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WORKING PAPER

Participatory amendments in Brazil: towards more citizen influence in public budgeting

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INTRODUCTION

Governments are constantly facing a strong contestation of their decisions. The past two decades have been marked by a constant struggle to open governments, to make them more accountable to citizens and in some ways also more participatory. Efforts and pressures in these directions have come from the civil society, international organizations, other governments and many other formal and informal actors from the social and political realms, resulting in some initiatives that share a common goal, and which is the focal point of this study: institutional arrangements that can enable citizen participation and accountability in public budgeting.

In fact, despite these critics on the current form of political governance, one universal value has not changed: the democratic ideal (Sen, 1999; Tormey, 2014). The old saying quoted by Churchill in front of the United States House of Commons in 1947 seems to be just as valid as it was in the past century.

Many forms of Government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time. (House of Commons, 11 November 1947)

Nonetheless, it does not mean that the interpretation of what should be a democratic government is still the same. During the history of mankind different theories prescribing how political institutions and public officials should behave have emerged and fallen, becoming more or less influential and modelling the state structure. In the twentieth century, the prevalent institutional model of the state was the liberal democracy, which stresses the importance of individual liberties, competition among political actors and the preeminence of elections and universal suffrage as the main form of political participation. In fact, according to the Democracy Index 2018, from 167 countries, 114 have at least partially a democratic government.

However, by the end of the century, many authors have stood out claiming that elections, free competition and universal suffrage are good but not enough to reach democratic ideals. These theorists were looking at low voter turnout, low interest in politics, and more recently at a number of massive protests throughout the world and election of outsiders as symptoms that liberal representative institutions might be at a crossroad (Mainwaring 2006; Tormey 2014; Della Porta, 2018). Their conclusion: we need to call citizens back to politics; we need to create more spaces of participation; we need to reform undemocratic authority structures and democratize democracy towards the development of a participatory society (Pateman, 2012).

This reading of contemporary events has been well accepted in academic, governmental and societal fields. In the last decades, many governmental and non-governmental organizations were created aiming to foster democratic ideals such as participation, accountability and transparency, both in the national and international environments. At the same time, multilateral organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the World Bank, the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund also started to encourage countries to pursue a governance more accessible to citizen's influence¹.

Since the Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 1989 – the main and most influential experience under participatory democracy ideals in the world – efforts towards making public governance more open and permeable have gained attention, especially regarding public budget decision-making processes. After all, in modern economies, public budgeting is the central institution in managing the administrative state (Veiga, Kurian, & Ardakanian, 2014) and where citizens demands are prioritized, performed and accounted (Rubin, 2016).

Public budgeting and its stages of formulation, execution and control are constantly object of study inside and outside the academic community through analysis of the forms of prioritization of public policies during the phases of competence of executive and legislative branches; investigations on the implementation stages of the public budget; and by the role of internal and external audit institutions in controlling public spending. However, in relation to the institutional mechanisms of citizen participation in public budgets, studies have focused primarily on describing and analyzing initiatives to open the decision-making process in the executive branch, thus, creating a gap in literature in relation to the other stages of the budget cycle.

In fact, using academic databases such as Scopus and Web of Science to look for studies published in the main global journals relating participation initiatives in public budgeting with the legislative branch has found scarce results². One of the studies, for instance, mentions the complexity added to the decision-making process when new actors come into play such as Participatory Budgeting

¹ As seen in section “2.3.3 Public Participation” in <http://blog-pfm.imf.org/files/ft-code.pdf>, <http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/principles-budgetary-governance.htm>, <https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/Recommendation-of-the-Council-on-Budgetary-Governance.pdf> and <http://www.un.org/es/comun/docs/index.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/218&referer=http://www.fiscaltransparency.net/giftprinciples/&Lang=E>

² The query “(participat* W/2 budget*) AND (legislat* OR parliament*)” retrieved only 41 documents with these terms in title, keywords or abstract in 28/01/19, in which only 5 actually addressed the issue.

Councils of citizens and the consequent loss of power by the legislative and executive branches (Souza, 2011; Turska-Kawa, & Wojtasik, 2018). On another perspective, Klase and Dougherty (2011) analyzed the creation of legislative websites aimed to inform the citizenry and foster participation in the governing process with minimal interaction and which do not enhance citizen participation in budgeting. In addition, Struić and Bratić (2018) see the rights to be informed, consulted and the right of initiative as possible participatory mechanisms, however, with limited effects and with many cases of ignored requests of information. Yet, the most descriptive case was about a participatory mechanism in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. In fact, two studies emphasize this case and the creation of two simultaneous participatory initiatives: the Orçamento Participativo Estadual (State Participatory Budgeting), under the executive branch; and the (Fórum Democrático) Democratic Forum, created by the majority legislative opposition in response. Both mechanisms that enhanced public debate on budgetary matters, created citizen proposition of amendments and open opportunities to get closer to representatives (Faria, 2006) but also intensified competition and rivalries between government and opposition in the state (Goldfrank, & Schneider, 2006).

Hence, despite having multiple phases, the development of innovative initiatives to foster citizen participation in public budgeting processes appears to be circumscribed to the initial formulation stage and to institutional mechanisms created by the executive branch. Scientific literature analyzes and describes very few initiatives regarding the role of the legislative branch and possible channels of participation, as seen in the papers on citizen's rights of participation, websites to inform citizens and the example of the Forum Democrático in Rio Grande do Sul.

Therefore, in order to fulfill this literature gap and contribute to the repertoire of legislative participatory initiatives, we will describe two cases in which Brazilian congresspeople created mechanisms to gather citizens opinions and preferences before allocating the money that each elected politician has to amend the budgetary bill. The theory of participatory democracy is then used to analyze how institutional arrangements called "Participatory Amendments" enable citizen participation in the debate phase of public budgeting.


Finally, understanding participatory mechanisms related to individual amendments to the public budget is important since this type of allocation of resources by congresspeople has been associated historically with corruption, unethical behaviors and as political currency, with politicians using it in exchange for favors from the executive branch and for votes from citizens who have benefited from the actions carried out with the resources (Limongi, & Figueiredo, 2006). Thus, the study also investigates whether this type of initiatives enhances responsiveness and accountability of public policies to which the money was transferred.

BUDGET CYCLE AND AMENDMENTS TO THE BUDGETARY BILL IN BRAZIL

Public budgets are essentially planning tools. They are usually represented as a formal document that estimates the revenues that governments expect to collect in the following year and authorizes a ceiling of expenditures based on these expectations (Veiga, Kurian, & Ardakanian, 2014). The detailed description of these two elements – revenues and expenditures – indicates to the society the priorities set by the elected government, thus, playing an important role in public administration,

with political, social, economic and legal implications and confers power to those actors that participate in their formulation and execution (Bringerhoff, 2001; Veiga, Kurian, & Ardakanian, 2014; Rubin, 2016).

Public budgeting involves a series of processes, steps and actors in a overlapping system of phases, from the formulation by the executive branch, passing through a debate and vote stage by the Congress, followed by the execution of public expenditures into public policies and a final step of controlling and evaluation of the spent resources, with cycles beginning and ending each year, as seen in Figure 1 (Sanches, 1993; Veiga, Kurian, & Ardakanian, 2014). It is usually formulated for a single year, however, the whole process might continue through a much longer period of time (Veiga, Kurian, & Ardakanian, 2014).



Source: Adapted from Sanches (1993) and Veiga, Kurian, & Ardakanian (2014).

In the Brazilian federal institutional arrangement built by the Constitution of 1988, the executive power is responsible for formulating the Annual Budgetary Bill (Projeto de Lei Orçamentária Anual – PLOA), based on the established governmental planning and on the demands presented by all Ministries and all the other powers. Then, the Bill is submitted to the National Congress, where it will be preliminarily debated and voted by 63 federal deputies and 21 senators in the Joint Committee on Plans, Public Budgets and Inspection (Comissão Mista de Planos, Orçamentos Públicos e Fiscalização – CMO), respecting partisan proportionality and, after that, put into appreciation by the plenary of the National Congress.

The main mechanism for parliamentarians to direct influence public budgeting is the use of parliamentary amendments. The amendments made to the Annual Budget Law (Lei Orçamentária Anual – LOA) are proposals through which federal deputies and senators can express their opinions and direct affect the allocation of financial resources in the direction of the political commitments they assumed with his electoral base, states, municipalities, and institutions. Such amendments may be presented individually by each congressperson or collectively and may add, suppress or modify items of the Annual Budgetary Bill submitted by the Executive branch (Senate, 2019).

According to the Resolution nº 1/2006 of the National Congress, each parliamentarian may submit up to 25 individual amendments to the LOA in the total amount defined by the rapporteur's preliminary statement. For the year of 2019, for instance, the LOA estimates a limit of R\$ 15,4 million for each federal deputy or senator to be spent through individual amendments. These amendments will be incorporated or not to the final text of the PLOA after appreciated by the CMO.

Nonetheless, these amendments are also limited by many restrictions. To propose an amendment that raises public expenditure, a parliamentarian must assure that it was included previously in the established governmental planning – the Multi-Year Plan (Plano Plurianual – PPA) and the Law of Budgetary Directives (Lei das Diretrizes Orçamentárias – LDO). It must also indicate

the sources of financial resources necessary for its execution. And the amendments must be intrinsically linked to ministries' work programs, since they are executed through the executive structure. According to Batista (2015), it means that parliamentarians are not able to promote new expenditures or new public policies since they have to incorporate their preferences in the programmatic structure established in the ministries.

After being approved in the CMO and in the joint plenary session of the Congress, the PLOA is submitted to the Executive to be sanctioned by the President, allowing the public budgeting to be executed by the federal administrative structure in the following year and controlled internally and externally by the Office of the Comptroller General and the Federal Court of Accounts.

Nonetheless, the institution of amendments to the Budgetary Bill, which might be viewed as a form of collaborative production of public policies since they would gather opinions and preferences from the electoral base of the parliamentarian (Batista, 2015), is historically associated with corruption and other unethical behaviors (Limongi, & Figueiredo, 2006). In fact, five years after the enactment of the Constitution of 1988 and its new institutional design for public budgeting, Brazilian society faced a political corruption scandal called “budget dwarfs” involving congresspeople accused of including amendments for illicit enrichment. They directed financial resources to philanthropic organizations linked to relatives and received bribes from majors and contractors in exchange for the inclusion of projects in the Annual Budget Bill (Sodré, & Alves, 2010). According to Praça (2011), there were many institutional changes in the Brazilian budgeting process after the scandals, however, there are still some recent studies correlating individual amendments and corruption mainly due to a lack in the controlling process of its allocation of resources (Sodré, & Alves, 2010).

TOWARDS A PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE

Therefore, how can we restructure the institutional arrangements related to the process of budgeting to make it more accountable while sustaining a mechanism for civil society to participate more directly in the decision-making process? According to some seminal authors such as Souza Santos (2005), Avritzer (2002) and Pateman (1970, 2012), the answers lies on the concept of democracy itself.

Democracy has passed through many changes since its foundations in Ancient Greece. However, one principle seems to guide the characterization of each different democratic model: citizen participation. According to Barber (2005), in principle, all democracy is to a degree participatory since it is grounded on the original consent as well as in periodic elections. Nonetheless, the strength, scope and connotation that each democratic way of governing gives to the participation ideal can vary significantly.

In the classic model of democracy, participation was inherently direct. In Athens, the main institution responsible for government deliberations was the Assembly (Ekklesia), where all citizens of the city-state all citizens had the right to attend, speak (Dahl, 1994) and where they met at least thirty times a year for deliberation on all matters (Pateman, 2012). These communities were socially and geographically demarcated and had a few thousand people living around the urban center or in the

countryside, factors that facilitated and accelerated communication and the impact of social and economic arrangements.

Politics was understood as a form of expression and realization of human nature, with all citizens debating, deciding and approving laws, without the modern perspective of distinction between State and society (Held, 2006) and with all citizens having broad and easy access to public functions and offices, and to public deliberations based on consensus, rather than customs or use of the force (Raaflaub, 1998; Held, 2006). In summary, the Athenian governance was grounded on a dialogic process in which the demos (people) was both the ruler and the ruled and governed itself through collective-binding decisions from the assembly (Aristotle, n.d.). However, there was no universal suffrage since only a male resident of Attica whose parents were born Athenians were considered citizens, hence, excluding women and slaves from the decision-making process.

In modernity, the influence of the thoughts of Machiavelli and Hobbes helps to construct the notion of separation between State and society, consequently between government and people (Held, 2006). And the size and complexity of the modern industrialized society has led to a change in the original concept of democracy (Pateman, 1970; Dahl, 1995). Throughout this process, government decisions move away from the direct action of citizens and, gradually, a new set of political practices and institutions are set up to embrace this new context: indirect participation through elections (representation) becomes the essence of democratic practices. Thus, from a perennial, broad and dialogistic process of the classical model, democracy in the modern age becomes an occasional, limited and monologic process (Fuchs, 2007).

In fact, theorists of the representative liberal democracy had a pessimist view on citizenship since the results of their investigations showed that citizens in general, especially those from lower classes, have a lack of interest in politics and even support authoritarian attitudes. These studies also made some researchers to fear and avoid more participatory institutions for the people as it may threaten democracy itself (Pateman, 1970). In their view, which was based on the Schumpeter economic perspective on democracy, participation is relevant, however, competition by potential decision makers for the people's vote is the vital feature since the fact that individuals can switch support from one set of leaders to another ensures that leaders are relatively responsive to non-leaders (Pateman, 1970; Schumpeter, 1946).

Nonetheless, for participatory theorists, since Rousseau, citizen participation goes beyond. For them, citizen participation in decision making is more than a protective institutional mechanism since it also has a psychological effect on participants that foster democratic qualities. In other words, they reinforce the participation element on the democratic theory (Pateman, 1970), however, both concepts state that a certain level of participation is essential to legitimate representatives (Della Porta, 2018).

In fact, participatory democracy theorists have a major concern on the apathy of citizens in relation to politics. They believe that the crisis of representation is a demand for representative democracy to be complemented by direct mechanisms (Bobbio, 1997). Different from liberal democracy view, these theorists argue that by feeling under-represented or marginalized, people would tend not to see the democratic process as fair, finding few reasons to participate in decisions that affect their lives and often considering them to be authoritarian. The solution would be the existence, knowledge

and encouragement of more opportunities for effective participation of the population in decision making processes, thus leading to a greater incentive to engage, to perceive participation as important and to consider collective decisions as binding (Held, 2006). After all, as Pateman (1970) points out, participation have the educational function of teaching people to participate, gaining experience in democratic skills and procedures. In this perspective, participation have a defensive effect from arbitrary power and produces more informed decisions by public officials, therefore, fostering a virtuous circle in society (Della Porta, 2013). In table 1, we can see a summary of three major participatory theorists and their premises and results expected in relation to their democratic ideals.

Table 1. Participatory theorists and their views on democracy and participation

Authors	Assumptions	Results
Rousseau (n.d.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic equality • Economic independence • Every man own some property • Psychological impact of social and political institutions (interrelationship between the authority structures of institutions and the psychological qualities and attitudes of individuals) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political equality • Political independence • Develops responsible, individual social and political action (educative function) • Participatory system 'forces' individuals to deliberate according to his sense of justice (educative function) • Collective decisions to be more easily accepted by the individual. (impersonal rule of law) • Sense of belonging in their community (integrative function).
Pateman (1970, 2012)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participation is a right • All citizens are able to participate • Individuals interact with authorities • Individuals learn to participate by participating (psychological and practical aspects) • Basic disposition in relation to the possibility of exerting political influence • Economic equality 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democratization of democracy • Reform of undemocratic authority structures • Creation of a participatory society (all political systems have been democratized and socialization through participation can take place in all areas) • Self-sustaining system • Acceptance of collective decisions (integrative effect)
Della Porta (2013, 2018)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Citizens are able to make complex decisions • Participation spaces stimulates the collective development of ideas, interests, preferences and identities • Delegation is an instrument of oligarchic power • Participation rebalances power inequalities • Creation of multiple and varied channels of participation since there are conflicts between actors possessing different resources and powers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Changes perception from individual to collective • Real equality • Democratization of societal institutions • Defense from arbitrary power • Production of more informed decisions • Growth of the legitimacy of decisions • Creations of spaces of participation - schools of democracy (educative function) • Virtuous circle • Redistributes resources to the advantage of the weakest. (redistributive function)

Source: The authors.

However, some contemporary authors have been criticizing this eagerness to build more and more participatory institutions as a major goal. For them, in reality, participatory initiatives frequently reproduce class hierarchies (Lijphart, 1997), does not foster real discussion (Zittel, 2007) and may be used to co-opt citizens and organizations, thus, creating a kind of controlled inclusion of people (Lupien, 2018). Critics of participatory democracy theory such as Offe (1997) and Pieterse (2001) also claim that (1) it has not been successful in revealing which specific institutions have a positive effect on participation; (2) it fails to explain the contextual conditions that may affect participation and other political behavior; (3) and it lacks a reasonable explanation of how and why some institutions may or may not encourage an specific citizen behavior.

PARTICIPATORY DIMENSIONS

In this sense, the analysis of the institutional characteristics of a participatory mechanism should help understand and analyze the initiatives and might show hints of the dimensions that can favor or disfavor their success.

According to Pateman (1970, 2012), one of the core premises of participatory democracy is that participation must be seen as a right and not a concession from public officials to citizens. But how can we guarantee that this goal is achieved in a participatory mechanism while inserted in a representative context in which a politician must be elected and decide to create it by himself? The first condition must be then the enactment of a specific law for the mechanism, thus, limiting the power of the creator or the opposition to shut down the initiative at their own will and ensuring that any change in the future must surpass some legal and political limits as a protection from arbitrary power. However, one can certainly see a law which is broad enough to still rely on political will to sustain the mechanism in the long term. Therefore, there must be also self-sustaining characteristics in the design of the initiative that help maintain it over time, including, but not limited to, established sources of funding. This condition is also consistent to Pateman's (2012) thoughts of a self-sustaining system needed to participatory democracy. Moreover, as Pereira (2016) postulates, the instability of the mechanism over time might play a role in its success since it would tend to constrain citizen's interest and participatory behavior. Hence, analyzing the timeframe and continuity of a participatory initiative is also an important element for the investigation. These three conditions combined, we argue, would help analyze the stability dimension of a participatory mechanism.

A second dimension to evaluate in participatory initiatives is their accessibility or, in other words, the capacity of a mechanism to be understood, reached and used easily by the people. According to Pereira (2016), difficulty of participation related to low understanding of the initiative and lack of communication might higher the costs of participation for citizens and compromise the participatory mechanism. Thus, in order to analyze the accessibility dimension, we should seek for the existence of an outreach strategy for communicating and educating the public about the initiative. Yet, even if there is a great communication program, if the decision process happens in a remote region or in a unknown platform, for instance, we might not consider the initiative properly accessible. Hence, a second condition must be the platform (place) used for public discussion. In addition, as seen in Della Porta (2018), the participatory democracy theory have a specific concern on real equality and on the

redistributive function into the advantage of the weakest. Therefore, any interpretation of the accessibility dimension must consider the existence of incentives, with special attention to those aiming to foster participation of marginalized groups. Finally, the presence of partners, such as social movements and other informal social actors, might also influence the knowledge and dissemination of the mechanism as seen in Avritzer (2002) and should be part of the equation.

The third dimension is the participation itself. For this dimension, we see five conditions necessary to call a mechanism participatory in its full sense: the model of participation, the scope, the binding level, the universality and the weighting of votes. With this dimension, we try to analyze if the institutional arrangement effectively gives voice, vote, control of agenda and promotes equality among citizens. The model of participation itself is certainly one of the most influential conditions to the participation dimension, and might play a special role in educating the public onto democratic ideals, as proposed by Pateman (1970, p.30): “individuals learn to participate by participating”. Within this condition, we also analyze if the initiative allows citizens to express their preferences and ideas freely and vote accordingly to their will. A second condition is the scope of participation. Throughout the world, we see many kinds of initiatives ranging from a broad scope, with debates on urban planning, health and education policies, and so on, to narrow scope mechanisms that limits the direct influence of citizens to a very small proportion of the public budget and to limited areas (Sousa Santos, 2005; Pereira, 2016). Thus, the boundaries of influence might affect citizen behavior and interest in participate and should be subject to scrutiny. The third condition is the binding level of the mechanism. In fact, when reviewing the literature on participatory budgeting initiatives, a common issue is the lack of guarantees that the decisions made will be implemented as is. Usually the participatory mechanism confer limited discretionary power to citizens and can easily and legally be changed by public officials or not put into effect at all (Coelho et al., 2015). Finally, two of the premises of liberal democracy are also incorporated into the participatory democracy ideals: the equal weight of individual participation, frequently known as the saying “one man, one vote” and the universality of the right to participate.

Figure 2. Participatory dimensions

Stability	Accessibility	Participation
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Time of existence • Law • Self-sustaining characteristics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Platform (place) • Partners • Communication • Incentives <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marginalized groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scope • Binding level • Equal weight • Universal • Model <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Voice and vote

Source: the authors.

METHODS

This study focuses on understanding citizen participation in public budgeting during the legislative debate phase of the budget cycle. The methods described further will be used to understand

the institutional design of the mechanisms and its implications on the success of the initiatives by answering the following general research questions:

- How do institutional arrangements called “Participatory Amendments” enable citizen participation in the debate phase of public budgeting?

In order to support this discussion and analyze its implications, the investigation will use the participatory dimensions as a model of analysis, which are represented in the following specific research questions:

- How do these mechanisms work (Participation dimension)?
- How citizens have access to these mechanisms (Accessibility dimension)?
- How can the mechanisms perpetuate in the long term (Stability dimension)?

These dimensions will be used to analyze through the lenses of participatory democracy ideals the cases of two congresspeople that created initiatives called “Participatory Amendments”: Glauber Braga, a congressman from the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL) representing the state of Rio de Janeiro that created the mechanism of participation in 2009; and João Henrique Caldas, also known as JHC, a congressman from the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) representing the state of Alagoas that created the online mechanism of participation in 2017.

The two cases were selected in order to extend the emergent theory of participatory initiatives regarding public budgeting and because they fill a theoretical gap in the literature of participatory mechanisms, as propose by Eisenhardt (1989), since they started in the legislative branch and occur during the debate and vote phase of the budget cycle. These specific cases were also chosen because they are currently in effect and have been passed through at least one full budgetary cycle.

Primary and secondary data were collected through many techniques (see table xx) and analyzed under the three theoretical dimensions – participation, accessibility and stability – using the premises proposed by Bardin (2011). For her, content analysis goes through three stages: pre-analysis, where the materials are selected and the methodological procedures defined; exploitation of the material, when the chosen techniques are applied and the information is aggregated into categories; and, finally, the interpretation, when trying to give meaning to the information collected. Thus, we identify five main categories that oriented case development and analysis: organization of the initiative; incentives and outreach; process; participants; and challenges.

Table 2. Description of sources of information

<i>Type</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
Interview	2
Communication pieces	45
Videos	4
Websites	3

Database	1
News	10
Social networks	4

Source: the authors

These multiple data sources were used to triangulate the information and to increase validity of the proposals and conclusions derived from this paper, as proposed by Creswell and Miller (2000) and Yin (1994).

GLAUBER BRAGA'S PARTICIPATORY AMENDMENTS

Glauber Braga is a 37-year-old lawyer and congressman representing Rio de Janeiro, a state with one of the highest HDI in the country and located in the southeast of Brazil. Before becoming a member of the Brazilian Federal Chamber of Deputies, he worked as secretary of special projects and chief of staff under his mother government in the city of Nova Friburgo, in the interior of the state of Rio de Janeiro. He was first elected in 2006 as substitute of Jorge Bittar, a politician from the Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores - PT), and took the mandate on January 6, 2009, due to his license. After that, he was elected three more times and now has a mandate until 2023. He was affiliated to the Brazilian Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Brasileiro – PSB) until 2015, when he migrated to the Socialism and Freedom Party (Partido Socialismo e Liberdade – PSOL). In the Congress, Glauber is member of the commissions on Education, on Participatory Legislation, on Foreign Relations and National Defense and, accordingly, his mandate is focused on themes related to expansion of direct participation instruments, free public education, foreign relations and protection of workers' rights.

Braga's Participatory Amendments (Emendas Participativas) were created in 2009, in the first year of Glauber Braga as a congressman. The initiative was developed under a diagnosis of failure in the Brazilian representative system and that this situation cannot be solved through a denial of the political universe, but by showing its limits and by complementing representation with accountability and direct participation instruments. According to Braga, Participatory Amendments (PA) were also a response to the elitism of the Brazilian budgetary cycle in which there is a very low level of public participation in the definition of the direction of the public budget.

Organization of the Participatory Amendment

In the typical Brazilian budget cycle, the presentation of parliamentary amendments takes place in October of every year. However, the process of organizing and operating the Participatory Amendments requires that their preparations take place at the beginning of the year. The first stage of the PA takes place in the first months of the year, with the team responsible for monitoring the projects of the parliamentary mandate of the deputy, defining the schedule of meetings and the places where the meetings will take place. There is an effort to meet minimally all the regions of Rio de Janeiro and, however, it is also noticed that throughout history there has been a predominance of PA meetings in the cities of the Center-North of Rio de Janeiro, the only region of the state with all cities served at least once by the initiative, coinciding with the region of origin of the deputy, and where in the 2006, 2010 and 2014 elections there was the highest concentration of votes.

After choosing the cities through which the initiative will pass, the places where the face-to-face meetings will take place are chosen. The aim is to hold meetings in places that are easily accessible to people, in order to facilitate and encourage attendance and participation. According to Braga, in many municipalities, when possible, the meeting takes place in the City Council because it is already a point of reference for the general population: "you arrive in a city, it will be in the City Council, everyone already knows where it is" (Braga, 2019)

Also in this first stage, along with the definition of the timetable and the location of the face-to-face meetings, possible directions of a political nature are also defined. Since 2013, with Constitutional Amendment nº86, also known as Amendment of the Imposing Budget (Emenda do Orçamento Impositivo), parliamentarians are obliged to allocate at least 50% of the resources of individual parliamentary amendments to the health area. However, in addition to these legal issues that affect the allocation of resources, Glauber Braga's PA also predefine priorities according to the moment, area or region that the mandate considers important. In 2019, for example, the area of education should be privileged as a result of the recent cuts of funds made in the area by the Ministry of Education: "this year, for example, we think that, for all the circumstances, we are going to have a line of participatory amendments, which are not from the health area, they are all directed towards the area of education ... [however,] there is no complete inflexibility" (Braga, 2019). In addition, there is also no previous determination of the amount of resources allocated to the initiative, with the amount varying greatly over the 9 years of initiative.

Incentives and outreach

After this first stage of defining the guidelines of the PA and in close proximity to the face-to-face meetings, the dissemination to the local community takes place. The communications about the PA are distributed through sound cars through the city, messages directed by the Whatsapp application, a tool widely used by the Brazilian population, local radios and the mandate team goes to the places of greater flow in the region to carry out a body to body action. The main motive for the dissemination of the participation mechanism is the idea that, by participating in the process of indicating the amendments, citizens will be defending the municipality in which they reside. During this campaign, it is also explained what a participatory amendment is and what can be chosen with that resource of parliamentary amendment.

In the early years of the PA, the meetings were announced well in advance and social networks were used to aid in the communication of the encounters. However, it was noticed that the role of the local mobilizers was more significant for the presence of the population, which made this activity discontinued: "we went to make a meeting in Barra do Piraí, it was a nice meeting, gave a lot of people and such , but the mobilization was all concentrated on the people there" (Braga, 2019). Besides, in addition to contributing little to greater popular participation, this material generated very little engagement when disseminated in social networks. In 2018, for example, no social network communication material related to PA was used. However, by 2019, this decision not to use the main mass social networks, such as Instagram and Facebook, has been re-evaluated and will be resumed the messages publications on the meetings of AP in those networks, aiming to reach people who were

not mobilized by the local device: "even if it is low-interactive, [they will be used] for someone to mention someone else. If one person learns and tells someone, it's cool. We have already decided to give it another chance" (Braga, 2019)

To encourage the participation of the population in the meetings, no monetary or financial incentives are used. In Braga's PA, the main incentive for participation is the possibility of participating in the process of deciding individual amendments and defending what is considered relevant to the local community. After all, "when they [people] envision that they will be able to achieve that effectively, that is the stimulus it has" (Braga, 2019).

The process

The process of participation of the PA is totally conducted in loco. Although there is a project to hold online meetings, there is no intention of replacing face-to-face meetings with exclusively digital mechanisms. According to Braga (2019), technology is not capable of emulating the face-to-face interaction and properly promoting collective action.

Technological instruments do not replace the ability to articulate face-to-face, to contact, to verbalize an emotion, this is not replaceable. I think you may have a virtual participatory amendment meeting in the future, I think it's good, but not as a substitute for the process of face-to-face organization, where you have the rational aspects, but at the same time that emotion that crosses a collective. This is important for the mobilizing force. (Braga, 2019)

On the day set for the PA meeting, the process starts from the congressman's speech about how the administrative process of a parliamentary amendment in the executive branch is. He explains that amendments are linked to the Annual Budget Law (LOA) and that the federal budget may suffer cuts that might impact the amendment timeframe; it is also clarified that there is a need for referral of the project by the City Hall, otherwise there will be no object for the application of resources; and the role of the parliamentarian in the decision-making process and at that meeting. Present citizens are then called upon to present and defend their ideas, all of which will be registered and will be visible to all participants in order to be voted on in sequence.

During this stage, if there is an indication of a proposal that is impossible to carry out, according to the legal criteria for the indication of amendments, there will be an explanation of why such a suggestion should not be moved to the voting stage.

For example, [if someone say] 'I wanted it to go to a circus'. We are going to explain that it is difficult to get an amendment to a circus, which does not have a specific program for this. We explain that and we never saw a person willing to make an impossible idea to prevail. But other than that, there is no restriction on our part. There were participatory amendments from dog kennel to health resources, that is, it is a pallet with more malleable definitions from the local needs and the mobilization that was made (Braga, 2019).

In this discussion part, the mayor, city councilors and members of social organizations that are present can express their opinions by advocating for a certain cause or mentioning the need not to target certain ideas because another resource had already been directed to such a situation, thus, redundancies in projects for the community.

Finally, with all the ideas presented and written, there is the moment of voting. Citizens are invited to raise their hands for the proposal that suits them best, and then the votes are counted for

each of the ideas presented, considering that each person present is entitled to one vote. Thus, from all the facts above, in short, PA participation process can be divided into three stages: explanation of parliamentary amendments and public budget, presentation of ideas with debate, and voting.

Participants

There is no restriction on participation in the meetings of Braga's PA. All the citizens of the municipalities are invited, as well as the mayor and the councilmen. However, according to Braga (2019), the initiative was created primarily for the participation of grassroots organizations. In addition, the dynamics of PA lead each of these actors to behave differently in relation to the projects and the own initiative of participation. In general, when the mayor attends meetings, he seems to feel compelled to defend his political choices and administration. City councilors, on the other hand, when they appear, are perceived as tending not to express opinions on the discussions that are happening among citizens. This happens even with councilors who have no political connection with the deputy and are from the local opposition. In relation to citizens, there is a great difference in performance and perception among social classes. Citizens of lower social strata feel more comfortable to participate, while higher-class citizens have difficulty understanding the reasons for those subjects being set in a popular forum.

Since 2009, the number of participants has varied considerably in relation to the year and region of the cities where the meetings were held. The largest participation occurred in the city of Nova Friburgo, already in 2009, in a meeting with more than 1000 people and suggestion of 65 different proposals. On the other hand, the smallest meeting occurred in the same city, however, in a remote region known as Centenário, where 15 people participated and there was only one proposal.

In relation to popular organizations and associations, there is also a particular dynamic. The existence of a prior articulation by these actors to advocate their causes is often noted.

There is an institution called Love Jesus house. It is a spiritist institution, that provides a recognized service to elderly people under situation of total vulnerability. And they went to the first meeting, articulated before, and won in the participatory amendment meeting. They got the vehicles they have in the institution to carry groceries [... After that] they rearticulated themselves in a second meeting, [and] they won again. Only then after the second meeting the City Hall did not prepared and submitted the projects and they did not receive the amendment. (Braga, 2019)

However, despite noticing that this type of organization has been successful in explaining its specific demands, they may also suffer from barriers imposed by the bureaucracy itself involved in the execution of parliamentary amendments.

Challenges

The main challenge of PA is the relationship between the parliamentary mandate and other political actors involved in the process of implementing parliamentary amendments. According to Braga (2019), today, in some cases, there is a process of boycott by the municipal executive power, with the intention of putting in check the credibility of the project, as well as making the congressman responsible for not doing a certain project. Nonetheless, in some cases, when there was large popular mobilization for a project, the public power felt pressured to open a channel for dialogue with the community and to present the project for a particular demand.

It has happened in my hometown, the City Hall does not proceed with the project and sometimes the responsibility comes to the mandate when it was the city that had to make the referral of the proposal [...] The community is usually the pressure maker and the one who will establish power and forced dialogue there. (Braga, 2019)

In this sense, in order to mobilize the population for the execution of the projects chosen through the PA, local monitoring committees are also created, with the purpose of ensuring that all the process with the local public agencies will be carried out and that the decision of the participants will be assured and will not suffer unilateral changes by the city hall. According to the parliamentarian, there is always an attempt to "set up a monitoring committee because there is usually some trouble [...] The city hall wants to change, their representatives were not there [in the meetings of PA], despite being invited, but wants to change it" (Braga, 2019).

Another challenge faced by the project is the very nature of the participatory instrument. According to Braga, the PA mechanism happens from its first mandate until today as the initiative is seen as a long-term instrument. In words words, to have participation, it is necessary that there is routine and time for the consolidation of the PA.

I talk to the the mandate team that we must have a mandate and space for political discussion with establishment and routine as a little church. And I explain so as not to be misunderstood. If you go, if you are a Catholic, you do not wonder, 'Is the priest going to be there today to celebrate the Mass?', If you are a protestant, you do not wonder: 'Will the minister go there today? if you're a spiritist, if you're from umbanda, you're not asking yourself,' is the Mãe de Santo going to be there today?' No. We do not have that. You already know that on that day, from that routine, you will have a welcoming space. (Braga, 2019)

In other words, despite the fact that it has been functioning for 9 years, it is understood that, in historical time, a participatory mechanism such as PA is conceived to have a certain amount of predictability, even if the trajectory of engagement and participation is not linear.

JHC'S PARTICIPATORY AMENDMENTS

João Henrique Caldas, also known as JHC, is a 31-year-old lawyer and congressman representing the state of Alagoas, a state with the lowest HDI in the country and located in the northeast of Brazil. Before going to the Federal Chamber of Deputies, JHC was state deputy of Alagoas and his is son of a former congressman, João Caldas. He was first elected congressman in 2014 and was reelected in 2018 for a mandate until 2023. He was affiliated to the National Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Nacional – PTN) from 2010 until 2013, when he migrated to Solidarity Party (Solidariedade), and his is affiliated to the Brazilian Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Brasileiro – PSB) since 2015. In the Congress, JHC is member of the commissions on Education, on Science, Technology, Communication and Computing and of the Council on Ethics and Parliamentary Behavior. His mandate is focused on themes related to youth, digital technology and free internet.

JHC's Participatory Amendments (Emendas Participativas) were launched in September 20th, 2017 and in 2018 it has won the WeGov Network Award for its innovative communication proposal related to policy development. The initiative was developed under a diagnosis of people's distancing from politics and that this might be solved by using digital technologies to put power in the hands of the

people and to promote social control. According to Normande (2018), the project was inspired in two concepts: participatory budgeting and digital democracy. However, the initiative was not the first attempt to strengthen ties with citizens. Since the beginning of 2017 JHC also developed another project, The Amendment Route (Rota das Emendas), a project in which he travelled to many cities that had received financial resources from his amendments to supervise and to interact with managers and citizens.

Organization of the Digital Participatory Amendment

Initially, the proposal of JHC's project intended to create a mobile structure, in which the congressman would travel to the main cities of Alagoas to carry out the initiative and listen directly to the population on the allocation of the resources of the parliamentary amendments. However, high costs were identified as a main condition that could make the project unfeasible, hence this model of participation *in loco* was aborted. In this way, in order to optimize and reduce costs, the final proposal defined that the participation process would be carried out online, with the development of a platform with a voting system aimed at engaging the population and explaining how the Brazilian federal public budget is.

Thus, JHC's process of organizing Digital Participatory Amendments (DPA) began with the creation of the site that would receive the online voting tool. In the two years of operation of the initiative, the online address that hosted the EPD underwent a minor change, from www.emendasparticipativas.com in 2017 to www.emendasparticipativas.com.br in 2018. This change occurred due to unavailability of the latter for registration in the first year of the initiative.

The platform project were divided into three major areas: (1) the main page, with information about the project and a simple explanation of what a parliamentary amendment is; (2) a voting area and; (3) a space for monitoring the implementation of the parliamentary amendments chosen through this participatory mechanism. During project organization, another element was considered: how to give credibility to an online voting system and ensure that each person voted only once? Hence, in addition to the voting system, there would be a form in which citizens would have to fill in personal information (name, email, telephone, city of origin and CPF³). In addition, the page also recorded IP addresses and blocked consecutive answers from the same IP address.

In the first year of implementation of DPA, the only policy definition of the mandate for the resources allocated to the project was that 50% would go to the health area, reflecting the premises of the Amendment of the Imposing Budget, and the definition by the mandate team of the other areas to be chosen. By the year 2018, in addition to the 50% for health projects, the process was divided into two stages in order to make the process even more open and allow the citizens themselves to define which areas they would be targeting choice in advance.

In both years 2017 and 2018, the voting stage of DPA lasted about a month. In 2018, specifically, JHC's initiative was launched on September 26, 2018, during its campaign to re-election to the position of federal deputy and 11 days of the first round of the election.

³ CPF is a unique number that identifies a taxpayer at the Brazilian Federal Internal Revenue Department.

Incentives and outreach

DPA project was entirely based on building a communication program, in particular, using Web 2.0 engagement resources and strategies. Communication pieces were developed with two fundamental objectives: to encourage the use of the participatory mechanism and to educate people about what parliamentary amendments are and the origin of these public resources. The team developed animations and videos the project, parliamentary amendments and, while the initiative gathered votes, JHC also used his social networks for dissemination and explanation of the project and its innovative feature, both through traditional posts and Instagram lives. However, in order to broaden the audience that would know the platform, they also developed offline communication strategies, with the use of billboards, spots on local radios, press services and flyer distribution in two occasions.

Another key feature of DPA engagement strategy was the use of partnerships with diverse actors to increase its relevance. Mandate team contacted organizations that foster innovation in the public sector, such as the startup Wegov and the NGO Vetor Brasil to carry out content in their communication channels. In addition, they coordinated actions with local governments, which led to sharing information about the initiative in the official communication channels of city halls, by city councilors and local leaders (see Annex I).


Also, a significant number of the pieces of communication showed an attempt to minimize the personal character of the project by the deputy. many videos brought unknown people or the deputy's team (also unknown by the greater population), and only at the end, JHC's logo appeared quickly, except for the videos recorded by the parliamentarian himself to explain and publicize the participatory mechanism.

In this sense, it is important to point out that the main figure who explained the project and that appeared in some videos was the idealizer of the mechanism and parliamentary adviser of the deputy, Naara Normande.

The process

DPA participation process is fully digital. In the first year of its implementation, the initial phase of the project consisted in only one stage with a duration of approximately one month for voting. Citizens saw a form in which they should define the general area for which the resources of the parliamentary amendments would be directed. They could choose between four areas: health, infrastructure, sports and childhood. Next, one of the predefined actions should be selected within that area and, finally, citizens could indicate to which of the 102 cities of Alagoas that project would be destined (figure 3).

Figure 3. DPA voting system in 2017



Source: the authors.


Even with the DPA project being restricted to approximately 15% of the total value of individual amendments of the JHC, the mandate decided to replicate the restriction imposed in the Federal Constitution in relation to the allocation of at least 50% of the resources of the amendments to the area of health. And during the voting timeframe, citizens were able to see in real time the most voted amendments so far, considering this rule.

After the resource allocation phase and disclosure of results, on October 20 2017, the winning amendments were formally indicated and the site was updated to show the status of each parliamentary amendment as a way of giving more credibility to the initiative (see Annex II). According to Normande (2019), “people believed in an online voting platform and, therefore, they had the right to follow the whole legal process until the materialization of these actions”. However, it is no longer possible to access the site for the 2017 DPA⁴. Only a portion of the 2017 site has been migrated to the 2018 URL, where you could see a page for tracking the 2017 amendments, however, without updating the execution of the indicated projects.

For the year of 2018, DPA has undergone some adjustments. Besides changes in the amount allocated to the project and the maintenance of the 50% restriction for the health area, the voting would now be carried out in two stages. Between September 26 and October 3, 2018, citizens could only define which macro priority areas to invest. From this result, the site underwent a modification to host voting of the projects that would receive the resources, the city and the amount to be directed. This second round of voting was scheduled to last until October 15, however, there was an extension until October 25, 2018. The first stage of the voting was more open and, once the four macro areas were defined, the second stage was analogous to the 2017 model (figure 4)

Figure 4. DPA voting system in 2018

⁴ Accesses were tested on several dates between January 2019 and July 2019, all of them unsuccessfully.



Source: the authors.

Besides, DPA project indicated that hosting websites of the mechanism would function as a follow-up environment for the execution of the projects indicated through the amendments, however, since the beginning of 2019, it is not possible to see the result of the 2018 DPA and the site is off air. In addition, data for the year 2018 have not been provided so far.

Participants

The model of the participation mechanism allows any citizen with a CPF number to vote in an area and indicate the city to which that resource should be directed. In 2017, 5,135 citizens of Alagoas participated with individuals from all 102 cities in the state. As early as 2018, the number of participants rose to more than 6 thousand citizens. In addition, in both years, each citizen can vote individually according to their convictions and there is no predefined space for collective discussion within the platform.

However, during the 2017 DPA process, it was noticed that, despite the individual vote, there was a kind of competition between residents and managers from different cities in order to reach the goal of raising those resources for the necessary action of their city.

In the case of the health area, the city of Santana do Ipanema had 332 votes in action to build a health post and was one of the two winners [...] The interesting thing to follow is that in the first weeks of voting, Santana did not appear and only after the mobilization through WhatsApp and the identification that they were growing in number of votes, the city managed to guarantee the R\$ 663 thousand for the health center. (Normande, 2018b)

Based on data collected by the form and provided for this research, it is not possible to identify demographic characteristics of the participants as age, gender or income profile. However, we can identify the cities that obtained the highest absolute number of votes (table 2).

Table 2. Top 10 cities in DPA

City	Votes
Rio Largo	766

São José da Tapera	704
Satuba	551
Maceió	500
Traipu	484
Santana do Ipanema	369
Pindoba	360
Porto Real do Colégio	207
Água Branca	100
Maragogi	92

Source: data obtained by the authors.

In addition, according to Normande (2019), people participating in the initiative was not restricted to JHC voters, or only to young people familiar with the Internet. It is possible to identify other profiles by participating and sharing the initiative in their social networks as teachers of the Federal University of Alagoas, elderly people, etc.:

I know people who had not voted for the deputy and they were sharing because of the initiative itself. [...] they made a point of saying 'look, with regard to political opinions, everything, but this is where I am participating, I'm disclosing, I want it, it deserves our recognition. (Normande, 2018)

Challenges

In DPA project, the main challenge was to convince all actors involved in the process of defining and managing parliamentary amendments regarding the importance of the project and its possible benefits. That is, not only the mandate team need to perceive the initiative as favorable, but mainly outside actors such as local administrators, which are the bodies responsible for implementing public interest projects to which parliamentary amendment resources were directed. In addition, according to Normande (2019), EPDs are a model of participation that requires engagement and sharing by citizens to function effectively. In this way, another big challenge is how to convince people, often disbelieving the political process, that they should participate in an initiative of a politician. The option to focus on the strategy of communication in engagement and digital media was then chosen as a means to try to overcome this obstacle.

PARTICIPATORY AMENDMENTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

In order to analyze the case described by interviews, collected documents and audiovisual content as holistically as possible (Pérez-Nordtvedt et al., 2008), we use the indicators derived from the theoretical background revisited above.

With regard to the stability of a participatory mechanism, it is clear that this criterion is naturally difficult to meet when the initiative is intrinsically linked to an eminently unstable and with expiration

date institute such as the parliamentary mandate. However, Braga's PA have existed for nine years without interruption and JHC's DPA have occurred for two years, both with intention of continuity. In this sense, the perpetuation of these initiatives coupled with the parliamentary mandate seems to hold some degree of stability, which might be related to the high reelection rate of the Brazilian political system. After all, in the last 20 years, the number of parliamentarians who managed to maintain their mandate for at least one more election varied between 60% and 70% (DIAP, 2018). In this way, in practice, the parliamentary mandate in Brazil has a characteristic of stability, which favors the maintenance of initiatives linked to it.

In addition, the very nature of parliamentary amendments to the federal budget within the Brazilian political system tends to favor the maintenance of initiatives that generate electoral returns for parliamentarians. Historically, the institute of the individual amendments is associated to the presentation of projects of interest of that population that constitutes the electoral base of the parliamentarian. Braga's PA case shows a great part of the resources and the very location of PA meetings coinciding with their historical electoral base. Therefore, the participatory mechanism can, at the same time, aggregate the institute of participation and preserve the nature of linkage and approximation with the electoral base of the parliamentarian, which may favor the stability of the mechanism. However, in relation to the JHC's DPA, it is observed that the exclusively digital nature of the participation mechanism favored the participation of people with no link or voting history for the parliamentarian, as can be observed in Normande's speech (2018) and reinforced through table 3.

Regarding the existence of a law guaranteeing the perpetuity of an initiative, there are no rules to ensure that they are maintained in the time of both institutes. There has already been legislative initiative in this matter, however, it did not go ahead due to the understanding that it is a prerogative of the parliamentary mandate to define the way to deliberate on the resources of individual parliamentary amendments. Similarly, in relation to the existence of characteristics that guarantee the self-sustaining mechanisms of participation, it can be considered that, in both cases, there are also no elements of self-management, since the whole process of organization and definition of the guidelines strictly depends on the conduct of the mandate team each year.

Regarding the aspect of accessibility, in the case of Braga's PA, an effort is made to find places that favor participation of citizens. The choice of the City Council as a focal point is interesting since, in general, it is in the central part of the city and is easily accessible, besides being known by the population, especially in smaller cities. However, the fact that the participation is in person can make it difficult for people who are distant or residents of other cities. In addition, this feature may indirectly restrict the participation of people from regions other than those in which face-to-face meetings occur, since it minimizes the chances that a project from another region will be endorsed by the local population. Also, the mechanism is intrinsically associated with the figure of the parliamentarian sponsoring it, thus it might constrain the access and participation of people who do not have some history of knowledge or vote for the parliamentarian.

In the case of JHC's DPA, access is exclusively via the web, which can favor participation of people from all cities of the state, as indeed happened with the initiative. At the same time, participation is limited to a portion of the population that has access to the internet, which are, in general, residents

of larger cities and have a younger profile. Nonetheless, an exclusively online mechanism can favor the participation of people who do not have some type of relationship with the parliamentarian's mandate, since the process occurs under a condition of partial anonymity, typical characteristic of the social tools of the web. It also can be seen that, in fact, there was participation of people who were not JHC voters. When comparing JHC votes by city with the number of votes in DPA website from the same cities (table 3), we found that in four of the ten cities with the highest voting in the platform and two of the winning cities of the initiative, the number of votes in projects of the EPDs was higher than the vote of the deputy in the immediately previous elections in 2014. We also observed that the main electoral base of the deputy JHC and municipality with greater number of inhabitants of Alagoas, the city of Maceió, had a vote in the EPDs well below its potential. In other words, from this data there is no evidence that this mechanism of participation is only reinforcing the electoral base of the deputy.

Table 3. JHC election data versus DPA usage

<i>Cidade</i>	<i>Votos nas EPDs</i>	<i>Votos na eleição de 2014</i>
Rio Largo	766	2757
São José da Tapera	704	192
Satuba	551	1280
Maceió	500	68084
Traipu	484	387
Santana do Ipanema	369	1014
Pindoba	360	41
Porto Real do Colégio	207	127
Água Branca	100	120
Maragogi	92	277

Source: Brazilian Superior Electoral Court and data gathered by the authors.

Regarding the use of communication tools, in Braga's PA, the use of local communication vehicles, such as local radios, sound cars and flyers distribution in areas of great circulation seems to favor the knowledge of a large part of the population about the initiative, even with the lack of other incentives for participation, especially since it is a face-to-face mechanism in smaller cities. The use of social networks of direct and individualized communication such as Whatsapp, which has a widespread use in Brazil and holds great trust of the population, can favor the transmission of information between people who already have some contact or knowledge of the congressman, since it presupposes the existence of a database with these contacts or the transmission by someone who are in this database to others nearby.

Regarding the JHC's DPA communication strategy, the main focus was on the use of digital channels and on partnerships with institutions related to innovation. These facts are consistent with the priority agenda of the deputy of technology and youth, and also indicate the search for a greater communication with a public linked to these themes. In addition, strong use of local formal and informal institutions is seen as an instrument to increase engagement and participation through communication with local governments, local leaders and city council members.

We found that, in both cases, as mentioned by the interviewees and observed in the pieces of communication, there is a focus on educating citizens on budgeting matters with the development of material that explains to the citizens what the public budget is, where the resources of the parliamentary amendments come from, and how these resources can be used.

Regarding partnerships, we observed that because it is an institute that depends on the city hall and often other institutions for the execution of projects, these actors can naturally contribute positively or negatively to the knowledge, engagement and dissemination of the participation mechanism. In the case of PA, it can be observed that social organizations play a very significant role and are even the main focus of the initiative, both for the presentation of ideas and for local mobilization. However, in relation to the local public power, the existence of divergences and oppositions may disadvantage the participation of a part of the population. After all, as the decision of an individual amendment occurs in the political sphere, it is subject to the interests of several antagonistic actors, which can lead to disputes over political-electoral space that overlap with the deputy's negotiations with his potential electoral base (citizens). In relation to DPA, no obstacles associated with local governments have been reported, a fact that may be associated with prior articulation with local authorities for the purpose of disseminating the initiative.

On the aspects of participation itself, it is observed that in both PA and DPA, there is equality and universality of the vote, with all the citizens who want to participate, being able to do so and with the right to voice and vote. The scope of participation is relatively broad, but it has legal and political limitations on the parliamentary mandate. Besides, although there is no formal mechanism to ensure the binding level of decisions taken at participatory amendment meetings or the online tool, the political-electoral nature of the mechanisms and their link to the candidate's electoral base favor may act as an informal enforcement tool, since not submitting the promised amendment could result in loss of votes in future elections and negative media. In the case of PA, this possibility seems to be exploited by opposition politicians in situations in which the city council deliberately does not present the amendment requested in order to generate political cost to the parliamentarian. Regarding the percentage of the individual amendments that are intended for the initiative, in JHC's DPA there was a previous definition of the amount to be allocated through the participation mechanism and corresponds to approximately 15% of the total resources of individual amendments. In relation to Braga's PA, although the deputy mentioned that there is an effort to ensure that all the resources of the individual amendments are allocated in a participatory manner, it was not possible to verify this fact from the data obtained.

It should also be noted that, in relation to PA, there is a perception that the population belonging to lower social classes feels more comfortable and participates more in the meetings, which reinforces the results of the several Participatory Budget initiatives that indicate a greater presence of citizens with these characteristics and results of public policies more focused on this social group (Avritzer, 2002). However, in relation to JHC DPA, the data are controversial and not comparable, since it is not possible to obtain information or general perceptions about the social classes of the participants. However, two of the six winning cities of the initiative (São José da Tapera and Traipu) are among the state's smallest HDI, while three winning cities are among the highest HDI in Alagoas.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

From the elements brought by the cases, we observed that institutional arrangements called Participative Amendments, whether digital or face-to-face, make it possible for citizens to have access to the debate and vote phase of the Brazilian budget cycle and, therefore, bring institutional innovation in terms of the development of public policies, given that this space is traditionally by the team of political articulation of the mandate directly with the local governments. This new dynamic is also the subject of questioning within the mandate team and the actors previously involved, thus creating a need for prior articulation of the participation initiative, spelling out the benefits for all sides, especially for those who may feel lost in decision-making power, such as representatives of local administrations.

When analyzing the participatory dimension of the mechanisms, both are based on the model of voice and vote, in which, to some extent, citizens can express their preferences, either in person in meetings of Braga's PA or in digital form, as in the first phase of the 2018 DPA, and after that they can vote on those actions and programs that best suit their wishes.

The scope of both initiatives is relatively broad, covering several areas, however, in both cases there is some political definition of the mandate on which initiatives will be the target of popular vote. If on the one hand this definition brings limitations to the exercise of a theoretical full participation, on the other it certainly facilitates the tangibility of the understanding of which public policies can be fostered by that mechanism of participation. In fact, this might be relevant since we are analyzing two innovative cases of public policy making that are also atypical for citizens from the point of view of democratic exercise.

Moreover, although in both cases there is no element that ensures the linkage of the participatory decision to the exercise of the mandate, it can be inferred that the model itself creates incentives in this direction, since the non-execution of the chosen action can generate political costs for the agent, a fact that was corroborated even by the boycott situations in relation to Braga's PA.

Regarding the dimension of accessibility, it is observed that both use completely different models of access to the public. The decision to be a purely face-to-face or digital mechanism already marks an important difference between the two initiatives, the first reinforcing the local character of the participation process, by favoring the access of the population of a specific city - where the meeting will take place - and consequently to hinder access by other publics, while the second favors wider access to the platform of participation and, at the same time, generating a more diffuse participation. These perceptions are confirmed by the choices of communication tools in each case. In PA, the use of local communication is preferred, with flyer distribution in zones of great flow, local radios, cars of sound and use of application of personal communication, therefore, always focusing on one determined city each moment. On the other hand, in DPA, there is intense and priority use of social networks, including partnerships, which also reinforces the broader and more diffuse nature of this initiative.

In addition, we also point out that a face-to-face mechanism, in addition to making it more difficult to depersonalize and, in this sense, possibly discourage the participation of people unrelated to the sponsor of the initiative, a digital mechanism tends to be naturally more impersonal, by the characteristic of the web, which can favor the participation of any citizen and even modify the logic of restricted use by the electoral base of the parliamentarian.

Regarding partners, there is no formal establishment of partnerships in Braga's PA, and in some cases local governments make it difficult to carry out the project. However, in JHC's DPA, there is a search for previous articulation with the representatives of the local administrations, aiming also at promoting the dissemination of the initiative by other institutional channels not linked to the mandate. Besides, it also sought contacts with institutions and professionals related to the area of innovation in the public sector to increase the knowledge of the tool and generate news about the mechanism. In this way, we argue that the use of partnerships, especially with local governments, could help the functioning of the mechanism of participation, both from the point of view of dissemination, and in relation to the implementation of projects resulting from popular choice. However, this strategy may run into places where there is strong opposition to the policy sponsor of the initiative.

About the dimension of stability, we found that there is no formal institution that guarantees the perpetuation of the mechanism in the long term and that the creation of a law in this sense has already been raised in the National Congress, but obtained a contrary opinion with arguments for the parliamentary autonomy to make policy decisions related to the mandate. However, considering the cases, it is possible that when the participatory mechanism is linked to the parliamentary social bases, especially as in the case of Braga's PA, there is an informal incentive for the mechanism to be maintained over the years.

Also, regarding a single digital mechanism, in potential terms, cities with a larger number of inhabitants might take advantage of smaller cities in terms of number of votes. However, from the data collected, we noticed that this expectation was not met and that the results of the scientific literature that a participatory budgeting mechanism tends to favor the targeting of resources for the poorest can be observed to some extent both by Braga's perception (2019) and by the existence of two cities with low HDI and that did not vote in the JHC Congressman as winners of the initiative.

In addition, despite premises of democratic governance, reiterated by the UN Sustainable Development Goals, indicate that more transparent and accountable institutions must be developed, as well as the need for greater responsiveness and participation in decision-making processes, we argue that these two cases have broken with the traditional and widely criticized logic of decision-making on parliamentary amendments. However, there are still some measures to ensure greater transparency and accountability, especially to allow effective citizen monitoring of decisions taken in a participatory manner. After all, in both cases citizens cannot identify his choices directly and easily.

Finally, from the analysis of both cases, along with the motivations and perceptions of parliamentarians for their creations, we observed that the creation of the institutional design of both instruments of participation, including the option for an exclusively presential mechanism by Glauber Braga and exclusively digital by JHC, seem to be related to their understanding of the concept of democracy and the democratic process. It is clear from Braga's statements that his vision of democracy implies a more substantial participation, with the need for debates and exchanges of ideas between opposing actors, in order to arrive at a synthesis of this process, similar to the ideas of participatory democracy postulated by Pateman (2012) and Della Porta (2018). JHC's initiative, on the other hand, with the use of real time results and the creation of the spirit of competition between cities seems to indicate a concept of digital democracy derived from liberal perspectives such as Dahl's (1994), in

which the expression of the democratic decision comes from the aggregation opinions of individuals and competition between actors in opposition to the same resources.

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ANNEX I – Examples of DPA communication pieces

CONTRIBUA COM O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO NOSSO MUNICÍPIO!



A SUA PARTICIPAÇÃO É DE EXTREMA IMPORTÂNCIA PARA GARANTIR MAIS UM INVESTIMENTO NA NOSSA CIDADE.

1° PASSO - ACESSE O SITE - WWW.EMENDASPARTICIPATIVAS.COM

2° PASSO - CLIQUE EM VOTAR

3° PASSO - ESCOLHA A ÁREA QUE MAIS PRECISA DE INVESTIMENTO: CLIQUE EM SAÚDE

4° PASSO - SELECIONE A OPÇÃO: COMPRAS DE EQUIPAMENTOS

5° PASSO - SELECIONE A CIDADE QUE MAIS NECESSITA DESSE RECURSO: ÁGUA BRANCA

6° PASSO - PREENCHA SEUS DADOS NOS CAMPOS SOLICITADOS, FINALIZE A VOTAÇÃO, AGUARDE O COMPROVANTE E PRONTO!

OBS: VOCÊ PODE ESCOLHER OUTRAS ÁREAS (INFRAESTRUTURA, ESPORTE, INFÂNCIA), MAS É MUITO IMPORTANTE QUE A OPÇÃO ESCOLHIDA SEJA ESSA, POIS NOSSA CIDADE ESTÁ DISPUTANDO NESSA ÁREA.



EMENDAS PARTICIPATIVAS



PREFEITURA MUNICIPAL DE ÁGUA BRANCA
TRANSPARÊNCIA COM HONESTIDADE

Prefeitura de Água Branca
Curtir esta página · 16 de outubro de 2017

Cidadãos aguabranquenses. Chegou a hora de unir esforços para trazer desenvolvimento a nossa cidade. Acesse: www.emendasparticipativas.com

O Deputado Federal JHC colocou disponível mais de 2 milhões de reais em investimentos para a população decidir em quais cidades eles devem ser realizados.

Estamos em 5º Lugar nessa disputa. A votação é rápida e simples que vai até dia 20 de outubro (sexta-feira). É importante votar na opção saúde - compras de equipamentos, pois é onde o nosso município está disputando.

Toda a aplicação das verbas será fiscalizada e todos os trâmites de prestação de contas com a população serão garantidos.

Contribua para uma cidade cada vez melhor e mais desenvolvida!

#EmendasParticipativas #Saude #Desenvolvimento #Compartilhe

38 Curtir · 6 comentários · 13 compartilhamentos

Curtir · Comentar · Compartilhar

Mais relevantes

Fernanda Bezerra Já fiz minha parte!

Escreva um comentário...



EMENDAS PARTICIPATIVAS

Chegou a sua vez de **decidir** onde o dinheiro público deve ser investido em Alagoas.

VOTE AQUI



José Feitosa Feitosa
25 de outubro de 2018

Bom dia pessoal.
EMENDAS PARTICIPATIVAS - Sua chance de escolher para qual cidade em quais áreas serão investidas as emendas parlamentares do Deputado JHC. Já são mais de seis mil votos. Mobilize seus vizinhos, amigos, familiares, colegas de trabalho, da igreja... Acesse www.emendasparticipativas.com.br e faça parte desse movimento democrático reconhecido nacionalmente!
Sugerimos votar escolhendo uma UBS para São Miguel dos Campos.
#SaoMiguelDosCampos
#EmendasParticipativas
#MandatoEmAção

14 Curtir · 3 compartilhamentos

Curtir · Comentar · Compartilhar

Escreva um comentário...

Source: Facebook pages of Água Branca Cityhall and city councilor of São Miguel dos Campos, José Feitosa.

ANNEX II – DPA results in 2017

<i>Cidade</i>	<i>Projeto</i>	<i>Votos</i>	<i>Valor</i>
Maceió	Construção de Unidade Básica de Saúde	171	R\$ 663.000
Rio Largo	Aquisição de kits para conselheiros tutelares	673	R\$ 100.000
Satuba	Pavimentação de ruas	458	R\$ 250.000
Santana do Ipanema	Construção de Unidade Básica de Saúde	332	R\$ 663.000
Traipu	Pavimentação de ruas	439	R\$ 250.000
São José da Tapera	Pavimentação de ruas	657	R\$ 250.000
Satuba	Aquisição de kits para conselheiros tutelares	40	R\$ 100.000
		TOTAL	R\$ 2.276.000

Source: data gathered by the authors.