Bringing in Big Business: The Role of the Private Sector in Forging Security Sector Reform

By Paul J. Angelo

University College London

Paul.angelo.16@ucl.ac.uk

Abstract:

Although the security sector reform (SSR) literature highlights the importance of civil society involvement in reform initiatives, scholars have devoted relatively little attention to the specific role of the private sector in SSR (Caparini, 2010; Gordon, 2014; Knight, 2009; Kümmel, 2003; Loada and Moderan, 2015). Most of the treatment of the subject touches on the outsourcing of SSR to private development and security companies and on the inability of state sponsors of SSR to enforce accountability of privatised interventions (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2006; Mancini, 2005; Perito, 2009; Puck, 2017). The SSR literature has scarcely addressed the needs of economic elites from the "human security" perspective. Scholars are only just beginning to explore systematically the role of the private sector in supporting citizen security strategies (Flores-Macías, 2014; Moncada, 2016; Pearce, 2018; Rodríguez-Franco, 2016). This paper explores the role of big business in SSR in the cases of Colombia and Mexico. In doing so, it adds to the growing body of literature on the domestic factors that facilitate SSR by establishing the support of economic elites as a crucial factor for the successful implementation of SSR.

Paper:

According to recent scholarship on the topic, business tends to prioritise a larger and more professional police and military presence when the state is unable to establish order in economically vital spaces (Moncada, 2016, pp. 95, 185).[1] Where governments and big business operate in isolation due to historically low linkages between the two sectors, the probability of collaboration on security policy is low due to a lack of negotiating mechanisms and scant trust; conversely, collaborative government-business relations typically result in a united local front that reinforces shared policy preferences to confront insecurity (Moncada, 2016, p. 19). In this view, the density of linkages between political authorities and private sector interests determine capacity for governance (Cammett, 2007; Maxfield and Schneider, 1997; Walton, 1977). Indeed, Jackson notes that the influence of local elites on shaping the direction and implementation of reforms is a crucial frontier in the SSR literature that is, as yet, woefully under-researched (Jackson, 2018, p. 4).

In Colombia and Mexico, the level of cohesion among economic and political elites at differed at the outset of SSR, contributing to disparate levels of private sector support for public security initiatives at the national level.[2] Whereas in Colombia public-private cooperation on SSR represented an evolutionary step in an already close relationship between economic and political elites, Mexican economic and political elites historically tended to operate in distinct spheres—a factor that undermined big business' support for federal-led SSR. Furthermore, the cases of Colombia and Mexico diverge with respect to whether financial elites perceived SSR to be the best means of providing for citizen security and over how important citizen security was for business operation (Enders et al., 2006; Frey et al., 2007; *Human Development Report*, 1994; Keefer and Loayza, 2008; Stewart, 2004). At the heart of this difference in calculation is the critical juncture of the failed peace process with

[1] Business refers to the formal sector of for-profit enterprises that engage in the sale of goods and services. The term "big business" refers to the top economic echelon consisting of large profit-making corporations that act as an interest group in the public policymaking process.

[2] This trend is evident in government spending on SSR. Whereas the Mexican government spent less than 2 percent of its annual GDP in the security and justice sectors during the Mérida Initiative, the Colombian government outspent U.S. contributions to Plan Colombia by a factor of four and invested more than 3 percent of the country's GDP in security alone every year since 1998 (Biden, Jr., 2015; "World Bank Open Data," n.d.).

the FARC in 2002, which convinced economic and political elites alike that SSR was the only feasible solution to Colombia's security crisis. For this, economic elites acquiesced and paid a security tax to help underwrite SSR, thereby creating channels for public oversight of the government's management of SSR. In the Mexican case, big business harboured severe distrust of the federal government and only casually participated in federally managed SSR. The reluctance of elites to participate more closely ultimately undermined the process, as SSR lacked specific mechanisms to take the government to task for declining security.

Insecurity and the Colombian Private Sector

Elite Stakes in Security and the Failure of Peace

Colombia reached a verifiable breaking point with the security crisis that climaxed between 1997 and 1998. The growing military power and geographic reach of the country's irregular armed groups undermined the state's authority and exposed increasing numbers of Colombian citizens, including economic elites, to wanton violence. The perception of threat among Colombian elite circles dramatically spiked in this period. The FARC's strategy had shifted to the urban sphere and focused on killing and kidnapping wealthy and influential people; doing so gave the guerrilla group an air of national relevance that they had not previously enjoyed (Author interview with Acuña, 2017). The class antagonism embraced by the FARC's leadership, as well, ensured that the FARC's principal targets for kidnapping ("political retentions"), terrorist acts, and extortion were members of Colombia's elite class. Between 1996 and 2002, the number of kidnappings, which specifically targeted the business community, increased 85.7 percent (Rettberg, 2009, p. 193).

The impact of guerrilla violence on Colombia's elite class drove a variety of defensive reactions, ranging from financial accommodation to complicity with paramilitarism (Sánchez León et al., 2018; Stone, 2016). At the national level, however, a coordinated effort among political and economic elites to engage the FARC in a negotiated settlement gained momentum with the election of President Pastrana in 1998 (Rettberg, 2007, pp. 485–490). The urban private sector in Colombia was seldom directly impacted by the rural guerrilla violence that had characterised the Colombian armed conflict for much of its history. Despite significant financial costs generated by conflict (e.g., high risk insurance premiums, high transaction and operating costs, damaged infrastructure), urban elites perceived the conflict to be an unfortunate but manageable aspect of doing business in the country (Rettberg, 2007, pp. 482–483).[3] However, they grew increasingly concerned about personal security in the late 1990s, suggesting that it was not just the nature of the threat but also its locus that became an important factor in boosting elite support for dealing with insecurity. When President Pastrana placed peace at the centre of his political agenda, the private sector wagered that a negotiated solution would be good for business and supported his bid. Cattle ranchers offered to donate land to peasants as part of a negotiated settlement, and the commercial sector purchased government-issued "peace bonds" (Bonos en Solidaridad para la Paz) to collect revenues for social and military investment (Godoy, 2003, p. 5).

Fortuitously, Pastrana's early decision to pursue SSR alongside peace talks had also afforded state security forces the time and breathing room to improve their practices and tactics. When the president ordered the military to retake a 42,000-square kilometre demilitarised zone back from FARC insurgents, the Armed Forces did so with highly trained special forces, helicopters, advanced intelligence, and, most importantly, a new mandate (Delgado, 2015). The breakdown of peace talks was a critical juncture that marked a renewed effort at militarisation and a consolidated commitment to SSR. One observer summarised, "The FARC showed us all that they were not negotiating in good faith," leaving the

[3] The security costs of doing business in Colombia were immense. Colombian companies in 2006 spent as much as ten percent on security-related expenses, and according to the Colombian government, the armed conflict cost the country between two and four GDP points per year between 1991 and 1996 and over seven percent of GDP between 1998 and 2003 (Rettberg, 2007, p. 483).

government with the "mano dura" option only (Author interview with a representative of the Colombian business community, 2017). The absence of alternatives for dealing with guerrilla-perpetrated violence drove consensus among political and economic elites alike in favour of continued SSR.[4]

Financing SSR: The Democratic Security Tax

One of the Colombian government's historical weaknesses had been its inability to introduce taxes and enforce tax collection. Richani explains that "large landowners, cattle ranchers and the agribusiness elite conspired to resist the growth of state power," restricting the tax base of the Colombian central government (Richani, 2007, p. 406). DiJohn describes an arrangement in which Colombian elites usually succeeded in passing tax exemptions for the wealthy and in reproducing a systematic toleration of tax evasion (DiJohn, 2010). The reluctance of the wealthy to pay higher taxes was so acute that in the 1990s Colombia had the second-smallest tax revenue per capita in South America (Stone, 2016). However, as a number of scholars posit, crisis helps overcome the opposition and administrative inertia that prevents tax reform (Bird, 1992, p. 32; Gracher, 2016, p. 6; Sanchez, 2006, p. 772). Moreover, the government, in the face of mounting debt, could no longer afford to mortgage the security effort on loans and bond sales: taxes had the advantage of relieving stress on the rising fiscal burden (Flores-Macías, 2014, p. 486). The economic recession that had beset Colombia starting in 1999 left the country without access to international credit markets, all but necessitating an increase in taxation as a component of structural adjustments encouraged by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Gracher, 2016, p. 15). As Rettberg points out, "missing out on the potential gains to be made from the global economy" are often enough to

[4] Even though victimisation by paramilitary violence was every bit as fierce as that by guerrilla violence, historic ties between wealthy land and business owners and the AUC meant that the private sector was less directly affected by paramilitary-driven insecurity ("Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica," n.d.).

spur big business into real action (Rettberg, 2007, p. 465). It is this very impetus that thrust President Uribe, who campaigned on a militarised security strategy, onto the scene in 2002 and allowed him to usher in one of his signature policy legacies: the Democratic Security Tax.

In hopes of averting prolonged confrontation with these members of the private sector and their well-positioned allies in Congress over the terms of the security tax, the president assumed power and just days later implemented extraordinary decree measures. Immediately after declaring a State of Internal Unrest (Estado de Conmoción Interior) for three months, the newly inaugurated Uribe introduced by decree a special tax to address declining insecurity (Flores-Macías, 2014, pp. 487–488).[5] The Democratic Security Tax (Impuesto de la Seguridad Democrática), earmarked for defence and security expenditures, targeted high-net-worth citizens, and total sums of revenue collected represented about one percent of the country's GDP and 20 percent of the security sector's budget (Flores-Macías, 2014, p. 478). The new tax, enacted in 2002 and renewed on three occasions during the Uribe presidency, facilitated a 120 percent increase in the security sector's expenditures and amounted to roughly five percent of the government's tax revenue in the first decade of the 2000s.[6] The revenue from the Democratic Security Tax was appropriated principally to fund President Uribe's citizen security strategy, outlined in a 2003 presidential declaration as the Democratic Security Policy (*Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática*) (Presidencia de la República and Ministerio de Defensa, 2003). Citizen security—the lack of which was at the root of Colombia's social, economic, and political problems—had become the cornerstone of the Uribe government (Marks, 2005, p. 77).

---

[5] The legality of the special tax by decree was decided by the Constitutional Court in a ruling that favoured the Uribe administration and permitted the continued collection of security tax revenue.
[6] The first tax applied to some 420,000 taxpayers (roughly 1 percent of the population), 120,000 of which were corporations.

Private Sector Conformity with War Taxation

Some elites saw the tax as a compromise to avoid more comprehensive tax reform (Flores-Macías, 2014, p. 490). The Uribe government consistently defended economic elites against an increase in their overall income tax burden and instead made use of existing budgets by freezing public sector wages and pensions. It also transparently and publicly defended its imposition of the security tax in the first place in high-profile settings to reassure elites that the government was making good on its investment (Carrasquilla Barrera, 2005). Elite faith in the security sector was sustained across a backdrop of much-improved operational prowess and the surge in foreign direct investment, which grew by a factor of seven between 2002 and 2006, helping the government justify its repeated appeals to financial elites to help fund the war effort (CEIC, n.d.; Cerritelli, 2005, p. 180). This is reflected in public perceptions of security during this period, which among business leaders spiked from a low just prior to Uribe's election to a new high by the close of 2003 (Flores-Macías, 2014, p. 494).

The cohesion of power elite circles in Colombia was another essential factor in the passage of the Democratic Security Tax (Flores-Macías, 2014). There is a large body of literature about the importance of unity between political and economic elites to the creation and passage of policy agendas, and the heterogeneity of an interest group like big business can actually impair success of the accomplishment of a policy objective (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Bull, 2014; Smith, 2000; Vogel, 1989). In Colombia, economic elites, despite the diversity of industries represented in the national economy, have historically maintained a cohesive and privileged bloc that has successfully defended elite prerogatives in the political sphere (Avilés, 2001, p. 166; Renon, Forthcoming).[7] Furthermore, economic elites felt

[7] For information on elite cohesion in Colombia, see Gutiérrez Sanín et al., 2007, p. 32; Hylton, 2003, p. 68; Lee and Thoumi, 1999; Ocampo, 2015; Stone, 2016.

represented in government, as well, because so many from within their ranks and in their families entered government service. Thus, an important factor that permitted elites to accept higher taxation for SSR was the tight-knit and cohesive nature of elite circles, which sufficiently convinced big-business owners that their political counterparts would both make good on investments and protect class interests.[8]

Additionally, because the formal mechanism of a tax linked business contributions to the government's delivery of security, economic elites had secured a means of pressuring the government and holding it accountable. Abello Colak and Pearce convincingly argue that although security must remain a public good, it requires a mechanism of participation to ensure both accountability and policy content that reflects the lived experiences of citizens (Abello Colak and Pearce, 2015). Likewise, Loada and Moderan stress the importance of citizen-led oversight of security budgets as a component of SSR (Loada and Moderan, 2015, p. 40). The application of the Democratic Security Tax gave rise to the Ethics and Transparency Commission, which granted economic elites a forum through which they monitored state expenditure on security matters (Flores-Macías, 2014; Salazar, 2013, p. 489). The private sector's ability to exert control over or monitor processes of policy implementation—in this case, SSR—drove private sector support (Rettberg, 2007, p. 466). In fact, because elite-financed resources were at stake, the Colombian government even expressed a willingness to tackle corruption in the security sector—long seen as a contentious move—by emboldening the mandate of the Attorney General's Technical Body for Investigations to go after crooked members of the military and police (Author interview with a senior U.S. law enforcement official, 2016). Such measures served to encourage top contributors to the Democratic Security Policy, who sustained their public support for the tax

[8] Elite circles began to fracture during the Santos administration over the issue of the peace negotiations with the FARC (Matanock and García-Sánchez, 2017).

for the duration of the Uribe government. In fact, private sector contributions to security became, using the language of HI, a self-reinforcing feedback process.

In sum, Colombian economic elites accepted, however reluctantly, an active role in SSR because they had reached a critical level of desperation over the intensification of crime and violence in the late 1990s. The geographic generalisation of insecurity and the susceptibility of the elite class to guerrilla violence, especially, forged consensus and galvanised economic elites to endorse a state-building project initiated by President Pastrana that centred on SSR. The failure of peace talks with the FARC in 2002 served to discredit non-repressive national approaches to managing insecurity in the country and was a critical juncture that convinced Colombia's private sector of the essentiality of SSR and of paying a security tax. The cohesion of political and economic elite networks and the private sector's ability to exert oversight on security spending consolidated a high level of support for the tax regime, which helped sustain an expanded security budget well into the following decade. The Democratic Security Tax was a specific mechanism that directly linked the interests of the economic elite with those of Colombian state institutions—a circumstance that facilitated the political will to engage in SSR by ensuring a steady stream of resources and that, consequently, contributed to improved security provision.

Insecurity and the Mexican Private Sector

Big Business's Indifference to Federal-Led SSR in Mexico

In contrast, insecurity in Mexico did not meet a critical threshold by the early stages of SSR, and the country's private sector did not reach a meaningful level of desperation over crime and violence to help shape and fund federal security strategies in a coordinated fashion. The first full year of the Calderón administration, 2007, registered Mexico's lowest homicide rate on record (Author interview with Escalante, 2017). When Calderón called for sweeping reforms in the country's security institutions at the beginning of his government, many economic elites, although frustrated by high levels of corruption within the security sector, did not perceive SSR as a pressing national priority—at least not one that would require greater contributions or vigilance from the country's business sector (Olson and Baker, 2015). Unlike in Colombia, where violence was generalised and affected vast stretches of the national territory, violence in Mexico was concentrated in select states and municipalities, and some analysts understood Mexico's security crisis during the Calderón government not as a national problem but as a collection of local crises (Schedler, 2015, pp. 91–93). In Colombia, where the challenge posed to public security by insurgents was seen as a politico-military threat that only a stronger state could combat, the threat in Mexico proved to be mostly localized, apolitical, and private (Schedler, 2015, p. 223). Fernández de Castro notes that for many years it was even difficult for the Mexican public to accept that the country had a nationwide problem with insecurity because the government had created a narrative that the victims of the country's violence were mostly involved in organised crime (Olson et al., 2018).

Despite the involvement of the private sector in devising municipal public security strategies, no formal mechanisms linking the private sector to the federal government's SSR resulted, thus limiting the leverage of the private sector over the government's management of the reform. Even though the private sector in Mexico did not entirely turn its back on the country's security crisis, there was "zero talk of a security tax in Mexico" (Author interview with a political analyst (government), 2017). Part of the hesitation to levy a security tax and to involve the private sector more closely in SSR is attributable to a lack of a critical juncture of the magnitude of the failure of Colombia's peace talks with the FARC, which convinced elites that there were no longer any meaningful alternatives to militarised responses to insecurity. In Mexico, private sector leaders still believed that insecurity and violence could be managed—either by brokering clandestine payments to violent actors or by negotiating the protection of criminal networks via corrupt government officials.

The Peña government did little to court the private sector to help fund its security policies either. In fact, the former Director of the Colombian National Police, Óscar Naranjo (2007-2012), arrived in Mexico in 2012 to serve as a top security adviser to President Peña and expressly argued in favour of the imposition of a security tax in Mexico (Santaeulalia, 2014; Author interview with a senior security official, Calderón administration, 2018). These overtures met little success, however, as the moment for sweeping, decisive action to engage the private sector—the perception of a bona fide crisis—appeared to have passed. This became especially true as crime rates dropped during the first years of the Peña administration, convincing many that the worst had passed. Once crime and violence spiked again in 2016, the administration's political capital was severely diminished, undermining the political will to revamp the SSR and solicit greater support from big business to that end.

A number of factors help explain the specific reluctance to levy such a tax or build security coordination mechanisms between the federal government and the private sector. Importantly, as one analyst confided, "[t]here is not enough public outrage over insecurity, and the public has become inured to high levels of violence. Also, violence is targeted, and it rarely touches elite circles" (Author interview with a political analyst (government), 2017). Implicit in this argument is a sense that business leaders would only fund SSR if there was a direct benefit to their personal safety or investments. Organised crime has not targeted Mexican economic elites on a large scale since the 1990s. The 1994 kidnappings of well-known businessmen Ángel Losada Moreno and Alfredo Harp Helú scared the country's wealthiest citizens to invest heavily in private security measures such as bodyguards and armoured vehicles. Following a period of privatisation of security, high net-worth Mexicans were no longer major targets for criminal groups (Author interview with French, 2017).

Furthermore, the private sector typically relies on municipal police forces to protect businesses and operations, encouraging close personal relationships between economic elites and local government and obviating a perceived need to contribute to *federal* security initiatives (Author interview with a security analyst (private sector), 2017a). In this context, elite groups, insulated from the most damaging effects of criminal violence, had little personal incentive to contribute to massive public sector security programmes, especially a federally managed SSR.

A complementary factor that reinforced elite reluctance to support a security tax regime pertained to elite distrust of the government to manage tax revenues transparently and effectively. In the absence of rampant elite victimisation by crime, big business continued to resist tax increases by political elites—which may have something to do with the nature of elite circles in Mexico. One analyst noted that political and economic elites do not often mingle, and in many cases, their ambitions are at odds (Author interview with French, 2017). This quality of elite circles in Mexico is different from the more cooperative spirit that took hold in Colombia, and as Camp emphasises, "Mexico is clearly not characterized by an overlapping power elite" (Camp, 2012). In a study of power elite circles, Camp finds that only one leading Mexican political figure out of more than 200 from 1970 to 2000 occupied influential roles in both political and economic spheres (Camp, 2002, p. 12, 1980; Middlebrook, 1995). In fact, Smith stresses that the generation of Mexican politicians that dominated politics in the 2010s is predominantly middle class in origin (Smith, 2015). Despite a convergence of policy agendas during the neoliberal era of the 1990s, the relationship between career politicians and business leaders in Mexico remains uneasy, and economic elites have found a number of ways to exert meaningful pressure on the country's main political parties, even in the absence of direct representation of big business in politics (Middlebrook, 2000, p. 41).

According to one researcher, Mexican business elites are more concerned about corruption's impact on profits than they are about the effects of insecurity, which is why anti-corruption watchdog organisations attract such generous donations from big business (Author interview with Novoa, 2017). In Mexico, levying new taxes has polarising electoral implications because the business class expresses so little trust in the government's ability to make transparent use of public revenue, and politicians habitually look for ways to expand budgets without raising taxes (Aguilar et al., 2013, pp. 33–35; Author interview with a security analyst (academia), 2017b). The rare introduction of a new federal tax in 2013, applied to soft drink purchases in an attempt to reduce obesity, faced tremendous opposition from business chamber and purportedly resulted in the closure of 30,000 small stores in 2014 (Heredia, 2013; "Lessons from Mexico," 2018).

One of the biggest complaints of top private sector executives is that the payment of federal taxes seldom trickles back into the communities or territories that contribute the most to federal revenues or where investment is most needed. This is largely a function of peculiar governmental budgeting rules. The monies to finance public security services at the state level are pooled by the federal government in a special budgetary item known as the Fund of Shares for Public Security in the States and Federal District (Fondo de Aportaciones para la Seguridad Pública de los Estados y del Distrito Federal). Mexican municipalities receive 72 percent of their revenue from federal transfers and do not have the legal faculties to raise funds, unlike in Colombia where cities have increased tax revenues to fund crime prevention (Sabet, 2013, pp. 241, 244). Economic elites have grown to resent that federal politicians distribute funds in ways that expand their clientelistic networks instead of in ways that prioritise recipient states by demonstrated need (Author interviews with a political analyst (government), 2018; Rendón, 2018). And, given the reluctance of the private sector to pay higher taxes, Mexico has one of the lowest taxation rates in Latin America.[9] Without raising taxes—or suspicions—at all, the Mexican federal government increased the budgets for security institutions every year of the Mérida Initiative and over the decade invested more than 50 times the U.S. government's contributions toward Mexican security (Fonseca, 2016).

Still, insecurity convinced economic elites to subsidise some federal efforts—a scenario that led to sporadic and inconsistent private sector involvement in security strategies and programmes. For example, in Tamaulipas state in 2016, business donors paid 800 Mexican pesos (US$40) a day per soldier for hundreds of extra army soldiers deployed in the state at the request of regional landowners. Instead of paying the salaries and per diem of the military from a central account, these financial transactions took place directly between SEDENA leadership and local business owners (Author interview with Novoa, 2017). In other instances, local elites collaborated with federal security forces in an ad hoc fashion to build physical infrastructure such as barracks and training facilities in places of intensifying conflict like Coahuila and Guanajuato (Fernández, 2016). At the federal level, private sector contributions focused principally on expanding benefits to security force personnel. The banking sector raised nearly US$100 million over a little more than a decade for a programme called "Sponsor Them" (*Bécalos*), which provides academic scholarships for children of military and Federal Police personnel, and banks extended larger mortgage credit lines to military members (Moleznik, 2013, p. 80; Author interview with Poiré, 2017; "Transparencia y Resultados," n.d.). Although these investments are symbolic of elite interest in security, they were poorly coordinated with broader governmental strategies and represented an infinitesimally small donation given both the country's vast wealth and the magnitude of the security problem.

[9] The Mexican government relies heavily on income generated by oil production to fund public goods. In 2011, oil exports represented 4.7 percent of Mexico's GDP, but this figure dropped consistently during the Peña administration, levelling out at just over 1 percent (Sonnel, 2017).

The lack of a security tax, on its own, is not a sufficient condition for the failure of SSR in Mexico. However, in the Colombian case, taxation created mechanisms of private sector participation in government policy making and of accountability. According to Poiré, who served as Calderón's national security spokesman and then Secretary of the Interior, it was not so much that the private sector was uninterested in security policy but, rather, that economic elites lacked a mechanism to hold the government accountable for its failures (Author interview with Poiré, 2017). He remarked:

> The private sector is generally the most interested party in ensuring the success of a security policy, which is why economic elites did not question an annually expanding security budget during the Calderón government….but because of lax participation on part of the citizenry, the Mexican government has never produced a diagnostic of the security threat and has not introduced meaningful evaluation mechanisms.

Schedler also describes how both the Calderón and Peña administrations deliberately side-lined the citizenry in the formulation of security strategy (Schedler, 2015, pp. 14–15). Calderón's government framed the problem as one of rival drug gangs fighting amongst each other, a challenge for which the government perceived military and police repression to be the only viable solution. The tactic was one of externalisation, which understood delinquents not as Mexican citizens but rather as wayward individuals operating outside of the concept of the nation. Conversely, President Peña's discourse about Mexico's levels of violence denied the very existence of a national security crisis and endeavoured to minimise the severity of the problem.[10] Despite rhetorical differences, the message to the Mexican citizenry—including business elites—was the same: "We, the government, will handle this; you can all relax" (Schedler, 2015, p. 15). Across both Mexican administrations, the very instruments

[10] By the end of the Peña administration, the country's business community became increasingly outspoken over deteriorating security (Saldaña, 2018).

that kept the Colombian government engaged with and answerable to its citizenry were absent in the formulation of SSR in Mexico.

Subnational Change Agents: The Private Sector in Ciudad Juárez

Although SSR in Mexico at the federal level failed to draw significant backing from the country's economic elite, one subnational case stands out for exhibiting strong ties between financial elites and local government efforts to reform security sector policies: the municipality of Ciudad Juárez. In Ciudad Juárez, circumstances changed in 2007, when an armed faction of the Sinaloa Cartel descended upon Ciudad Juárez to confront their local rivals in an attempt to seize control of the *plaza*. The homicide rate in Ciudad Juárez skyrocketed to between 178 and 224 murders per 100,000 inhabitants in 2009 and 2010, and on average, organised crime groups perpetrated ten kidnappings a day in 2010 (Conger, 2014, p. 5). In addition to a violent turf war in which innocent people often became collateral damage, the crime syndicates engaged in rampant extortion, a criminal practice that prior to 2007 was virtually unknown in the city. By 2010, roughly 8,000 businesses had fallen victim to routine extortion, forcing many in the private sector to close companies or relocate their operations (Quiñones, 2016).

Contending with a soaring homicide rate and drug violence in a city so essential to the Mexican economy, President Calderón responded to local calls for assistance by deploying the army and Federal Police to Ciudad Juárez, amassing more than 10,000 federal security agents in the city by the end of 2010. This strategy, known as Joint Operation Juárez (Operación Conjunta Juárez), was intended to overwhelm the duelling cartels with federal presence and firepower, but the intervention served only to complicate matters on the ground. Conflicts between municipal, state, and federal authorities disturbed the local government's protection of the Juárez Cartel and fuelled violence between state authorities and organised crime (Durán-Martínez, 2017, p. 205). One observer noted that the Sinaloa Cartel had infiltrated the Federal Police, yet the municipal police served the Juárez Cartel—a scenario that occasionally pitted state agents against one another in armed confrontations (Author interview with a representative of the Citizens' Observatory for Prevention, Security, and Justice, 2018). Between 2007 and 2011, Ciudad Juárez reported more than 9,000 murders, peaking at 3,116 homicides in 2010 alone (Valencia and Chacon, 2013). This wave of violence also contributed to an economic recession in the city, as the decline in tourism hit small- and medium-sized business especially hard (Author interview with a representative of an international civil society organization, 2018). Furthermore, as one civil society representative noted, the federal war on drugs exposed the local population to abuses and corruption by federal forces. The individual lamented that the Federal Police even orchestrated a spate of kidnappings and later blamed innocent members of the community for the crimes (Author interview with a representative of the Citizens' Observatory for Prevention, Security, and Justice, 2018).

The federal government also looked to existing community mechanisms in Ciudad Juárez to help channel the wave of investment in preventive measures. To this end, the Calderón administration benefitted from an established relationship between local government and the business community to work collaboratively on security matters. Starting in 2007, a group of the city's top community leaders—many entrepreneurs fed up with a slumping economy and crime that affected their business operations—founded a public safety forum called the Security and Justice Roundtable (Mesa de Seguridad y Justicia) to transmit the community's increasing concerns to the municipal and state governments. The Roundtable, convened on a monthly basis, was an innovative measure to bring the city's top stakeholders—including politicians, police, human rights organisations, and business—together to strategise for improved security. As described by one business leader, "The

Roundtable set up different committees based on different criminal trends and assigned relevant authorities to each committee. This was novel because for the first time many public officials were being introduced to their counterparts in other government agencies and were encouraged to work hand in hand" (Author interview with Luján Olivas, 2018).

Nevertheless, the approach to managing community-based problems confronted a major weakness: a lack of resources. The Roundtable did not have a large operating budget of its own, and local authorities depended on devolution of revenue from federal and state governments to fund the proposed initiatives. Moreover, a spike in extreme violence in early 2010 generated an unprecedented urgency to enact security reforms. The massacre of 15 young people in January 2010 at a party in the Villas de Salvárcar neighbourhood was a tipping point for local business owners, teachers, and human rights defenders, and the event served to unify civil society in a quest to deliver effective solutions to the city's ever-worsening insecurity (Author interview with Ley, 2018). In Ciudad Juárez, the violent events of 2010 represented a critical juncture for the city's economic elites.

Given the local government's marginal budget for public security, the city's business sector responded to the crisis by establishing in 2010 a public-private trust, the Trust for Competitiveness and Citizen Security (Fideicomiso para la Competitividad y Seguridad Ciudadana, FICOSEC), to boost private sector contributions to local strategies to tackle insecurity. At the petition of the Juárez business community, the state legislature introduced in 2011 an additional 0.05 percent payroll tax on all business owners in the State of Chihuahua, earmarking any revenue associated with the tax for crime prevention programmes and SSR initiatives. The FICOSEC tax, indeed, represented an unprecedented request by a business community in Mexico to raise its tax burden, and the strength of the FICOSEC operating model depends on the premise that the trust, in conjunction with the Roundtable, fully controls the spending priorities. FICOSEC monies were, in essence, public resources administered by a council of private citizens (Author interview with Luján Olivas, 2018).

In FICOSEC's first five years of operation, the government collected more than US$4 million annually, which financed new schools and drug rehabilitation centres, youth sports leagues, vocational training, and the certification of municipal and transit police (Luján Olivas, 2018). FICOSEC also underwrote programmes to complement prevention investments from the federal government via "We are all Juárez," demonstrating an impressive and unprecedented synergy between civil society and the federal, state, and municipal governments. The Roundtable and FICOSEC, as well, succeeded in pressuring government authorities to apply harsher penalties for kidnapping and murder, and the security tax was instrumental in subsidizing higher salaries, advanced training, and career benefits for the municipal police force and the district attorney's office (Quiñones, 2016). Some of the most meaningful contributions included courses in crime-scene preservation for state and municipal police officers and the reformed State Attorney General's Office (Fiscalía General del Estado de Chihuahua). Perhaps most importantly, FICOSEC founded a public security observatory, which collects community data, analyses local crime trends, and evaluates the effectiveness of anti-crime strategies in the city.

One of the private sector's biggest priorities was the reform of the municipal police force, long seen as an agent of organised crime. The appointment of Julián Leyzaola (2011-2013), a retired army lieutenant colonel, as the Ciudad Juárez police chief signalled a major change in the security sector. Upon assuming command, Leyzaola purged thousands of municipal police officers from the force, purchased new patrol vehicles and weapons, and upgraded the force's public image by changing the colour of its uniforms from grey to blue

(Quiñones, 2016).[11] During his tenure, FICOSEC sponsored audits of the local police and background checks and polygraph tests of police personnel. The newly minted municipal police assumed an aggressive posture toward organised crime, and from 2011 to 2015, the force arrested record numbers of gang and cartel members (Valencia and Chacon, 2013).

Gradually, the citizen security initiatives and local SSR began to bear impressive results, and crime rates declined starting in 2012. By 2015, homicides in Ciudad Juárez had fallen from highs of over 3,000 per year to just 256 (Quiñones, 2016; Author interview with Salazár Gutiérrez, 2018). The kidnapping rate, which peaked at nine per 100,000 inhabitants in 2009, also dropped to below one per 100,000 inhabitants in 2014 (Ramírez Verdugo and Ruiz González, 2016, p. 11). Problems with rampant extortion remained, but as of 2018, the city no longer registered among the top ten most violent cities in Mexico (Olson et al., 2018).

Conclusion

As the Colombian case validates, an engaged private sector is central to the generation of political will to carry out meaningful SSR. The subnational cases of Ciudad Juárez and Monterrey offer additional support for this hypothesis. Ramírez and Ruiz contend, "Full implementation of the measures to revert insecurity is expensive…and imposes such severe stress on local budgets so as to eventually require increases in taxes and reduction in other expenditures for at least the ensuing three to five years" (Ramírez Verdugo and Ruiz González, 2016, p. 2). One of the factors that made all the difference at the national level in Colombia and at the state level in Ciudad Juárez was the creation of a formal mechanism, a security tax, to channel private sector contributions to SSR and regulate governmental

[11] In 2018, Leyzaola became mired in scandals surrounding human rights abuses committed during his tenure as police commissioner (Díaz, 2018).

spending on SSR. Security taxes ensure greater transparency, encourage continuity of effort, and forge democratic accountability to the citizenry.

In Mexico, though, elite grievances against organised crime never reached a critical mass to engender broad support for SSR and, thus, the political will to implement it. Jorge Tello, a top security adviser to President Calderón, stated, “In Colombia, distinct actors came together to devise a solution because the violence caused great pain at all levels of society…. Mexico lacks a sense of pain that Colombia felt” (Author interview with Tello Peón, 2018). Tello pointed to some successful instances in Mexico, when outrage over violence spurred meaningful responses, like Ciudad Juárez. He continued, “[B]ut these cases only met success because there was an articulation of the three levels of government, the committed participation of the military, and broad participation of civil society, including the private sector.”

Bibliography

Abello Colak, A., Pearce, J., 2015. Securing the Global City?: An Analysis of the ‘Medellín Model’ through Participatory Research. Confl. Secur. Dev. 15, 197–228. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2015.1055136

Abrahamsen, R., Williams, M.C., 2006. Security Sector Reform: Bringing the Private In. Confl. Secur. Dev. 6, 1–23.
Acuña, F., 2017. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Bogotá, D.F., Colombia, 24 October 2017.
Aguilar, M., Archundia, E., Regalado, R., 2013. The Security Crisis in Mexico and Its Imnpact on Business Management. Rev. Bus. Finance Stud. 4, 29–47.
Avilés, W., 2001. Assessing Colombia's Political System: Review of Colombia: The Politics of Reforming the State. Lat. Am. Perspect. 28, 165–174.
Baumgartner, F.R., Berry, J.M., Hojnacki, M., Kimball, D.C., Leech, B.L., 2009. Lobbying and Policy Change. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Biden, Jr., J.R., 2015. Joe Biden: A Plan for Central America . N. Y. Times.
Bird, R., 1992. Tax Reform in Latin America: A Review of Some Recent Experiences. Lat. Am. Res. Rev. 27, 7–36.
Brillones, A., 2018. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Ciudad Juárez, México, 15 January 2018.
Bull, B., 2014. Towards a Political Economy of Weak Institutions and Strong Elites in Central America. Eur. Rev. Lat. Am. Caribb. Stud. Rev. Eur. Estud. Latinoam. Caribe 97, 117–128.
Cammett, M., 2007. Globalization, Business Politics and Development: North Africa in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Camp, R.A., 2012. Mexican Political Elites in a Democratic Setting, in: Camp, R.A. (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Mexican Politics. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Camp, R.A., 2002. Mexico's Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century. University of California Press, Berkeley.
Camp, R.A., 1980. Mexico's Leaders: Their Education and Recruitment. University of Arizona Press, Tucson.
Caparini, M., 2010. Civil Society and the Future of Security Sector Reform, in: Sedra, M. (Ed.), The Future of Security Sector Reform. The Centre for International Governance Innovation, Waterloo, Ontario, pp. 244–262.
Carrasquilla Barrera, A., 2005. La sostenibilidad fiscal del esfuerzo en seguridad, in: Rangel, A. (Ed.), Sostenibilidad de La Seguridad Democrática. Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, Bogotá, pp. 113–138.
Castro, A., 2018. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Ciudad Juárez, México, 16 January 2018.
CEIC, n.d. Colombia Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) [1996 - 2019] [WWW Document]. CEIC. URL https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/colombia/foreign-direct-investment (accessed 2.13.19).
Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica [WWW Document], n.d. . Cent. Nac. Mem. Histórica. URL http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/informes (accessed 5.3.18).
Cerritelli, J., 2005. La inversión extranjera y la seguridad democrática: percepciones, in: Rangel, A. (Ed.), Sostenibilidad de La Seguridad Democrática. Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, Bogotá, pp. 177–188.
Chapa Koloffon, L., 2018. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Mexico City, México, 09 February 2018.
Conger, L., 2014. The Private Sector and Public Security: The Cases of Ciudad Juárez and Monterrey, in: Working Paper Series on Civic Engagement and Public Security in Mexico. Wilson Center: Mexico Institute.
Delgado, J.E., 2015. Colombian Military Thinking and the Fight against the FARC-EP Insurgency, 2002–2014. J. Strateg. Stud. 38, 826–851. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1005610
Díaz, G.L., 2018. Leyzaola Pérez, acusado de tortura en Tijuana, candidato a diputado del PES. Proceso.

DiJohn, J., 2010. Taxation, Resource Mobilisation and State Performance, in: Working Paper Series on Development as State-Making. London, p. 37.
Duncan, G., 2006. Los Senores de La Guerra: de Paramilitares, Mafiosos y Autodefensas En Colombia. Planeta, Bogotá.
Durán-Martínez, A., 2017. The Politics of Drug Violence: Criminals, Cops and Politicians in Colombia and Mexico. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Enders, W., Sachsida, A., Sandler, T., 2006. The Impact of Transnational Terrorism on U.S. Foreign Direct Investment. Polit. Res. Q. 59, 517–531. https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290605900402
Escalante, F., 2017. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Mexico City, México, 13 September 2017.
Fernández, H., 2016. Firman convenio para construcción de cuartel militar en Coahuila. El Univers.
Flores-Macías, G.A., 2014. Financing Security Through Elite Taxation: The Case of Colombia's "Democratic Security Taxes." Stud. Comp. Int. Dev. 49, 477–500.
Fonseca, B., 2016. In Mexico, It's Institutions, Stupid. Huffington Post.
French, J., 2017. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Mexico City, México, 24 August 2017.
Frey, B.S., Luechinger, S., Stutzer, A., 2007. Calculating Tragedy: Assessing the Costs of Terrorism. J. Econ. Surv. 21, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6419.2007.00505.x
Godoy, H., 2003. Plan Colombia's Strategic Weakness. Presented at the Latin American Studies Association, Dallas, TX.
Gordon, E., 2014. Security Sector Reform, Statebuilding and Local Ownership: Securing the State or its People? J. Interv. Statebuilding 8, 126–148. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2014.930219
Gracher, H., 2016. Elites and Taxation: The Case of the Colombian Democratic Security Tax, in: PSA 66th Annual International Conference. Presented at the The Political Studies Association, Brighton, UK.
Grajales, J., 2017. Private Security and Paramilitarism in Colombia: Governing in the Midst of Violence. J. Polit. Lat. Am. 9, 27–48.
Gutiérrez Sanín, F., Acevedo, T., Viatela, J.M., 2007. Violent Liberalism? State, Conflict, and Political Regime in Colombia, 1930-2006: An Analytical Narrative on State-Making (No. Working Paper No. 19), Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2. London School of Economics, London.
Heredia, C., 2013. To fix Washington, look to Mexico. Christ. Sci. Monit.
Historia – FICOSEC [WWW Document], n.d. . FICOSEC. URL http://ficosec.org/fideicomiso/historia/ (accessed 11.21.18).
Human Development Report, 1994. . Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Hylton, F., 2003. Colombia: An Evil Hour. New Left Rev., II 51–93.
Jackson, P., 2018. Introduction: Second-Generation Security Sector Reform. J. Interv. Statebuilding 12, 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2018.1426384
Keefer, P., Loayza, N. (Eds.), 2008. Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness edited by Philip Keefer. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511754388
Knight, M., 2009. "Security Sector Reform, Democracy and the Social Contract: From implicit to Explicit". J. Secur. Sect. Manag. 7, 1–20.
Krauze, E., 2013. The Danger in Mexico's Divided House. N. Y. Times.
Kümmel, G., 2003. Why Engage in Security Sector Reform Abroad? International Norms, External Democratisation and the Role of DCAF, in: Edmunds, T., Germann, W.N. (Eds.), Towards Security Sector Reform in Post Cold War Europe: A Framework for Assessment. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, pp. 56–86.

La Tromba en Chihuahua: El día en que se cayó el cielo [WWW Document], 2014. . Código Delic. URL http://codigodelicias.com/movil/ver.noticia.php?id=38869#.W6uZXNNKiUk (accessed 9.26.18).
Lee, R.W., Thoumi, F.E., 1999. The Political-Criminal Nexus in Colombia. Trends Organ. Crime 5, 59–84. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-999-1034-1
Lessons from Mexico: ‘Our sugar tax hasn’t worked’, says beverage association, 2018. . FoodBev Media.
Ley, S., 2018. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Mexico City, México, 09 January 2018.
Loada, A., Moderan, O., 2015. Civil Society Involvement in Security Sector Reform and Governance. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva.
Luján Olivas, A., 2018. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Ciudad Juárez, México, 15 January 2018.
Mancini, F., 2005. In Good Company? The Role of Business in Security Sector Reform. Demos, London.
Marks, T.A., 2005. La sostenibilidad del apoyo estratégico-miliar a la seguridad democrática, in: Rangel, A. (Ed.), Sostenibilidad de La Seguridad Democrática. Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, Bogotá, pp. 67–112.
Martin, C.J., Swank, D., 2012. The Political Construction of Business Interests by Cathie Jo Martin. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139088299
Matanock, A.M., García-Sánchez, M., 2017. The Colombian Paradox: Peace Processes, Elite Divisions & Popular Plebiscites. Daedalus 146, 152–166. https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_00466
Maxfield, S., Schneider, B.R. (Eds.), 1997. Business and the State in Developing Countries, Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
Meyer, M., 2010. Abused and Afraid in Ciudad Juárez: An Analysis of Human Rights Violations by the Military in Mexico. Washington Office on Latin America.
Middlebrook, K.J. (Ed.), 2001. Party Politics and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico: National and State-Level Analyses of the Partido Acción Nacional, U.S.-Mexico contemporary perspectives series ; 17. Center for US-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
Middlebrook, K.J. (Ed.), 2000. Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore ; London.
Middlebrook, K.J., 1995. The Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the State, and Authoritarianism in Mexico. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
Moleznik, M.P., 2013. President Felipe Calderón’s Strategy to Combat Organised Crime, in: Payan, T., Staudt, K., Kruszewski, Z.A. (Eds.), A War That Can’t Be Won: Binational Perspectives on the War on Drugs. University of Arizona Press, Tucson, pp. 65–92.
Moncada, E., 2016. Cities, Business, and the Politics of Urban Violence in Latin America. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA.
Novoa, M., 2017. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Mexico City, México, 13 September 2017.
Ocampo, G.I., 2015. Poderes regionales, clientelismo y Estado: etnografías del poder y la política en Córdoba, Colombia. Odecofi-CINEP, Bogotá.
Olson, E.L., Baker, G., 2015. Violent Crime Plagues Businesses in Mexico. Wilson Cent.
Olson, E.L., Shirk, D., Fernández de Castro, R., Treviño, E.J., Farfán-Méndez, C., n.d. Soaring Homicide Rates in Mexico: Understanding the Crisis and Proposing Solutions, Woodrow Wilson Center: Mexico Institute.
Payne, L., Pereira, G., 2016. Corporate Complicity in International Human Rights Violations. Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 12, 63.

Pearce, J., 2018. Elites and Violence in Latin America: Logics of the Fragmented Security State (No. 1), Violence, Security, and Peace Working Papers. Latin America and Caribbean Centre, LSE, London.
Perito, R.M., 2009. The Private Sector in Security Sector Reform: Essential but Not Yet Optimized, USIPeace Briefing. January 2009, Washington, DC.
Poiré, A., 2017. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Mexico City, México, 14 September 2017.
Political Analyst (Government), 2018. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Mexico City, México, 29 January 2018.
Political Analyst (Government), 2017. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Mexico City, México, 08 September 2017.
Presidencia de la República, Ministerio de Defensa, 2003. Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática.
Puck, L., 2017. Uneasy Partners Against Crime: The Ambivalent Relationship Between the Police and the Private Security Industry in Mexico. Lat. Am. Polit. Soc. 59, 74–95.
Quiñones, S., 2016. Once the World's Most Dangerous City, Juárez Returns to Life. Natl. Geogr.
Ramírez Verdugo, A., Ruiz González, R., 2016. Security Strategies: Experiences of the Mexican States of Chihuahua and Nuevo León. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, CA.
Rendón, E., 2018. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Mexico City, México, 03 January 2018.
Reno, W., 1997. African weak states and commercial alliances. Afr. Aff. 96, 165–185.
Renon, E., Forthcoming. Bringing the Firm Back in State and Business Relations in Latin America (Doctoral). University College London, London.
Representative, Citizens' Observatory for Prevention, Security, and Justice, 2018. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Ciudad Juárez, México, 15 January 2018.
Representative, Colombian Business Community, 2017. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Bogotá, D.F., Colombia, 14 December 2017.
Representative, International Civil Society Organization, 2018. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Ciudad Juárez, México, 15 January 2018.
Rettberg, A., 2009. Business and Peace in Colombia: Responses, Challenges, and Achievements, in: Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War. U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, pp. 191–206.
Rettberg, A., 2007. The Private Sector and Peace in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia. J. Lat. Am. Stud. 39, 463–494. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X07002817
Richani, N., 2007. Caudillos and the Crisis of the Colombian State: Fragmented Sovereignty, the War System and the Privatisation of Counterinsurgency in Colombia. Third World Q. 28, 403–417. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590601153937
Rodríguez-Franco, D., 2016. Internal Wars, Taxation, and State Building. Am. Sociol. Rev. 81, 190–213. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122415615903
Sabet, D.M., 2013. The Role of Citizens and Civil Society in Mexico's Security Crisis, in: Payan, T., Staudt, K., Kruszewski, Z.A. (Eds.), A War That Can't Be Won: Binational Perspectives on the War on Drugs. University of Arizona Press, Tucson, pp. 239–257.
Salazár Gutiérrez, S., 2018. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Ciudad Juárez, México, 16 January 2018.
Salazar, N., 2013. Political Economy of Tax Reforms: The Case of Colombia, Update on the Americas. Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC.
Saldaña, I., 2018. Businessmen Urge the Govermnent to Fight Insecurity in Mexico [WWW Document]. El Univers. URL https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/english/businessmen-urge-govermnent-fight-insecurity-mexico (accessed 1.25.19).

Sánchez León, N.C., Payne, L.A., Pereira, G., Bernal Bermúdez, L., Marín López, D., Barboza López, M., 2018. Cuentas Claras: El papel de la Comisión de la Verdad en la develación de la responsibilidad de empresas en el conflicto armado colombiano. Dejusticia, Bogotá.
Sanchez, O., 2006. Tax System Reform in Latin America: Domestic and International Causes. Rev. Int. Polit. Econ. 13, 772–801.
Santaeulalia, I., 2014. El general Naranjo deja México para regresar a Colombia. El País.
Schedler, A., 2015. En la niebla de la guerra: Los ciudadanos ante la violencia criminal organizada, Investigación e Ideas. Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, Mexico City, México.
Security Analyst (Academia), 2017. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Mexico City, México, 11 September 2017.
Security Analyst (Private Sector), 2017a. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Mexico City, México, 08 September 2017.
Security Analyst (Private Sector), 2017b. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Mexico City, México, 12 September 2017.
Senior Security Official, Calderón Administration, 2018. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Mexico City, Mexico, 26 January 2018.
Senior U.S. Law Enforcement Official, 2016. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Tegucigalpa, Honduras, 23 August 2016.
Smith, M.A., 2000. American Business and Political Power. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Smith, P.H., 2015. Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth-Century Mexico. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Sonnel, H.K., 2017. Weekly Chart: Oil and Remittances in Mexico's GDP [WWW Document]. Am. Soc. Am. URL https://www.as-coa.org/articles/weekly-chart-oil-and-remittances-mexicos-gdp (accessed 1.25.19).
Stanley, W., 1996. The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador. Temple University Press, Philadelphia.
Stewart, F., 2004. Working Paper 3: Development and Security, in: Security and Development Workshop. Presented at the Fifth Annual Global Development Conference, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.
Stone, H., 2016. Colombia Elites and Organized Crime: Introduction, InSight Crime. InSight Crime.
Tello Peón, J., 2018. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Mexico City, México, 13 February 2018.
Tófalo, I., 2006. Overt and Hidden Accomplices. Transnational Corporations' Range of Complicity for Human Rights Violations, in: de Schutter, O. (Ed.), Transnational Corporations and Human Rights. Hart Publishing, London, pp. 335–358.
Transparencia y Resultados [WWW Document], n.d. . Bécalos. URL https://becalos.mx/transparencia-y-resultados/ (accessed 1.25.19).
Valencia, N., Chacon, A., 2013. Juarez shedding violent image, statistics show [WWW Document]. CNN. URL https://www.cnn.com/2013/01/05/world/americas/mexico-juarez-killings-drop/index.html (accessed 11.21.18).
Verbitsky, H., Bohoslavsky, J.P., 2015. The Economic Accomplices to the Argentine Dictatorship: Outstanding Debts. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Vogel, D., 1989. Fluctuating Fortunes : The Political Power of Business in America. Basic Books, New York.
Walton, J., 1977. Elites and Economic Development Comparative Studies on the Political Economy of Latin American Cities. University of Texas Press, Austin, TX.

Wertman Zaslav, L., 2018. Interviewed by P. Angelo. Mexico City, México, 13 February 2018.
World Bank Open Data [WWW Document], n.d. . World Bank. URL https://data.worldbank.org/ (accessed 5.3.18).
Wuhs, S.T., 2001. Barbarians, Bureaucrats, and Bluebloods: Fractional Change in the National Action Party, in: Middlebrook, K.J. (Ed.), Party Politics and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico: National and State-Level Analyses of the Partido Acción Nacional, U.S.-Mexico Contemporary Perspectives Series ; 17. Center for US-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, pp. 129–155.