338	

*$p < .05$, **$p < .10$ (two-tailed).
†Indicates the effect is statistically different (at $p < .10$) during periods of cohabitation as compared to periods of unified government.

Table 2: Explaining Prime Ministerial Satisfaction and Confidence Ratings, 1978:11-2007:1

	OLS coefficient estimates (s.e.)			
	$Satisfaction_t$		$Confidence_t$	
	Unified	Cohabitation	Unified	Cohabitation
$Unemployment_t$	1.89	1.34	2.36	1.77
	(3.43)	(7.05)	(4.15)	(8.53)
$Inflation_t$	-1.09	-6.21*†	-.32	-3.34
	(1.55)	(2.44)	(1.88)	(2.95)
$Foreign-Security_t$	.31	.26	-.69	-.05
	(.90)	(1.16)	(1.09)	(1.40)
$Major\ Strikes_t$	-1.60*	-2.50**	-.78	-2.29
	(.75)	(1.43)	(.91)	(1.72)
$Domestic\ Strife_t$	-.83	1.20	-.58	.86
	(.92)	(2.04)	(1.11)	(2.46)
$Unemployment_{t-1}$	2.48	9.68	4.97	-3.32
	(3.41)	(7.22)	(4.13)	(8.73)
$Inflation_{t-1}$	.01	3.48	-2.16	1.77
	(1.55)	(2.38)	(1.87)	(2.87)
$Foreign-Security_{t-1}$	-.90	-.82	1.81**	.13
	(.91)	(1.17)	(1.09)	(1.42)
$Major\ Strikes_{t-1}$	.33	-.14	-.04	-.05
	(.75)	(1.39)	(.90)	(1.68)
$Domestic\ Strife_{t-1}$	-.07	-2.06	-2.02**	-1.19
	(.91)	(2.01)	(1.10)	(2.43)
$Constant$	.43	2.01*	1.06	.29
	(.66)	(.85)	(.80)	(1.03)
R^2	.08		.04	
Durbin-Watson	1.99		1.90	
N	338		338	

*$p < .05$, **$p < .10$ (two-tailed).
†Indicates the effect is statistically different (at $p < .10$) during periods of cohabitation as compared to periods of unified government.

Table 3: ARFIMA Model Estimates and t-Ratios, 1978:11-2007:1

		t-ratio for			ARMA
	d (s.e.)	$d = 0$	$d = 0.5$	$d = 1$	(p,q)
Presidential Satisfaction	.864 (.048)	17.97	7.57	-2.82	(0,0)
Prime Ministerial Satisfaction	.828 (.050)	16.59	6.57	-3.45	(0,0)
Presidential Confidence	.763 (.046)	16.45	5.67	-5.11	(0,0)
Prime Ministerial Confidence	.882 (.052)	17.10	7.40	-2.30	(0,0)

$N = 339$
Note: All models were estimated from first-differenced series and with a constant term.

Figure 1: French Presidential Satisfaction Ratings, 1978:10-2007:1



Source: IFOP.

Figure 2: French Prime Ministerial Satisfaction Ratings, 1978:10-2007:1



Source: IFOP.

Figure 3: French Presidential Confidence Ratings, 1978:10-2007:1



Source: SOFRES.

Figure 4: French Prime Ministerial Confidence Ratings, 1978:10-2007:1



Source: SOFRES.