

**Presidential elections and the nationalization of political parties in federal countries: comparing parties and institutions in Brazil and Argentina**

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Área temática: Espacio Alacip

**Trabajo preparado para su presentación en el VIII Congreso Latinoamericano de Ciencia Política, organizado por la Asociación Latinoamericana de Ciencia Política (ALACIP).  
Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Lima**

**22 al 24 de julio de 2015**

## Introduction

Past research on party nationalization has argued that the direct election of the national executive is likely to nationalize party systems. Presidential elections shape the legislative party system whenever there is a coattails effect in that the presidential candidate pulls with him other candidates from the same party label competing at lower level elections. The coattail effect occurs mainly because the presidency is the major political prize in the context of separation of powers and, for that reason, legislative candidates have strong incentives to organize their campaigns around their party's presidential candidate (Samuels, 2003). Specifically, as the number of effective presidential candidates approximates two and presidential and legislative elections are held concurrently, a "Darwinian" effect should follow, selecting those parties most successful in competing for the presidency and mobilizing a national constituency. (Golder, 2006; Shugart, 1995; Shugart and Carey, 1992). According to this reasoning, parties unable to present viable candidates to the presidency are unlikely to survive unless they coalesce around one of the two major contenders in the presidential race. As a consequence, district-level party systems come to resemble each other as well as the national party system, fostering party nationalization (Hickens and Stoll, 2011).

In this paper we argue that federal institutions shape the nature, scope and intensity of the nationalizing effect of presidential elections. In multilevel systems - especially where subnational governments have an influence over policy-making and national party dynamics -, parties unable to viably compete for the presidency may survive and win votes by regularly disputing elections to provincial governments. In the presence of gubernatorial coattails, parties may elect sizable delegations to the lower chamber by presenting competitive gubernatorial candidates in several districts, regardless of their performance (or participation) in the presidential election. From this follows that gubernatorial coattails may allow a party to nationalize by obtaining a more homogeneous distribution of the vote across regions for reasons unrelated to the presidential electoral cycle.

The article proposes to “disaggregate” the concept of party nationalization, by developing a typology of party strategies in multilevel presidential systems. We claim that parties seeking to expand their electoral base across the territory face a basic strategic choice: they can either concentrate resources and campaign efforts in the presidential race, tying the party's fortunes in both legislative and gubernatorial elections to presidential candidates' performance, or they can focus on gubernatorial elections, developing a poorly integrated strategy across national and subnational electoral arenas. Research on comparative nationalization has mostly neglected these issues, by relying on aggregate analysis of party nationalization over time and across countries. Despite their greater generalization scope, statistical analyses of TSCS data do not allow one to fully explore causal mechanisms and variation in party electoral

strategies. In particular, we seek to further an understanding of the impact of parties' choice between prioritizing presidential or gubernatorial elections on the nationalization of their vote.

We develop and test two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that parties that organize around the greater aim of disputing presidential elections will succeed in building a strong, nationalized organization as long as they implement vertically integrated strategies that allow them to tie nationalization in both gubernatorial and national legislative elections to mobilization of a national constituency in the presidential race. This implies that nationalization or denationalization in presidential elections will have a similar impact on gubernatorial and lower chamber elections.

Hypothesis two is that parties that focus on the gubernatorial race will nationalize in lower chamber elections *despite* poor integration between their national and subnational strategies, or even despite their lack of viable presidential candidates. Rather, because provincialized parties often lack viable presidential candidates or they routinely fail to coordinate effectively around a particular candidate, the party's capacity to obtain a relatively homogeneous share of the vote in national legislative elections will depend mostly on whether or not it succeeds in filing competitive gubernatorial candidacies across a wide number of provinces<sup>1</sup>. Hence, nationalization will have little or no association with performance in the presidential race.

The article analyzes comparatively party strategies and institutional rules in two federal, presidential democracies: Brazil and Argentina. Case selection followed a most-similar case logic. Brazil and Argentina are both large federations marked by striking regional inequalities, and they feature similar electoral institutions and federal arrangements: PR rules, electoral districts that coincide with states/provinces and powerful subnational governments. Regional sections of parties are granted wide autonomy to make alliances to compete for both provincial and national legislative offices in both countries. Further, several important decisions relative to elections and party organization – such as party primaries to select candidates to all relevant national posts, with the exception of the presidency – are taken at the provincial level. This necessarily creates wide opportunities for incongruence in party behavior across different elections and/or provinces (Clerici, 2012; Cortez, 2009; Jones, 1997; Samuels, 2003).

In spite of these similarities, Brazilian and Argentine institutions critically differ with regard to the concurrence of congressional, gubernatorial and presidential elections and the relative autonomy enjoyed by subnational party systems from national political dynamics. National legislative, gubernatorial and presidential elections have been held concurrently in Brazil since in 1994. In Argentina, on the other hand, the mandates of presidents and national legislators do not coincide. Since 1994, presidents have a four-

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<sup>1</sup> To secure uniformity of language usage, throughout the article we use the word "province" to refer to subnational units in federal countries, except when we refer specifically to Brazil's *states*.

year term, whereas legislative elections are held every two years: half of legislative races coincide with the presidential election, whereas the other half are midterm elections. Also, governors have had the prerogative to set gubernatorial and, until 2004, national legislative elections which allowed them to behave strategically and increase their influence over legislative elections (for instance by making the lower chamber election concur with the gubernatorial race, but not with the presidential election) (Leiras, 2006). Further, Argentine governors have counted on wider array of institutional powers and they have had greater discretion to execute provincial budgets than their Brazilian counterparts (Almeida, 2005; Ardanaz, et al., 2012; Arretche, 2009; Lodola, 2011).

We rely on cross-national comparisons to assess the impact of concurrent elections and the relative autonomy of subnational governments on party strategies. Further, we take advantage of within-case comparisons to analyze the effects of parties' strategic choices on nationalization while keeping institutional environment constant. Our analysis shows that independent of institutional differences, electorally relevant parties in both Brazil and Argentina have succeeded in surviving and even nationalizing their vote regardless of their competitiveness in the presidential race or alignment to one of the main presidential contenders. This indicates that decentralized government and electoral institutions partly undermine the systemic effect of presidential elections on the party system, even in the presence of concurrent elections.

### **Presidential elections, federalism and party nationalization**

The concept of party nationalization has been used in the comparative literature to assess the extent to which subnational units approximate national vote patterns. In nationalized party systems, parties' share of the vote in each district deviates only marginally from their national vote share. By the same reasoning, party systems are regionalized when most political parties compete in a few districts or concentrate their vote in specific regions of the country (Brancati, 2008; Chhibber, et al., 2004; Jones and Mainwaring, 2003; Morgenstern, et al., 2009).

In multilevel political systems, party nationalization includes a horizontal dimension (distribution of votes across districts) and a vertical dimension, which refers to the degree of congruence among the national and the subnational party systems. Party systems are vertically integrated when issues, parties and voter behavior at the state level are linked to the federal level. Vertical nationalization implies that national and subnational party systems are very similar and there is a substantial degree of correspondence in results of elections disputed at different levels of government (Leiras, 2010; Rodden and Wibbels, 2011; Thorlakson, 2007).

Fully nationalized party systems are those where political parties obtain very similar shares of the total vote in each district (horizontal nationalization) and, also, national elections and party alignments have a decisive effect on electoral results at lower levels of government (vertical nationalization). Given the strong connection between national and subnational electoral results, nationalization of parties' vote in

national elections is very likely to nationalize subnational party system as well. As we show in the following sections, however, such a connection between the vertical and horizontal dimensions of party nationalization is not always present, neither can it be assumed as given.

Research on the effect of presidential elections on party systems show that, all else being equal, the direct election of the national executive favors more nationalized party systems. The likelihood of the presidential election shaping the party system depends mostly on the strength of the coattail effect, by which a presidential candidate pulls with him other candidates from the same party label competing in national legislative elections (Golder, 2006; Jones, 1994; Samuels, 2002; Shugart, et al., 1992).

Because the presidential race induces parties to mobilize a national constituency and expand their base of support throughout a country's territory, the coattail effect in the presence of a low number of effective presidential candidates (i.e. close to two) is very likely to foster the survival and growth of nationalized parties, through a mechanism we label the "Darwinian effect" of the presidential race (Cox, 1999; Hicken, 2009; Hickens, et al., 2011).

The hypothesized effects of the presidential race on party aggregation rest on the assumption that the election of the national executive has a determinant impact on parties' electoral fortunes. Not being able to file competitive presidential candidates entails electoral costs that parties are likely to avoid if they can. In multilevel, decentralized political systems, however, this assumption no longer holds. Where subnational governments have relevant powers to tax, spend and formulate and implement policies, the incentives to nationalize and attach the party's electoral strategies in other races to the presidential election are much lower.

This is mostly because the decentralization of authority over policy making gives parties and voters both incentive and opportunity to mobilize and respond to locally defined issues, leading to the development of distinctive party systems at the state level, relatively independent from the national party system (Thorlakson, 2007). Party aggregation is more difficult to achieve when voters' preferences are mostly locally based and candidates do not have to coordinate with politicians in other districts. (Brancati, 2008; Chhibber, et al., 2004; Leiras, 2010; Morgenstern, et al., 2009).

Note further that federal institutions may interact with electoral rules allowing subnational (gubernatorial) elections to shape the national legislative election, sometimes to the detriment of the presidential election. Candidates to the national legislature are most likely to benefit from gubernatorial coattails from candidates affiliated with their party or coalition when national legislative elections are held concurrently with gubernatorial elections, but not with the presidential race (Jones, 1997; Jones, 2010; Samuels, 2003).

## **A typology of party strategies in multilevel presidential systems**

We propose a typology of party strategies that allows for the definition of theoretical expectations regarding the causal mechanisms connecting institutional incentives, party strategies and party nationalization. Before presenting the model, a short note is required on our assumptions concerning parties' behavior and strategies. We do not assume that parties seek nationalization as an end in itself; rather, parties will only nationalize when it allows them to meet other ends such as votes, policies or office. It is true that nationalized parties are, most often, large parties (Jones and Mainwaring, 2003), which implies that institutional incentives favoring vote maximization may indirectly lead to nationalization. To put matters somewhat differently, a regional party that can only compete effectively in a few districts imposes, in practice, a limit to its own electoral growth. Note however that if institutional rules allow parties to obtain desired office or policy benefits regardless of their capacity to nationalize and maximize votes, it may be perfectly rational to pursue a strategy that implies maintaining a geographically concentrated electoral base.

Our model assumes a presidential system with multiple levels of government, in which political parties may decide to concentrate organizational resources and campaign efforts to dispute the presidency or subnational executive offices. Given these institutional characteristics, parties' capacity to regularly file competitive gubernatorial or presidential candidates will often have an effect on parties electoral survival and growth, including in national legislative elections. Thus, one may conclude that both presidential and gubernatorial elections may have an impact on the national party system, affecting party nationalization.

The choice between prioritizing the national or the provincial level of government in the definition of party strategies depends on macro-institutional factors such as the extent to which government authority is decentralized, which in turn impacts on the value of the presidency relatively to provincial governments. Party-level factors are also relevant, especially parties' capacity to file competitive candidates to the presidency<sup>2</sup>.

Samuels (2002) and Samuels and Shugart (2010) argue that presidential elections generally encourage vote-seeking behavior and that these incentives are much stronger than any other vote-seeking incentive under parliamentarism because no parliamentary system has a threshold of exclusion as high as every presidential system does. However, not every party faces similar incentives to pursue a vote seeking strategy in presidential elections. Parties that can viably contend for the presidential race are the most likely to "presidentialize", concentrating their efforts and resources on the executive election as opposed to the legislative election (Samuels, 2002, p. 468).

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<sup>2</sup> It is important to stress that our model makes no previous assumption on parties' capacity to act as unitary actors. Thus, for our analytical purposes, it makes no difference whether party strategies arise from decisions taken by a small clique of national party leaders or, alternatively, if strategies are the unintentional outcome of various decentralized and incongruent strategies followed by the party's regional sections.

In this article we retain the basic insights of the party presidentialization hypothesis (Samuels, 2002; Samuels, et al., 2010) and expand it to a federative setting. We argue that competitive parties in the presidential election have strong incentives to subordinate all decisions concerning the filing of candidates, campaign strategies and party alliances in national legislative and, also, provincial elections, to the greater aim of winning the presidency.

Parties that are not competitive in the presidential race, however, must consider potential costs involved in the decision to run for president. Filing a presidential candidate implies the investment of valuable resources that might be allocated more effectively in other electoral races in which the party has a greater chance of winning (Melo, 2010). Considering the above aspects, we differentiate among two strategies. Pure presidentialization is defined as a strategy of electoral competition that subordinates all the party strategies in elections at lower levels of government to the purpose of winning the presidency and/or participating of national government. Note that this applies not only to the party that nominates the presidential candidates, but also to electoral coalition parties, which may benefit from coattails and from office and policy benefits in case of winning (Freudenreich, 2012)

In multilevel systems, linkage operates both horizontally, as candidates across districts join the same national party or coalition, and vertically, as parties and candidates coordinate their efforts across the national and subnational electoral arenas. In particular, parties who are competitive in the presidential election have strong incentives to subordinate all decisions concerning campaign strategies, party alliances, and the filing of candidates in regional elections to the greater aim of winning the presidency. Arguably, because presidential elections require candidates to compete by presenting national policy platforms and mobilizing a national constituency, they induce parties to adopt a vertically integrated strategy rather than allowing subnational party organizations to adapt to local political context. Vertical integration implies not only securing the support of co-partisan gubernatorial candidates that may help the presidential campaign at the subnational level, but also making alliances with other parties that are competitive in subnational elections and that may draw support from local voters in states where the presidential candidate's co-partisans lack a strong organization (Calvo and Escobar, 2005; Cortez, 2009; Spoon and West, 2013).

Note that such a strategy requires the establishment a symbiotic relationship between local and national candidates (Filippov, et al., 2004). On the one hand, candidates to subnational office benefit from sharing party labels with a popular presidential candidate (or they may benefit indirectly by entering a pre-electoral coalition in support of the candidate). On the other hand, the candidate running for national office increases the likelihood of winning if candidates to gubernatorial office in each and every district integrate their campaign with his (Filippov, et al., 2004; Leiras, 2006). To summarize, presidentialization is a strategy characterized by a high degree of horizontal and vertical party linkage.

This is not necessarily so when parties run for president with the main purpose of obtaining indirect benefits in terms of votes in other disputes, national media exposure and so on. We are especially concerned about a situation opposite to national presidentialization, in which a party with a regionally concentrated electoral base runs for president partly with the primary aim of consolidating and maintaining a territorially segmented constituency and extending the party's influence in the national arena by boosting its legislative vote through a cottail effect. Alternatively, the party may decide to run with the aim of increasing its bargaining power vis-à-vis the main presidential contenders in a likely runoff election, so as to obtain electoral, policy or office benefits that allow it to strengthen its regional stronghold. In any case, because the party cannot realistically expect to elect the president, or even finish among the top vote-gatherers, a strategy of territorial expansion of its constituency through party linkage may prove too costly or counter-productive, or simply fail.

This latter strategy, which we label *regional presidentialization*, is typically (but not necessarily so) pursued by regional parties whose voting is concentrated in a single region. Following Brancatti (2008), we use the term region to refer to the political regions of a country, that is, the level of government directly below the national level of government. Arguably, connecting national and subnational races through vertical party linkage is instrumental to the reproduction of regional parties in so far as it may allow them to "shut down" provincial borders to other presidential candidates and local forces attached to the latter. Note that both types of presidentialization imply vertically integrated electoral strategies, in the sense that parties subordinate their electoral fortunes in all lower level disputes to the presidential race, but they critically differ in their horizontal scope. On the other hand, regional presidentialization is probably less stable over time as compared to national presidentialization because regional party leaders running for president may sometimes succeed in mobilizing a national constituency.

In multilevel political systems, parties lacking a viable presidential candidate have yet the option of concentrating efforts and resources in provincial elections. Such a strategy, which we label *provincialization*, requires mobilizing voters by disputing elections to provincial executives and presenting proposals suited to the specificities of local constituencies.

There are two main types of provincialization. We define *regional provincialization* or simply put, *provincialization*, as a territorially circumscribed strategy with the purpose of maintaining the party's electoral base. Such a strategy differs from regional presidentialization in the sense that parties choose not to participate of national elections, focusing instead on disputes for provincial office in a given region of the country. By its turn, *national provincialization* is a strategy that combines prioritizing subnational elections and expanding the party's electoral base



through the filing of gubernatorial candidacies in a large number of provinces<sup>3</sup>. When this latter strategy is successful, it may allow parties to elect sizable delegations to the lower chamber, assuming there is a significant gubernatorial coattail effect at work in national legislative elections. In that situation, parties may increase their nationalization in legislative elections by obtaining a more homogeneous distribution of the vote across the various districts (horizontal nationalization), despite the fact that provincialization implies a low integration of national and subnational party strategies. In this sense, we agree with Leiras' (2010) hypothesis in what concerns the absence of a linear relationship between national and vertical nationalization.

Presidentializing implies both potential benefits, such as association with a popular presidential candidate, and potential costs related to the necessity of pursuing a national strategy rather than adapting to local context. These potential costs tend to be higher in federal settings. Among other reasons, once parties attach their electoral fate to the presidential race, they may be forced not to file candidates in certain provinces, due to the necessity of accommodating the national coalition interests in gubernatorial races. Furthermore, subnational party organization may be required to support a presidential candidate that is not very popular or well known in the province, or enter disadvantageous electoral alliances in favor of the party's national objectives.

We do not assume, however, that national provincialization is synonym with abandoning the presidential race. Parties may file a presidential candidate or enter an electoral coalition and yet decide not to subordinate provincial strategies to national party alignments. The key difference between presidentialization and national provincialization is, thus, whether or not parties adopt a vertically integrated strategy. To put matters somewhat simply, presidentialized parties will be keen to sacrifice their subnational ambitions for the greater aim of winning the presidency. On the other hand, a national provincialization strategy implies that the party will often sacrifice its presidential ambitions to allow subnational party sections sufficient autonomy to pursue a localizing strategy to maximize performance in gubernatorial races (e.g., by not associating gubernatorial candidacies with a weak or unpopular presidential candidate). Because provincialized parties often lack viable presidential candidates or they routinely fail to coordinate effectively around a particular candidate, integration between national and subnational strategies will be low and the party's capacity to obtain a relatively homogeneous share of the vote in national legislative elections will depend mostly on the decentralized strategies pursued by provincial party machines

The figure below classifies each of the strategies defined in this section according to the extent of vertical and horizontal party linkage they require.

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<sup>3</sup> This particular strategy was identified by Marcelo Leiras (2006) in his analysis of party nationalization in Argentina. Our concept of national provincialization extends and formalizes his basic theoretical insights.

## **insert figure1**

According to our typological model, presidentialized parties ought to nationalize mostly as a consequence of mobilization of a national constituency in the presidential race (hypothesis one). On the other hand, nationalizing in the presidential election will not have a relevant effect on nationalization of provincialized parties' vote, as the latter expand their electoral support across the territory mainly as a consequence of their ability to compete in gubernatorial races in various districts (hypothesis two). In the following sections, we test these hypotheses by relying on both statistical and comparative analyses.

## **Party strategies in Brazil and Argentina**

In this section we analyze party strategies and their impact on party nationalization in Brazil and Argentina. Our analysis covers the all presidential, gubernatorial and national legislative elections held in Brazil between 1989 and 2010. We look at Argentine elections throughout the period 1989-2011. Because both countries have multiparty systems, and there is significant electoral volatility associated with the decline (or even disappearance) of some parties and the rise of others over time, we established a set of simple rules to select our cases. For all parties, with the exception of regional parties, for reasons to be shortly explained, we applied a threshold of an average 4% of the national vote in legislative elections in the last three elections (from 2010 in Brazil and 2011 in Argentina); also, we only included parties that participated of national legislative elections in more than half of all elections under analysis. The party size threshold was not applied to regional parties on the grounds that these parties, due to their geographically concentrated voting patterns, are almost always very small parties. Hence, we selected all regional parties that competed regularly in national legislative elections (e.g., in more than half of all elections considered). The application of these criteria resulted in a list of eight parties in Brazil: PSDB, PT, PMDB, PSB, PFL/DEM, PTB, PDT and PP; and other and other nine parties in Argentina: PJ, UCR, ARI/CC, FPV, Compromiso Federal (EP/CF), PRO, Fuerza Republicana (FR), Frente Renovador de la Concordia (FRC) and Movimiento Popular Nuquino (MPN)<sup>4</sup>.

In order to classify parties within categories of our typology of electoral strategies, we created a presidentialization index which is comprised of a vertical party linkage (VPL) score and a simple measure of participation in presidential elections, which is the total number of presidential elections in which the party filed a candidate or joined a pre-electoral coalition divided by the number of elections held since the start of

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<sup>4</sup> In the case of Argentina, two additional criteria were considered for selecting regional parties: they had to present candidates in at least three gubernatorial elections and obtain more than 25% of district votes in at least four national legislative elections.

the period (or since the party's creation). The VPL score is intended to measure parties' coordination between national and subnational electoral arenas. Specifically, it measures at the extent to which presidential candidates counted on support of the party's gubernatorial candidates and provincial sections and/or gubernatorial candidates and provincial party sections agreed to follow the party's national coalition strategy, by making alliances congruent with the pre-electoral coalition formed in support of its presidential candidate. We created two questions, with scores ranging from zero to three attributed to each answer, to account for both dimensions of vertical integration (see the Appendix). The first dimension is captured by question A, whereas question B measures the second dimension. In all elections in which the party did not form an electorally relevant pre-electoral coalition (i.e., the presidential candidate did not make an alliance with a party that obtained at least 5% of the national vote in the previous election), only the first dimension was calculated. In all remaining cases, scores were obtained for both dimensions and averaged for each election. Parties absent the presidential election in a given year received a score of zero. The resulting VPL index is calculated as the sum of scores obtained in all presidential election years divided by the maximum score and multiplied by 100.

Note that differentiating between intra-party and intra-coalition coordination is necessary because pre-electoral coalitions are much more frequent in Brazil as compared to Argentina. In Brazil's coalitional presidentialism, electoral coordination involves the exchange of electoral support across different levels of government among the party leading the presidential coalition and their allies (Cortez, 2009).

Measuring subnational party organization support to a given presidential candidate is admittedly difficult. However, indirect inferences can be made by looking at the process of nomination of presidential candidates and the extent to which provincial party sections divided or agreed on selection of a particular candidate. In the case of Argentina, given governors' prerogative of setting election dates we also looked at the percentage of incumbent governors that opted for concurrent presidential and gubernatorial elections. This was useful to decide on scores attributed to PJ and UCR, which are the two parties with the largest number of governorships in Argentina.

The presidentialization score was obtained by multiplying the measure of vertical party linkage by frequency of participation in presidential races. This is necessary because, by definition, parties absent the presidential race do not face the issue of whether or not coordinating national and subnational campaign efforts.

We used a simple coding rule to classify cases: all parties that obtained a presidentialization score superior to 50 and, in addition to that, received VPL scores superior to 1 in more than 50% of all presidential elections disputed were coded as instances of either presidentialization or regional presidentialization. All the remaining cases were grouped in the other two categories. To classify cases on the horizontal linkage dimension, we considered the average number of districts in which the party competed in gubernatorial elections. According to our definition, both provincialization

and regional presidentialization strategies should be characterized by competition in a very small number of districts. All parties that competed, on average, in less than 15% of districts (3 provinces in Argentina and 4 states in Brazil) in gubernatorial elections were classified as instances of low horizontal linkage.

### *The case of Brazil*

The restoration of direct presidential elections in 1989 fostered intense competition among Brazil's major parties. It is now widely accepted that the presidential party system has stabilized around two major centre-left and centre-right coalitions of parties that regularly compete against each other, and which are led by the Worker's Party (PT) and the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB), respectively. The Worker's Party succeeded in electing the president four times, and social democrats two times, out of seven elections disputed from 1989 to 2014. Also, since 1994, PT and PSDB have always figured among the top two vote gatherers in presidential races.

The Worker's Party (PT) emerged in the early 1980s, from the reunion of new social movements, anti-corporatism unions, catholic radical activists and left-wing intellectuals that fought against the dictatorship. It clearly differentiates itself from Brazil's poorly institutionalized parties, due to its high levels of party cohesion and programmatism, and party-centered strategies of electoral campaign. The Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) was created in 1987 from a dissidence of the catchall PMDB (Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement), which happened to be the heir of the legal opposition to the authoritarian regime<sup>5</sup>. Different from the PT's originally radical leftist party agenda, the PSDB first organized around a mildly reformist, social democratic programme and it gradually moved to a centre-right, pro-market reform position (Hunter, 2008; Roma, 2002).

PT and PSDB have replaced PMDB as the major parties in national elections, as the latter failed to coordinate around viable presidential candidates following the restoration of direct presidential elections. PMDB leaders succeeded in leading the transition to democracy by making an alliance with one of the heirs of the ruling ARENA, the PFL (Liberal Front Party)<sup>6</sup>. The PMDB-PFL government was established following indirect elections to the presidency in 1985. Its disastrous economic policies, which led to hyperinflation in 1989 seriously harmed the parties' national brands, and their presidential candidates performed rather poorly in elections held that same year. PMDB suffered the heaviest losses due to consolidation of the PT-PSDB bipolarity in

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<sup>5</sup> Brazil's military rulers had created a façade of political pluralism by allowing politicians to join the opposition MDB and compete against the ruling party the ARENA. During the transition to democracy, the word "party" was added to the opposition's front name.

<sup>6</sup> In 2007, the PFL changed its name to DEM (Democrats). Throughout the remainder of the article, we use the latter to refer to the party.

presidential races, as the party had benefited from its pivotal position in the democratic transition to become Brazil's largest party in both gubernatorial and national legislative elections in the 1980s (Ferreira, 2002).

PT and PSDB are the only parties to have filed a candidate in all presidential elections held since 1989. When one considers participations in presidential coalitions plus the number of presidential candidacies, the catchall PMDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement) and the conservative PP (Popular Party) have the lowest presence in presidential races. PSB (Brazilian Socialist Party) and DEM rank first in number of participations in the coalitions led by PT (five times) and PSDB (four times) respectively. These two parties are, so to speak, "core allies" of the Worker's Party and the Social Democratic party, and their electoral fortunes have been closely tied to success or failure of presidential candidacies led by PT and PSDB (Limongi and Cortez, 2010).

The following table presents the summary score of presidentialization for each of the eight parties in our sample. Recall that the score considers both the extent of vertical party linkage as well as the number of times a party participated of the presidential election, either by filing a candidate or joining a coalition. Values range from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating a greater degree of presidentialization.

[insert table 1]

PT and PSDB feature the highest scores of presidentialization, which is unsurprising considering these are the parties that have predominated in presidential elections since 1994. According to the table above, the Worker's Party is Brazil's most presidentialized party, with a mean score significantly higher than the same figure estimated for the Social Democratic Party. One of the reasons for this difference lies in PT's more centralized organization and lack of territorially organized factions. PSDB's state sections have had greater autonomy to make subnational alliances, whereas powerful state governors and party leaders from Brazil's largest states - São Paulo and Minas Gerais - have competed for the presidential nomination in elections held in 2002, 2006 and 2010, partly undermining party unity. The core allies of *petistas* and Social Democrats (PSB and DEM) rank third and fourth, respectively, in vertical integration of electoral strategies. PP and PMDB have the lowest scores, well below the figures calculated for the PT and the PSDB.

The evidence presented so far indicates that PT, PSDB, PSB and DEM have developed the strategies most congruent with our definition of presidentialization. That is, despite variation among these four parties, they differentiate themselves from the others due to adoption of a strategy that subordinates subnational party alliances to a national strategy devised to win the presidency and/or participate of national government. PP, PMDB and PTB, on the other hand, are the parties with the less congruent strategies across levels of government; in particular, the PP stands out as the party with the lowest number of participations in presidential elections (two). Finally, the Democratic Labour Party (PDT) is a likely intermediate case, characterized by a

high number of participations in the presidential race (five out of six) but lower coordination of electoral strategies across levels of government as compared to PSB and DEM.

We now move on to analyze parties' capacity to compete in gubernatorial elections in each of Brazil's 27 states. The table below presents data on the number of gubernatorial candidacies by party and election year. The numbers in bold indicate the three parties with the greatest number of candidacies in a given election year.

[insert table 2]

Only PT and PMDB figure among the three top parties in number of candidacies in all election years. On average, the parties filing the greatest number of gubernatorial candidates were the PT, PMDB, PSDB and PDT. It is worth noticing, however, that in terms of percentage of the national vote obtained in gubernatorial elections, PDT has lost importance throughout the period, whereas PSB, PT and PSDB increased their share (Cortez and Limongi, 2010).

What one can infer from the data is that PMDB was most successful in pursuing a national provincialization strategy, whereas PTB and PP have developed much more regionalized strategies of competition in gubernatorial elections, which is reflected in the decreasing number of gubernatorial candidacies. It is important to note, though, that Brazil lacks truly provincial parties because participation in pre-electoral coalitions in gubernatorial races allows parties lacking the capacity to file candidates in all regions to increase their national presence. For instance, in 2010 PP and PTB filed gubernatorial candidates in four and three states respectively, but they were present in elections in all remaining states as member of coalitions.

By applying the coding criteria set at the start of this section we classified four parties as instances of presidentialization: PT, PSDB, DEM and PSB. The remaining four parties were all grouped in the national provincialization category.

### ***The case of Argentina***

Different from Brazil's highly fragmented democracy, Argentina has developed a moderate multiparty system. Two large national parties, the PJ and the UCR, have mostly dominated national and provincial elections. The Radical party is a middle-class, centre-right party that emerged in the early XXth century. Its core electoral constituency is geographically concentrated in the most developed and urbanized provinces, though this has changed in the recent years (Lupu and Stokes, 2009; Malamud and De Luca, 2005; Mustapic, 2009). Until very recently, the Peronist party was a populist, mass party that mobilized support among unionized workers, the popular sectors and the lower middle classes. Throughout the 1990s, however, the party went through significant reorientation, as its organization de-unionized and relied increasingly on clientelistic linkages in Argentina's poorest provinces (Levitsky, 2003).

Although the 2002 economic crisis has had a substantial impact on the political system, eroding support for traditional parties, PJ and UCR remain Argentina's largest and most important parties. Radicals elected the president two times (1983 and 1999), and Peronists five times (1989, 1995, 2003, 2007 and 2011) out of seven presidential elections disputed since 1983. In the recent years, the Radical party has lost ground in the presidential race, partly due to the rise of competitive third parties, including FREPASO, ARI/CC and more recently, the Socialist Party. However, as we demonstrate in the remainder of the article, changes to the presidential party system have not been reflected in similar changes in provincial races.

UCR and PJ are the only parties to have disputed all elections from 1989 to 2011. Since the mid 1990s, new players have entered the presidential arena: the left-wing FREPASO and ARI/CC, with two and three participations in presidential elections, respectively, and CF, a dissidence of Peronism turned into party which has filed presidential candidates in all elections since its creation (three). Four parties (PRO, FR, FRC and MPN) were absent the presidential race in all occasions, which is unsurprising considering these are provincial parties organized to compete in subnational elections.

Following a procedure similar to that applied in the analysis of Brazil's case, we estimated mean presidentialization scores for all Argentine parties in our selection:

[ insert table 3 ]

The four parties that never participated in presidential elections received a score of zero. These are provincial organizations, that rarely dispute national legislative elections in more than three (generally bordering) provinces. These regional organizations are either very competitive or dominant in the provincial electoral arena. For instance, the Movimiento Popular Neuquino elected all governors in the Neuquén province since the return to democratic rule in 1983.

FREPASO and ARI/CC received the highest scores, which reflects the fact that these are relatively centralized, national-oriented left-wing organizations that organized mainly to dispute the presidency and present themselves as an alternative to PJ-UCR polarization. FREPASO emerged out of a PJ dissidence during Carlos Menem's first presidential term (1989-1994). The party disputed the 1995 presidential election and finished second, beating the Radical candidate. Only four years after its founding, FREPASO allied with UCR to form the Alianza coalition. The UCR-FREPASO coalition succeeded in defeating the PJ in both presidential and congressional elections in 1999. However, in the eve of an unprecedented economic and political crisis that brought to abrupt end the Alianza government in 2001, the FREPASO simply collapsed (Van Dyck, 2014).

Both FREPASO and ARI/CC organized around popular national leaders and their presidential projects, but they lacked a supporting party structure in the provinces, especially in the poorest and less populated areas of the country. This is even more

evident in the case of ARI/CC, founded by presidential aspirant Elisa Carrió, formerly a member of the UCR. In the 2003 and 2007 presidential elections, ARI/CC performed well obtained 14% and 23% of the total vote, but the party lacked competitive gubernatorial candidates in all but a few provinces.

The Compromiso Federal (before known as Unión y Libertad and Es Posible) received the third highest presidentialization score, just below ARI/CC and FREPASO . This party was built around the long lasting family of governors of San Luis, the Rodríguez Saa family, which was originally affiliated with the PJ. Taking advantage of the their strong showing in provincial elections, the Saa political clan abandoned the PJ to create the CF in 2003. Since then, the party has disputed all presidential elections, obtaining good electoral results in both provincial and national elections disputed in San Luís. The CF is likely a case of regional presidentialization, relying on its resilient but concentrated electoral bases<sup>7</sup>.

Strangely as it may appear, the major parties in Argentina's presidential elections display relatively low presidentialization scores, just above 40. This is explained by the increasing separation between the national party organization and its presidential candidates, on the one hand, and provincial governors and provincial party sections, on the other (Calvo, et al., 2005; Leiras and Fundación, 2006). Factionalism has had a stronger impact on the PJ, as official presidential candidates are often unable to unify the various competing provincial branches of the party. Party divisions were especially evident in the 2003 election, as four different Peronist factions filed presidential candidates, but none of them was able to use the party's name.

In one important respect, however, the Peronist party is an outlier because it is the only party in our selection of cases to have been extremely successful in the presidential race - all but one president elected from 1989 to 2011 were Peronists - despite increasingly poor vertical party linkage. In contrast, the Radical Party's increasing reliance on gubernatorial races for its survival has been followed by very poor performances and decreasing nationalization scores in presidential elections. Seemingly, PJ has pursued a successful executive-seeking strategy, but the pillars of this strategy lie mainly on competitiveness in provincial elections

As a matter of fact, a notable feature of subnational party competition in Argentina is the persisting hegemony of Radicals and, especially, Peronists in gubernatorial races. These two parties have competed against each other in nearly all of Argentine's provinces. Peronists have elected the largest number of governors in virtually all elections disputed over the period, with the UCR and its allies ranking just behind. The table below presents data on the number of gubernatorial candidacies by party and election year:

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<sup>7</sup> Take for instance the 2003 elections. Adolfo Rodríguez Saá obtained an astonishing 87% of the presidential vote in San Luís, which amounted to 30% of his nationwide vote. This was so despite the fact that the San Luís province represented less than 1% of the Argentine electorate.



[insert table 4]

As expected regional parties compete in only one or a few provinces. New players in presidential elections, such as ARI/CC and FREPASO have not been able to challenge PJ-UCR dominance in provincial elections. In 1999, FREPASO and UCR ran under the same ticket in 16 out of 24 provinces. According to Leiras (2006), the Radicals had a much stronger subnational party organization, and Frepaso elected only one of the 10 governorships obtained by the Alianza.

Applying the same coding rules we used to classify Brazilian parties, we conclude only two parties fit the presidentialization category: ARI/CC and FREPASO. Although PJ and UCR have participated of all presidential elections since the transition to democracy, both parties score low on vertical party linkage and, hence, were classified them as instances of national provincialization. Compromiso Federal is a typical case of regional presidentialization. All the remaining cases were grouped into the provincialization category.

### **Comparative and statistical analyses: party strategies and their impact on nationalization**

How do party strategies impact on nationalization of the vote? Below we present simple descriptive data on parties' nationalization and the related electoral strategies. Among the various existing measures of party nationalization, we chose the PNS (Party Nationalization Score) due to ease of interpretation and comparability. The PNS is calculated by subtracting the Gini coefficient for each party's vote across district from 1 (Jones, et al., 2003).

We do not include parties classified in the low horizontal party linkage category of our typology in the tables below because, by definition, these parties were expected to have very low nationalization scores and the evidence has confirmed this assumption. Instead, the analysis focus on comparison of national provincialization and presidentialization strategies. Table x.x compares mean scores (lower chamber elections) for Argentine parties classified in these two categories. Means were calculated for the whole period for PJ and UCR. Party nationalization scores calculated for ARI/CC and FREPASO are means for the periods 2003-2011 and 1995-2001 respectively.

[insert table 5]

The following table shows the same figures for Brazilian parties, with respect to the period 1990-2010:

[insert table 6]

In both countries, national provincialization has allowed parties achieve levels of party nationalization comparable or even superior to those obtained by parties pursuing a presidentialization strategy. If one considers only the parties that succeeded in competing effectively in gubernatorial elections in a very large number of provinces in the whole period (PJ, UCR and PMDB), average scores are all above 0.70. The latter party differs from PJ and UCR, though, because it has either abandoned the presidential election, or accepted a secondary role by allying with PT or PSDB presidential candidates, whereas Argentine parties filed candidates in all presidential elections from 1983 to 2011. It is also worth noticing that the Popular Party (PP) succeeded in nationalizing its vote and figuring among the four Brazilian parties with the highest PNS at the end of the period, even though it featured the lowest number of participations in presidential elections (three) among all parties classified in the national provincialization group. Hence, the descriptive evidence clearly suggests that nationalization is unrelated to a party's capacity to file competitive presidential candidates.

Most certainly, Brazil's largest presidentialized parties - PT and PSDB - have been much more successful in building nationalized organizations than FREPASO and ARI/CC in Argentina. In some respects, the challenges faced by these four parties were markedly similar. PT and PSDB had to build viable national organizations by relying on party organizations that were strongest in the most developed region of the country, the Southeast. Both parties had to make broad alliances to enter electoral markets in the North and Northeast regions - as late as 1998, the PT had never elected a governor in these regions. FREPASO and ARI/CC also drew their strength from Argentina's wealthier regions, especially the Buenos Aires province and the federal capital. However, whereas both PT and PSDB became gradually more competitive in gubernatorial elections and succeeded in expanding their subnational organization to states where they were originally weak or absent, Argentina's presidentialized parties failed to challenge PJ-UCR dominance in provincial elections.

The table below shows the evolution of the number of governors elected by PT and PSDB throughout two periods: 1990-1998 and 2002-2010. These figures are compared with the number of governorships obtained by the three parties that obtained the lowest presidentialization scores (PMDB, PP and PTB):

[insert table 7]

As seen in the table, the number of governors elected by PT and PSDB experienced a substantial increase between the two periods. At the same time, the parties that pursued strategies characterized by low vertical party linkage experienced an analogous decrease in their share of governorships. If one adds to the governorships obtained by PT and PSDB the same figures for their core allies - PSB and DEM, respectively - the percentages rise up to 48% in the first period and 64% in the second. The following table shows the distribution of governorships by party in Argentina from 1991 to 1999 and 2003 to 2011. We present figures for PJ, UCR and provincial parties.

[insert table 8]

The table shows that Peronists have not only maintained their hegemony in provincial politics, but they have actually strengthened it throughout the period. Almost all of the governorships not controlled by PJ and UCR remained in firm hands of provincial parties such as PRO in Buenos Aires city. FREPASO and ARI/CC elected one and two governors, respectively, throughout the whole period.

Students of Argentine politics have persuasively argued that the relative closure of provincial electoral markets to new competitors is a function of provincial parties' prerogative of setting election dates and reforming provincial electoral systems to insulate local party dynamics from national competitive forces. Electoral reforms that began shortly after the return to democratic rule have relied on majoritarian and mixed member electoral systems to select provincial deputies, in addition to widespread gerrymandering, in order to build in marked majoritarian and partisan biases in the electoral rules that seriously hamper effective opposition (Ardanaz, et al., 2012; Calvo, et al., 2005; Gibson, 2005; Lodola, 2011). Peronists and, to a lesser extent, Radicals have benefited from pro-incumbents biases of provincial political systems, which in turn has created serious obstacles to effective presidentialization. This is not the case of Brazil, as concurrent elections and relatively weaker subnational governments, which lack the autonomy to manipulate electoral rules, have submitted state electoral markets to national political shifts to a somewhat greater extent

What remains to be seen is whether there remain relevant differences between party strategies in the presence of appropriate statistical controls. In particular, hypotheses one and two suggest that national provincialization and presidentialization differ in the sense that parties pursuing the former strategy nationalize in lower chamber elections mostly as a consequence of successful nationalization in gubernatorial elections. Nationalizing in the presidential election does not have a relevant effect on provincialized parties' PNS, though it does have an effect among presidentialized parties.

We tested these two hypotheses by estimating a set of TSCS models. Observations were pooled across years and parties to create the dataset. Our first, baseline model estimates the impact of party strategies on party nationalization scores (lower chamber elections) for each party-year observation. Strategies were operationalized as dummy variables for presidentialization (*presidentialization*) and national provincialization (*natprovinc*). The model also includes party nationalization scores in gubernatorial elections (*govnat*), on the grounds that success of either of these two strategies is partly conditional on successful horizontal party linkage in subnational races. Hence, we ought to estimate the differential impact of party strategies while keeping nationalization in subnational elections constant. We did not include party nationalization scores estimated for presidential elections (*presnat*) in this first specification, because these are highly correlated with presidentialization strategies.

A second model specification includes the *presnat* variable to test for the differential impact of participating in the presidential race across distinct party strategies. The PNS in presidential elections was interacted with the dummy for national provincialization. To allow for comparison, we ran two models: one with, and another without the interaction term (models 3 and 2). We expected the marginal effect of national provincialization conditional on nationalization in presidential elections to lack statistical significance. The main effect of *presnat* should be positive and statistically significant, indicating the existence of a relevant effect for parties that did not pursue a national provincialization strategy.

We included as control variables a dummy for concurrent elections (*concurrent*) and party size (*largeparty*). All else being equal, concurrent presidential and legislative elections should be associated with higher levels of nationalization, regardless of party-specific differences. Also, parties that control a large share of the national vote have a higher probability of maintaining and/or extending their levels of nationalization as compared to small parties. However, because party size might vary over time as a consequence of party strategies, we operationalized size by looking at parties' share of the national vote in the lower chamber election immediately prior the first election in our dataset. We coded as large parties those which ranked among the four top vote gatherers and also obtained a share of the national vote equal or superior to 10%.

Because our dummy for party strategy does not vary over time, a fixed effects specification would be inappropriate. Panel corrected standard errors with a lagged dependent are inadvisable as well, because most parties in our sample competed in a very small number of elections. Instead we relied on random effects models with robust standard errors and a pooled specification with clustered errors. Both specifications produced very similar results. Below we present the random effects models:

[insert table 9]

The effect of nationalization in gubernatorial elections on party nationalization scores in lower chamber races is very significant and strong in model 1, which is hardly surprising given the ubiquity of gubernatorial coattails in both countries. As expected, our dummies for party strategies both have a strong and positive effect in parties' PNS calculated for legislative elections. There is no significant difference in the size of coefficients, which indicates that national provincialization has been as effective as presidentialization in producing more nationalized party votes in Brazil and Argentina.

Models 2 and 3 behave partly according to our theoretical expectations. The overall effect of presidential elections' PNS on the dependent lacks statistical significance (model 2). However, as we introduce an interaction term between national provincialization and the latter variable, we find that it does have an effect among the parties that pursued presidentialization strategies. Note that parties that pursue provincialization all have a PNS in presidential elections equal to zero, such that *presnat* is not relevant to explain variation within this group. As for the interaction term,

it indicates a negative and statistically significant effect. Below we plot the relevant marginal effect on the Y-axis and PNS in presidential elections on the X-axis:

[insert figure 2]

The graph shows that national provincialization has the strongest effect on nationalization scores when  $presnat=0$  and, hence, the party was absent the presidential election. Curiously, the marginal effect diminishes as PNS in presidential elections increases, such that it is no longer significant for values above 0.59. This indicates that national provincialization ceases to have a relevant effect on the dependent variable when parties participate in the presidential election and obtain a sufficiently nationalized vote. A complimentary interpretation of these results might be that parties that opt for national provincialization compensate for poor cross-district coordination in the presidential election and poor vertical integration by maximizing competitiveness in the gubernatorial race. Hence, these parties obtain, for a sufficiently low PNS in the presidential election, nationalization scores higher than it would be expected had they decided to tie their fortunes in the lower chamber race to their candidate's coattails in the national election.

Looking at the distribution of cases, only the two Argentine parties classified in the national provincialization category (PJ and UCR) have a mean PNS in presidential elections above the critical level (0.59), at which the marginal effect is no longer significant. Hence, hypothesis two is only partly confirmed. Although parties that pursue national provincialization are much less dependent on participation in the presidential race to nationalize, congruent with our theoretical expectation, we cannot say this is true for a high level of nationalization in the presidential election.

### **Final remarks**

The comparative analysis of institutions, political parties and party strategies in Brazil and Argentina indicates that party competition in multilevel presidential countries does not fit into the schematic coattails story upon which numerous studies of presidential elections and party systems have built their empirical analyses. In the context of decentralized government, party and electoral institutions, national provincialization strategies offer an alternative to parties that are unable to presidentialize, but yet count on a strong and territorially diffuse organization that allows them to effectively dispute gubernatorial elections in several districts. At the same time, parties that opt for national provincialization may participate in presidential elections and yet make a strategic choice to maximize performance in gubernatorial races by detaching provincial parties from competition over the presidency. From this follows that the greater the rewards in terms of votes and office associated with nationalizing through provincialization, the lower the connection between the structure of competition in presidential elections and the structure of competition in lower chamber elections. To put matters simply, if national provincialization is the dominant strategy such that parties cannot expect to nationalize and outvote their competitors by

presidentializing, then party competition at all levels - including competition for the national executive - will institutionalize and stabilize around gubernatorial races.

Most certainly, presidentialization has had a greater impact in Brazil as compared to Argentina, as concurrent elections created incentives for coordination of electoral strategies across levels of government. Once PT and PSDB replaced the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB) as the main players in the national arena, this altered the balance of forces in gubernatorial races. On the other hand, Brazil's parties that opted for national provincialization were no less successful than their Argentine counterparts in sustaining high levels of nationalization over time and even in maintaining a pivotal role in the political system, distinct institutional rules notwithstanding. By 2010, the two parties with the lowest levels of vertical integration of electoral strategies in our selection of Brazilian parties (PMDB and PP) obtained some 20% of the national vote and figured among the four largest parties in the lower chamber (PMDB controlled the second largest delegation just below PT), which placed them in a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis president elected Dilma Rouseff. It is also worth noticing that Brazil's highly permissive electoral system, in combination with federal institutions, fosters extreme levels of party fragmentation and, as a consequence, the performance of the largest presidential parties and their core allies in the national legislative race has lagged behind their performance in national legislative elections.

Due to higher levels of subnational party systems' autonomy from national party competition, Argentina's traditional parties have maintained their status as the largest and most important national organizations, despite increasingly poor vertical integration of their electoral strategies. At the same time, the rise of new, competitive forces in the presidential race did not produce significant changes to the subnational party system. Also, and in contrast to our argument that national provincialized parties tend to sacrifice their presidential ambitions to maximize votes in gubernatorial elections, the Peronist party has consolidated as Argentina's most successful party in presidential disputes, despite fierce intra-party factional rivalries that conspire against a vertically integrated strategy connecting national and subnational races. However, PJ is clearly an exception, as all the other cases of national provincialization have been either absent the presidential election, (or have failed to file a candidates of their own) in most cases (the Popular Party in Brazil being the clearest example), or, as in the case of the Radical Party, they have strategically sought to dissociate provincial party branches from increasingly weak presidential candidates.

The figure below shows a summary of our classification of Brazilian and Argentine parties in each of the four types of electoral strategy :

**[insert figure 3]**

Comparative research has made a lot of effort in trying to understand the impacts of party nationalization at the systemic level, but variation in party nationalization/regionalization strategies suggests one should also evaluate such impacts across parties. For instance , do presidentialized parties mostly differ from other parties

in what concerns party programmatism and party institutionalization? To what extent does national provincialization promote lower levels of party cohesion and discipline in Congress, given their decentralized organization and electoral strategies? Considering that many presidential countries in Latin America and elsewhere in the developing world have gone federal in the recent years, these sorts of questions certainly deserve greater attention from students of comparative politics.

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## APPENDIX A

### The Index of Vertical party linkage

The VPL index is intended to measure parties' coordination between national and subnational electoral arenas. Specifically, it measures at the extent to which presidential candidates counted on support of the party's gubernatorial candidates and provincial sections and/or gubernatorial candidates and provincial party sections agreed to follow the party's national coalition strategy, by making alliances congruent with the pre-electoral coalition formed in support of its presidential candidate.

In addition to official electoral data obtained from Brazil's TSE and Argentina's Dirección Nacional Electoral, we relied on several secondary sources to calculate individual party scores. These are various studies on specific parties and/or on the evolution of party nationalization and integration over time in Brazil and Argentina, all of which are indicated in the bibliography. We relied on the following references to code Brazilian parties across elections : (Cortez, 2009; Ferreira, 2002; Hunter, 2008; Limongi, et al., 2010; Miranda, 2013; Power, 2015; Roma, 2002). The references on Argentina are the following: (Calvo, et al., 2005; Galván, 2011; Leiras, 2006; Lupu, 2014; Van Dyck, 2014)

We also relied on the Brazilian Biographical Dictionary edited by CPDOC-FGV to learn on the nomination process and electoral campaign of particular presidential candidates, and on newspaper articles when no other source of evidence was available.

A - To what extent did the party's provincial sections/ factions support the presidential candidate?

0 - More than one viable candidate disputed the presidential nomination and/or the winning candidate lacked support of a majority or near majority of the party's provincial factions. Thus, most gubernatorial candidates sought to dissociate themselves from the party's candidate in the presidential election and/or they supported another candidate.

1 - A majority of party factions coalesced around the official candidate, but some large and electorally relevant provincial factions put little effort in contributing for the party's national campaign, and/or they made efforts to dissociate themselves from the party's presidential candidate.

2 - The party's presidential candidate and/or his supporters within the party national directorate had firm control over the party machine, such that resistance to his candidacy was restricted to a few, relatively unimportant party factions. Hence, a very broad majority of the party's provincial sections trailed behind their presidential candidate.

3 - Party factions coordinated effectively around the party's broad national strategy, and none of the provincial sections of the party sought to dissociate itself from the official presidential candidate and/or supported a competing candidate/ Party factionalism was not relevant throughout both the party's primaries and the electoral process, such that the party's gubernatorial candidates remained firmly united around the presidential candidate

B - To what extent did the party's provincial sections/ factions followed national party guidelines, making alliances in gubernatorial elections that were congruent with the alliance formed in the presidential election?

0 - A broad majority of gubernatorial candidates and provincial sections pursued electoral and alliance strategies at the provincial level that were incongruent with the national alliance. That is, they made alliances with parties that integrated other, competing pre-electoral coalitions in the presidential election and/or they refused to support coalition candidates in gubernatorial races.

1 - Various electorally relevant provincial sections of the party made alliances that were incongruent with the presidential pre-electoral coalition, although national and subnational strategies were congruent in most cases. However, the national party mostly failed to discipline provincial sections and force them to comply with the party's broad presidential strategy.

2 - The national party succeeded in imposing national alliance guidelines to most of dissident provincial sections, such that incongruent strategies occurred in a minority of cases, and these were of small relevance to the party's national strategy.

3 - National and subnational strategies were highly integrated, such that deviation from the national alliance guidelines was mostly marginal or did not occur at all.

## Tables and figures

**Figure 1: A Typology of Electoral Strategies in Multilevel Presidential Systems**

Vertical linkage	Horizontal linkage	
	Low	High
High	Regional Presidentialization	Presidentialization
Low	Provincialization	National Provincialization

**Table 1 : Brazil - Mean Presidentialization Index, selected parties, 1990-2010**

	Participation in presidential elections	Vertical party linkage score	Presidentialization index
PT	1	91.67	91.67
PSDB	1	75	75.00
PSB	0.83	66.67	55.56
DEM	0.83	61.10	50.92
PDT	0.83	52.78	43.98
PTB	0.83	33.33	27.78
PMDB	0.67	22.22	14.81
PP	0.33	20.00	6.67

Sources: See Appendix.

**Table 2 : Brazil – Gubernatorial candidacies by party and election year, selected parties, 1990-2010**

Party	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	Average
PT	<b>23</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>10</b>	18.33
PSDB	<b>13</b>	10	<b>14</b>	12	<b>17</b>	<b>15</b>	13.50
PFL	9	7	12	8	7	4	7.83
PMDB	<b>16</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>19</b>	16.50
PSB	1	4	7	<b>19</b>	8	9	8
PDT	10	<b>14</b>	6	9	11	4	9
PTB	5	5	2	8	1	3	4
PP	9	10	5	6	3	4	6.17

Source: IPEADATA, [www.ipeadata.gov.br](http://www.ipeadata.gov.br)

**Table 3 : Argentina - Mean Presidentialization Index, selected parties, 1989-2011**

	<b>Participation in presidential elections</b>	<b>Vertical party linkage score</b>	<b>Presidentialization index</b>
ARI/CC	1	100	100
FREPASO	1	83	83.33
CF	1	66.66	66.66
UCR	1	46.66	46.66
PJ	1	44.44	44.44
PRO	0	-	0
FR	0	-	0
MPN	0	-	0
FRC	0	-	0

Sources: See Appendix.

**Table 4: Argentina – Gubernatorial candidacies by party and election year, selected parties, 1991-2011**

Party	<b>1991</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>Average</b>
PJ/FPV	<b>23</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>23</b>	22.50
UCR	<b>23</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>17</b>	19.83
CF	-	-	-	1	1	<b>3</b>	1.67
ARI	-	-	-	<b>9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>2</b>	6.67
FREPASO	-	<b>9</b>	<b>24</b>	-	-	-	16.50
PRO	-	-	-	1	2	3	2
FR	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
MPN	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
FRC	-	-	-	1	1	1	1

Sources: Dirección Nacional Electoral

**Table 5: Argentina - Mean PNS, Lower Chamber Elections, selected parties, 1991-2011**

<b>Party/ Strategy</b>	<b>PNS</b>
<u>National Provincialization</u>	
PJ	0.77
UCR	0.73
<b>Mean</b>	<b>0.75</b>
<u>Presidentialization</u>	
ARI CC	0.26
FREPASO	0.77
<b>Mean</b>	<b>0.52</b>

**Table 6: Brazil - Mean PNS, Lower Chamber Elections, selected parties, 1990-2010**

<b>Party/ Strategy</b>	<b>PNS</b>
<u>National Provincialization</u>	
PMDB	0.71
PP	0.59
PTB	0.51
<b>Mean</b>	<b>0.65</b>
<u>Presidentialization</u>	
PT	0.71
PSDB	0.63
DEM	0.62
PDT	0.55
PSB	0.40
<b>Mean</b>	<b>0.58</b>

**Table 7: Brazil - Elected governors by party, selected parties, 1990-1998 and 2002-2010**

	<b>1990-1998</b>	<b>2002-2010</b>
PSDB	15	20
PT	5	13
PT+PSDB (%)	<i>24.69</i>	<i>40.74</i>
PT+PSDB+allies	<i>48.78</i>	<i>64.19</i>
PMDB	23	19
PP	8	1
PTB	2	1
PMDB+PP+PTB (%)	<i>40.74</i>	<i>25.93</i>

**Table 8: Argentina - Elected governors by party, selected parties, 1991-1999 and 2003-2011**


	<b>1991-1999</b>	<b>2003-2011</b>
PJ	42	50
UCR	19	13
PJ+UCR (%)	<i>85.92</i>	<i>87.5</i>
Provincial parties	10	8
% provincial parties	<i>14.08</i>	<i>11.11</i>

**Table 9 : Estimates of the effect of party strategies on party nationalization scores, lower chamber elections**

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	B	sd	B	sd	B	sd
(Intercept)	**0.02	0.01	***0.20	0.04	***0.10	0.04
largeparty	**0.08	0.03	**0.14	0.06	*0.11	0.06
presnat	-	-	0.10	0.07	***0.30	0.07
govnat	***0.38	0.06	***0.43	0.10	***0.40	0.10
concurrent	**0.03	0.01	**0.04	0.02	**0.04	0.02
presidentialization	***0.40	0.06	-	-	-	-
natprovinc	***0.41	0.04	0.10	0.07	***0.29	0.07
natprovinc*presnat					***-0.30	0.08
Unbalanced panel						
Groups - 16	N	113	N	113	N	113
T - 4-12	R <sup>2</sup>	0.675	R <sup>2</sup>	0.509	R <sup>2</sup>	0.563

\* p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01 ; \*\*\*p<0.001

**Figure 2: Marginal effect of national provincialization strategy conditional on PNS presidential election, model 3**





**Figure 3: Classification of Brazilian and Argentine parties by electoral strategy**

		<b>Horizontal party linkage</b>	
		<b>Low</b>	<b>High</b>
<b>Vertical party linkage</b>	<b>High</b>	Regional presidentialization CF	Presidentialization PT PSDB PSB DEM ARI FREPASO
	<b>Low</b>	Regionalization PRO FR MPN FCC	National provincialization PJ UCR PMDB PP PTB PDT