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**BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP SEA:
Selecting partisan or independent running mates**

Amanda Vitoria Lopes

amanda_vilopes@hotmail.com

PhD Candidate

Institute of Political Science

University of Brasília

(IPOL/UnB)

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ABSTRACT

Traditionally, an electoral ticket for the presidential rally is composed of two partisans, one to run for the presidential post and another for the vice-presidency. In the United States, this is the absolute practice. However, this is not the pattern in Latin America. Besides the permission of independent candidates in some countries, another practice has been the selection of a running mate not from the presidential candidate's party. Hence, these take the vice-presidential selection some scales of complexity that the current studies on personal attributes do not consider. For this reason, I propose a paper to analyze how institutions, party strategies, and context affects the selection of partisan and independent candidates, not leading to a traditional ticket. To do so, I mount a new dataset of 542 presidential tickets from 51 elections in seven countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay) between 1979 and 2021. My previous findings suggest the difficulties of presidents in achieving majorities in the Legislative, conditioning them to compose coalitions even before the elections, and one of the bargain assets is the vice-presidential nomination. Moreover, the suspicion of running mates from other parties leads presidential candidates to select independent VPs, when choosing someone from their party is not an option.

Palavras-chave: Vice-president; Presidentialism; Elections; Latin America;

1 Introduction

The principal constant for every Latin American polity lies in the regime type: the presidential system. This regime is personified in the president's figure, who occupies the head of state and government (Linz, 1990). This feature, combined with the principle of mandate fixity, is prone to produce political tension in case of an institutional vacancy caused by death, resignation, or mandate interruption. In the meantime, the introduction of the vice presidency into the Latin American constitutions, following the U.S. example, sought precisely to solve the presidential absence (Mittelman, 2014).

The diffusion of the U.S. model in LA is not only the political regime but also some institutions that had inside them, including the vice-presidency (Lopes, *forthcoming*). Hence, since the third wave of democracy, most Latin American countries decided to follow the U.S. model of VP election: sharing the ticket with the vice-president. How does this work? A party launches its presidential candidacy composed of two partisans, one to be president and another to be vice-president. This is a rule of thumb in a bipartisan system like the United States. For example, president Joe Biden and vice-president Kamala Harris are both from the Democratic Party, such as their opponents in the 2020's elections, Donald Trump and Mike Pence, that ran for the Republican Party.

However, this is not the pattern in Latin America. According to Ugula (2020), 45% of the leading Latin American running mates (1978-2018) were not from the presidential candidate's party. Some of them are from another party or do not have any party affiliation at all. Hence, the presidential tickets with candidates from the same party, I call *pure tickets*, while the ones with members that do not share the same party affiliation, I call *mixed tickets*.

Among the mixed tickets, it is found three ways to compose them: I) a presidential candidate from party A and a vice-president from party B; II) a presidential candidate without partisan affiliation and a partisan vice-president; III) a partisan presidential candidate and an independent vice-president.

According to Ugula (2020), there is an increase in the popularity of what he called *external running mates* (i.e., vice-presidents who do not share their presidents' political background) in opposition to the internal candidate, who comes from the president's party, like the American model.

The literature argues that the non-composition of pure tickets is due to the need to seal pre-electoral alliances (Olivares et al., 2020; Serrafiero, 1999; 2018). The expansion of political party systems brought new challenges, such as the need to form political coalitions. The

multiparty dynamics and party fragmentation put strict obstacles for presidents in achieving majorities in the Legislative, conditioning them to compose coalitions even before the elections (Albala, 2021; 2017; Chasquetti, 2000; Freudenreich, 2016; Golder, 2006; Kellam, 2017; Ramirez, 2008). Hence, this leads political parties to negotiate the vice-presidential nomination to attract prospective allies and form pre-electoral coalitions (Bidegain, 2017; Olivares et al., 2020; Serrafiero, 2018).

Moreover, some countries allow that a candidate with no political affiliation may run for election (i.e., independents)¹. Some studies point out that the selection of independent running mates by partisan presidential candidates is due to the electorate's distrust of political parties (Pignataro & Taylor-Robinson, 2019). So, having an independent VP, the ticket would be capable of mobilizing this electorate.

During the first period after re-democratization (1978-1987) none of the vice-presidential candidates from the leading tickets were independent, the first one appeared in the 1989's Salvadorian elections when Fidel Chávez Media from PDC selected an independent running mate to join his presidential ticket (Gordon, 1990). Yet according to Uggla's (2020) research, 15% of the VP candidates between 1978 and 2018 were independent.

Given that, this paper aims to contribute to the field by answering the following question: What leads the selection of partisans or independent vice-presidential candidates? My purpose is to bring up the different compositions of electoral tickets in presidential elections in Latin American countries and explore which conditions in different countries contribute to the emergence of tickets with more than one party or with independent running mates.

The article proceeds as follow. In the next section, I review the literature on pre-electoral coalitions' formation and the emergence of independent candidates for Executive positions. After that, I develop seven hypotheses that highlight the expectations on the factors that influence the selection of independent running mates or vice-presidents from another party. Then, I present the data gathering and the methodology applied to this study. Next, I test my hypothesis on the selection decisions. My findings shows that a pre-electoral coalition is a necessary condition for the selection of vice-presidential candidates from another party and the experience on mandate interruption increases the suspicion of presidential candidates on VP from other parties, leading them to choose independent running partners, when their aim was not to bring a internal partisan to the ticket. I conclude by discussing the implications of these

¹ This is the case of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela (Astudillo, 2017).

findings on the selection of vice-presidents, consequently, on the construction of presidential tickets.

2 External running mates, pre-electoral coalitions, and independent candidates

In the first Latin American constitutions, the VP was the runner-up in the presidential election, which could boost conflicts and conspiracies around the presidency since his ambition was, literally, to succeed the president. After some disputes in the core of the presidency, some countries decided to abolish the office², while others followed the North American solution: an independent election for the vice-presidential position (Bidegain, 2017; Marsteintredet & Ugglá, 2019). This dynamic worked pretty well until the first half of the 20th century. However, some issues emerged, such as conflicts in the political agenda, because the winning vice-president was not always the president's candidate. Hence, it was common to have disputes between the president and vice-president from different political parties (Marsteintredet & Ugglá, 2019).

In the '80s, when most Latin American countries passed through the third wave of re-democratization, when the legislators decided to bring back the vice-presidency (Colombia, Paraguay, and Venezuela) or change the electoral mechanism (Uruguay). Except for Venezuela, the other countries started to elect the vice president on the presidential ticket. It was expected that this solution would reduce those conflicts and increase the successor legitimacy since both were elected sharing the same political agenda.

Usually, the selection of the presidential candidate precedes the vice-presidential selection. Traditionally, Latin American studies on candidate selection for the Executive sphere focus only on the candidate selection and recruitment of presidents or governors³, while the interest in the selection of vice-presidential candidates is relatively new (Lopes, *forthcoming*).

On this issue, electoral rules are usually explicit on candidacy requirements. For example, in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, the party has a monopoly on the inscription of candidacies, so only candidates affiliated with a political party can compete. While in Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador, a candidate who is not a member of a political party is authorized to enter the competition. Moreover, beyond the party affiliation requirement, almost all countries

² The vice-presidency was abolished in Venezuela in 1858, Colombia in 1910, and Brazil in 1934 (Bidegain, 2017).

³ Buquet & Chasquetti (2008); Freidenberg & López (2002); Freidenberg (2003); Luca (2008); Power & Mochel (2008); Siavelis & Morgenstern (2008); Taylor; Jaramillo & Crispy (2008).

set a minimum age of around 30 or 35 to run on the presidential ticket. In terms of the selection mechanisms, in Uruguay, for example, primaries for presidential candidates are mandatory, but there is not a word about the selection of the VP candidate (Freidenberg, 2015). In other cases, as in Brazil, the primary is even predicted in the rule, but parties are not used in carrying it out (Lopes, 2021).

In countries where the primaries are not compulsory, the political parties define how the selection will be. As a matter of fact, there are no clear rules on the selection of the vice-presidential candidate, hence, the candidate selection model cannot be applied.

Despite that, studies on vice-presidential candidate selection developed pretty well in the United States. They started in the '80s by studying the political considerations behind the choosing process (Dudley & Rapaport, 1989; Hurwitz, 1980; Natoli, 1980; Nelson, 1988). The main issue was to describe and analyze the considerations made by the presidential candidate when choosing the running mate. The decision was not just a simple choice. For the campaign, this was a signal for the electorate that the candidate could make good decisions, which is essential for a prospective president (Goldstein, 2016). In the following years, the studies advanced in the analyses by verifying the decisive criteria to choose one vice-presidential candidate and not another (Baumgartner, 2008; 2012; 2016; Hiller & Kriner, 2008; Sigelman & Wahlbeck, 1997).

Usually, the literature points out two main strategies. First, the selection of running mates with desirable attributes that the presidential nominee lacks (Baumgartner, 2006; Polsby et al., 2016). The objective is to mobilize the electorate by balancing the ticket: a candidate from the capital chooses a local politician; a southern selects a northerner; a radical nominates a moderate running partner; a younger presidential chooses an experienced vice-president, or a male presidential candidate selects a female running mate (Mieres & Pampín, 2015; Lopes, 2020; Natoli, 1980; Sigelman & Wahlbeck, 1997). And, second, the selection of a candidate with political experience, in order to assist the president, fulfill the vice-presidency attributions and, assume the presidency, if necessary (Baumgartner, 2008; 2012; 2016; Hiller & Kriner, 2008; Nelson, 1988; Pignataro & Taylor-Robinson, 2019).

However, as mentioned earlier, the study on personal attributes is not sufficient to understand the VP candidate selection in Latin American countries, because the presidential candidates do not choose only running mates from their parties, what is not demonstrated in the mentioned selection strategies. Hence, it is imperative to pursue further explanation on this matter.

2.1 *Pre-electoral coalitions in multiparty presidential systems*

In Latin American polities presenting a high party fragmentation, it is a challenge to presidents to secure a legislative majority in the National Congress (Albala 2009; Chasquetti, 2000; Ramírez, 2008). Without Legislative support, the president may choose to govern alone, which would suppose to make ad hoc bargains for every policy he may want to pass. This solution may reveal as sub-optimal since the costs are not previously known nor necessarily stable (Borges et al., 2021). Hence, a president may opt to find parties' support for the government by forming a coalition agreement. As chief of the Executive, he can offer office, administration budget, and influence over policies (Müller & Strøm, 2000).

Based on parliamentary systems studies (Budge & Laver, 1986; Müller & Strøm, 2000), the literature of coalition in presidential regimes usually focused on the coalition formation after the election, i.e., in the government coalitions (Amorim Neto, 2006). Recently, new studies have shown that those agreements start even before the government's formation; in fact, it begins before the electoral campaign (Albala, 2021; Freudenreich, 2016; Kellam, 2017).

The constitution of pre-electoral coalitions results from the need to guarantee governability. However, should this happen, some incentives have to be present to attract parties to form alliances.

During the election, competitors do not have pork or offices to offer, just promises. the literature claims, the vice-presidency seals coalition deals by putting a second party on the electoral ticket (Olivares et al., 2020; Serrafiero, 2018). Hence, the second spot in the presidential ticket spot may work as a bargain asset in the formation of pre-electoral coalitions. Unlike other offices, the vice-president's mandate is fixed, so the president cannot dismiss the person in charge. Moreover, by entering the presidential ticket, the VP's party has the main guarantee that they will be in a potential government. Thus, until the election results, if the formateur promised the nomination power to one of the allies, he can accomplish it.

Some cases that reflect the mentioned dynamic are remarkable, such as the entrance of PMDB on the Worker's Party (PT) presidential ticket in the 2010's Brazilian election. In order to get a majority in the National Congress in his second term, Lula's government worked to bring PMDB, the largest legislative party, to the coalition. To maintain the alliance for his successor, the Workers' Party agreed to give the VP's nomination power to PMDB, and then Michel Temer was chosen to be Rousseff's running mate (Dieguez, 2010). Likewise, to establish a broader array of parties, in the first presidential election of Cristina Kirchner, the Partido Justicialista decided to run with someone from UCR (Serrafiero, 2018). In both cases,

the pre-electoral coalition successfully reached the objectives: i) winning the election and ii) enlarging the legislative contingent, despite the conflicts their presidencies faced after (Marsteintredet & Ugglå, 2019)⁴.

Therefore, I assume that a presidential candidate selects a running mate from another party as a condition to seal a pre-electoral coalition and trail the governability of the mandate. Given that, I propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Presidential candidates select running mates from other parties instead of an internal partisan or an independent VP to seal an agreement for a pre-electoral coalition for the candidacy.

In a study about the determinants of the selection of running mates that are not from the presidential candidate own party, Ugglå (2020) finds out that prospective president from small parties are more prone to seek vice-presidents from other parties to ensure the electoral success and foster further governing performance (Ugglå, 2020). Small parties have more difficulties for attracting voter's support, so, they tend to seek other parties to run together given the low probabilities to be successful. Even having tiny or zero chances to win, it is profitable for small parties to enter the presidential election, because it is an opportunity to get known by the electorate (West & Spoon, 2012).

Thus, based on the first assumption, I suppose that presidential candidates from smaller parties use the indication of the vice-presidential candidate as a bargain asset to attract allies and seek for more votes. Therefore, the size of the president's party may be relevant for the selection of a partisan VP from another party. Hence, I propose to verify the coming hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: A presidential candidate from a smaller party is inclined to choose a vice-presidential candidate from another party.

2.2 *Party strategy and trajectory*

Under a presidential system, parties do not have the same strategy to capture the Executive and the Legislative (Samules & Shugart, 2010). To win the presidency, political

⁴ There are some studies on the difficulties faced by presidents with vice-presidents from other parties (Marsteintredet & Ugglå, 2019; Mittelman, 2019), however, this is not the object under discussion in this paper.

parties need to capture a large portion of the national electorate, while the competition for the Legislative is regionalized and focuses on niches. According to Samuels (2002), the decision to enter or not in the Executive competition changes party strategies in the election.

In that vein, Bertholini, Pereira and Bugarin (2022) bring up that parties that previously ran the presidential election, whether winning or losing, might take the same decision in the next race, suggesting "a path dependence generated by the partisan trajectory" (p. 31). For example, this is the case of Partido Justicialista in Argentina; the party has run every presidential election since 1983. In Brazil, PT and PSDB have also competed in presidential rallies since the 90s. The 2022's election will be the first since the return of democracy that PSDB will not launch a presidential candidate. This list includes Partido Colorado in Paraguay, as well.

So, according to the authors, political parties follow two different tracks: the presidential protagonist game and the legislative supporting party game. While the former enters the Executive competition, the latter focuses on reaching the maximum number of seats in the parliament. By doing so, the party can offer support to the winner protagonist party, by guaranteeing governability in the Legislative, in exchange, the supporting party expects to reach offices and influence policies (Bertholini et al., 2022).

As argued before, the VP nomination is a bargaining asset to attract allies to the presidential candidacy (Bidegain, 2017; Olivares et al., 2020). Considering the majoritarian game played by protagonist parties, I suppose they also adopt this strategy to call supporting parties to the presidential candidacy. As a result, they will form a pre-electoral coalition and concede the vice-presidential place to the allied.

For example, in the case of Brazil, studied by the authors, PT and PSDB were considered protagonist parties from 1994 until 2014, while PFL/DEM⁵ and PMDB⁶ played the supporting role because they never launched a presidential candidate in this period. In the elections of 1994, 1998, 2006, and 2010, PSDB's presidential candidate has a running mate from PFL/DEM. Except for the 1989 and 2018 elections, PMDB had never launched a presidential candidate. Nonetheless, the party had a vice-presidential candidate on protagonist parties' tickets. In 2002, PMDB ran for the vice-presidency in the ticket headed by the PSDB, and in 2010 and 2014, PMDB was also the running mate of PT's presidential ticket. Therefore, protagonist parties that decided to form a mixed-partisan ticket headed the tickets.

⁵ From its foundation until 2007, the party was called Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL). In 2007, the party changed its name to Democratas (DEM). In 2022, the party merged with Partido Social e Liberal (PSL), creating a new party, União Brasil (UB).

⁶ In 2017, the party changed its name to MDB.

Therefore, presidential candidates from protagonist parties are more likely to select vice-presidents from other parties to seal electoral alliances. Based on these suppositions, I present the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: A presidential candidate running for a protagonist parties might select a running mate from a different party, because the objective is to bring the VP party to the pre-electoral coalition.

2.3 *Independent candidates*

Unlike the parliamentarism, the presidentialism is personified in the president's figure (Linz 1990; Suaréz, 1982). As a result, this position endorses a personalized link between voters and candidates (Carreras, 2017), attracting “ambitious politicians who are often distinguished only by their personal support networks buttressed by personal charisma” (Kitschelt, 2000, p. 860). Given that, candidates without party affiliation, which I called *independents* are present in Latin American polities (Carreras, 2012), unlike other regimes, as the U.S.

Besides the regime type, most studies argue that the weakening of party systems is the main reason behind the rising of independent candidates (Carter, 2020; Corrales, 2008; Levitsky & Cameron, 2003; Seligson, 2002). In some contexts, political parties are having difficulties before the electorate when governing because parties are unable to reflect and articulate the electorate preferences, which increases the crisis on democratic representation (Mayorga, 2006). Due to this, candidates disconnected from political organizations emerge as an alternative to restore the electorate's trust - in the citizens' view.

Furthermore, in times of adverse economic performance, the governing parties are more vulnerable to voter's punishment on the previous performance (Benton, 2005; Fiorina, 1981). So, moments of disenchantment with the political establishment also contribute to the rise of candidates outside of the political arena with promises that they will deal differently from their counterparts on the electorate's demands (Carreras, 2012; 2017; Corrales, 2008; Mayorga, 2006).

We have in Latin America some sort of independent vice-presidents. Like the ticket launched by the Comunidad Ciudadana in the 2020's Bolivian election. The alliance nominated the former president Carlos Mesa (FRI) to run with the independent Gustavo Pedraza. In Latin America, I found **X** tickets that a presidential candidate launched by a political party selected an independent running mate.

Given this scenario, past studies points out that the same source that is generating the emergence of independent candidates for the presidency might be present on the increasing of vice-presidential candidates (2020, p. 2). On this issue, Pignataro & Taylor-Robinson (2019) argue that the inclusion of independent running mates is an appeal for groups that are resistant to political parties. Therefore, even a partisan presidential candidate might select a vice-president without partisan affiliation as a way to send a message for an electorate's group that is not considered to be represented by traditional partisans.

This, I assume that, when the social ties between society and political organizations are weakened due to the high levels of voter's distrust (Carreras, 2012; 2017), this might also impact the presence of independent vice-presidents in the election. Given that, I will test the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: The weakening of party systems increases the likelihood of a presidential candidate to choose an independent running mate.

In the same vein as Ugglá (2020), I presume that having experience with a presidential mandate interruption, except for health issues, might positively influence the decision of presidential candidates to select an independent partner for the second spot. After the re-democratization, Latin America's presidential regimes have seen thirteen interruptions in presidential terms, in which the vice-president has succeeded the president⁷.

Unlike state ministers, the president cannot dismiss the vice-president during the mandate, even if they are in open disagreement, as Cristina Kirchner and Julio Cobos in Argentina (Serrafero, 2018). As well as the president, the vice-president was also elected. He only can be remove by resignation or through new elections. It occurs that a vice-president from another party is likely to be more loyal to his home party than to the president's. So, in cases when existing an opportunity for the president's departure, a vice-president with political strength and party support might not work to end the presidential crisis (Marsteintredet & Ugglá, 2019).

History remembers recent examples of such processes include Paraguay in 2012 and Brazil in 2016. For this reason, having experienced a forced mandate interruption, prospective presidents might be aware of facing this process and prefer to select a running partner without

⁷ Four times in Ecuador, three times in Brazil, twice in Bolivia, and once in Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela (Bidegain, 2017; Lopes, 2020).

partisan support, eliminating the risk of having someone that can turn against his administration in the future (Uggla, 2020). This assumption forms the basis for hypothesis 2:

Hypothesis 5: The occurrence of previous impeachment might encourage presidential candidates to select running mates from another party.

Furthermore, Latin American countries have not adopted the same attributions for vice-presidents and this might influence the choosing decision. In some Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay, the VP is a member of the Legislative, but not a usual one, he presides the High Chamber. For this reason, it is expected that a prospective president would prefer a partner with party support and, experience, as consequence, to deal with a command position and work on the relationship between Executive and Legislative (Lopes, 2021). In the meantime, other countries maintain the vice-presidential role to the Executive branch, which would not demand party support. Hence, where the VP is a member of the Executive, the presidential candidate might select an independent partner. Given that, I suggest these next two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 6: Where the vice-president has assignments on the Legislative sphere, the presidential candidate is more likely to select a partisan running partner.

Hypothesis 7: Where the vice-president has Executive functions, the presidential candidate is more likely to select an independent running mate.

3 Data and methods

To evaluate the empirical implication of my argument, I examine presidential tickets across fifty-one elections held in seven countries between 1979 and 2021 from an original database⁸. I selected the cases under study using the *Most Similar System Design* (MSSD). First, the country should have a vice-president, which excludes Chile. Second, the vice-president must be elected using the shared-ticket method. For this reason, Venezuela is out since the elected president nominates the vice-president. Third, the country must have only one vice-president, whereas more than one would require a different research design, excluding Peru.

⁸ *Presidential Tickets in Latin America Dataset*.

Therefore, this selection leaves me with seven cases: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay.

The observations of Argentina (1983-2019), Bolivia (1985-2020), Brazil (1989-2018), Ecuador (1979-2021), Paraguay (1993-2018) and Uruguay (1999-2019) date from the return of democracy. In the case of Colombia (1994-2018), the first election was the one in which the vice-president ran on the presidential ticket. In the Colombian case, the vice-presidency was abolished in 1905, but the constitutional reform of 1991 brought back the Executive position (García, 2015). While in Uruguay, the vice-presidency had never disappeared. However, until the new constitutional amendment of 1996, the vice-president was not elected in the presidential ticket, which are the main criteria for cases included in the analysis.

My unit of analysis is the presidential tickets. Unlike previous works (Lopes, 2021; Ugglá, 2020), I include all electoral tickets that ran the elections. Therefore, this left me with 542 observations. As demonstrated in the last column of Table 1, regarding this population, most of the presidential candidates selected a running mate from their party (N = 404). In second place is the ones that chose a VP from another party, with 76 observations, and then the candidates that nominated an independent running partner (N = 48). There are just a few tickets in which the presidential candidate, when independent, selected a VP with the same status. For this case, Table 1 shows twelve observations distributed by Bolivia (2), Colombia (1), and Ecuador (9). Finally, I found two occurrences of independent presidential candidates that nominated partisan VPs, and all of them were from Ecuador.

Table 1 – Frequency of presidential tickets in the selected cases

| | Argentina | Bolivia | Brazil | Colombia | Ecuador | Paraguay | Uruguay | N |
|--|-----------|---------|--------|----------|---------|----------|---------|-----|
| President party A + VP party B | 23.4 | 6.2 | 21.6 | 13.0 | 12.9 | 9.1 | | 76 |
| President party A + VP party A | 25 | 6 | 19 | 7 | 15 | 4 | | |
| President party A + VP independent | 76.6 | 90.7 | 78.4 | 83.3 | 37.9 | 90.9 | 100 | 404 |
| President independent + VP party A | 82 | 88 | 69 | 45 | 44 | 40 | 36 | |
| President independent + VP independent | | 1.0 | | 1.9 | 39.7 | | | 48 |
| President independent + VP party A | | 1 | | 1 | 46 | | | |
| President independent + VP independent | | | | | 1.7 | | | 2 |
| President independent + VP independent | | 2.1 | | 1.9 | 7.8 | | | 12 |
| | | 2 | | 1 | 9 | | | |
| Total | 107 | 97 | 88 | 54 | 116 | 44 | 36 | 542 |

Note. Prepared by the author.

Among the cases of interest, the first and third lines sum 124, while the rest sum 418. All countries, except Uruguay, have tickets of president and VP from different parties. Whereas examples of independent running mates selected by partisan presidents are observed in Bolivia (1), Colombia (1), and Ecuador (46). In that case, it is flashy the overrepresentation of Ecuador. As a matter of fact, Ecuador has a higher number of independent candidates compared to the other countries.

As my aim is to understand the selection of a VP candidate, my dependent variables lie on their status. If the running mate was affiliated to a political party or movement - which has party status in the political system – and was not from the president’s party I considered that he or she was a partisan candidate. On the contrary, when the VP candidate ran the election without being a member of a political party or movement, he or she was considered an independent candidate. Due to the dependent variable format, I applied two models of logistic regression for each response, in which one model is with the control variables, and the other is not.

As proposed in the first hypothesis, to verify if a pre-electoral coalition is a necessary condition to select a vice-president from other party, I coded this variable in a dummy format, where 1 is when the ticket had a pre-electoral coalition and 0 otherwise.

Second, regarding the selection of partisan running mates, I applied party size as a predictor of hypothesis 2. To examine the presidential candidate's party strength, following Ugglá (2020), I used the number of parliamentary seats won in the previous election, precisely the seats won in the unique or low chamber. I did not consider the party strength in the high chamber due to the multicollinearity.

To test H3, I want to verify how party strategy affects the selection of a vice-president from other party. Based on their trajectory, I expect that parties with presidential ambitions are more prone to launch a ticket with another party, so I am expecting a positive effect. To measure its impact, I adopted a dichotomous variable, where 1 is when the president's party launched a presidential candidate in the previous election and 0 otherwise.

To test the impact of party system weakening on the selection of independent partners by partisan presidential candidates (hypothesis 4), I used the Effective Number of Parties at the Legislative Level (ENPP) by Laakso and Taagepera's (1979). As a matter of fact, measuring party system crisis is problematic because there is no standard measurement on this issue (Corrales, 2008). However, following Corrales (2008) and Ugglá (2020), I choose to test party weakening through party system fragmentation because it works as a proxy for the exam of party system stability. In other words, the enhancement of the number of effective parties, increasing party fragmentation, indicates a worsening of party system crisis due to the detachment of

society and political organizations. I compiled most of the information from Gallagher (2019). Nonetheless, for the most recent elections, I based the calculus on party seats in the lower house, when was the case of a bicameral system, and the unique chamber in unicameral legislatures.

I applied the experience on presidential mandate interruption with subsequent vice-presidential succession to verify hypothesis 5. Of course, I did not include those cases in which the president had to leave his post due to health issues because this assumption aims to measure the influence of this event on the selection decision. As I want to measure the occurrence or not of an event, I establish a dummy operationalization.

For the analysis of the VP assignment's influence on candidate selection (Hypotheses 6 and 7), I employed a dummy measure for each function. Then, I applied VP Executive function, where I coded 1 when was the case of assignments on the Executive sphere and 0 otherwise. And, I have done the same for assignments in the Legislative sphere.

Furthermore, I controlled the effect of democracy youth, due to the emergence of independent candidates in the first free elections (Carreras, 2012; 2017; Corrales, 2008), which might boost the selection of independent running mates. Hence, I applied the number of years since the last democratic transition. I also controlled the effect of federalism. The territory's political decentralization, characteristic of the federative systems, might encourage the formation of pre-electoral coalitions (Siavelis & Morgenstern, 2008; Spoon & West, 2015). Then, I presume that this organizational format of the territory will stimulate the selection of partisan candidates to run for the vice presidency.

At last, I add an economic control through previous economic performance. The fall of the employment rate, increasing in products price, and decreasing in GDP is a profitable scenario for the insurgence of independent candidates (Carreras, 2012; 2017; Corrales, 2008; Mayorga, 2006), so this may influence the VP selection. Thus, I based the economic performance on two measures: mean 3-year GDP growth and inflation. If the economic growth decreases and inflation increases, it worsens the economic performance.

4 Preliminary results

Based on the literature statement, the first hypothesis assumes that the vice-presidential nomination is an instrument to seal coalition agreements, hence, the presidential candidate might select a running partner from one of the allies, leading them to a mixed ticket. To verify this supposition on the population of mixed tickets, I tabulated the mixed tickets with independent running mates and from other parties to observe which tickets ran with a pre-

electoral coalition (PEC). According to Table 2, all tickets with VPs from other parties had a PEC. Therefore, it is feasible to say that PEC is necessary for selecting a VP from another party. Nonetheless, the contrary is not valid, i.e., having a PEC around the presidential candidacy, the ticket will be composed of runners from different parties. On behalf of the occurrence of electoral tickets with independent VPs that still had the support of a PEC.

Table 2 – Frequency and count of mixed tickets with pre-electoral coalitions

| | With PEC | Without PEC |
|---------------------|----------|-------------|
| VP from other party | 100% | |
| | 76 | |
| VP independente | 14.6% | 85.4% |
| | 7 | 41 |
| N | 83 | 41 |

Note. Prepared by the author.

I rely on logistic regression models to analyze the impact of the other predictors on the selection of VPs not from the presidential candidate's party and independent VP candidates. This technique is valid in cases of categorical dependent variables, especially in the dichotomous format, which I have adopted for this paper. Hence, Table 3 presents the results of the models. In model 1, I employed a dependent variable of running mates from other parties. Whereas in model 2, my dependent variable is the independent VP candidate.

Firstly, regarding the selection of a partisan running mate, based on previous findings (Uggla, 2020), H2 put that the smaller the presidential candidates' party, the more likely to choose a VP from another party as an attempt to increase the chances of the ticket in the competition by attracting more voters. In model 1, the coefficient of the predictor is very low. The predictor did not show the expected direction despite the statistical significance for the selection of running mates from other parties. This means that running mates from other parties are more likely to be found in larger parties because they are more likely to form mixed tickets. These results are out of the blue since the studies pointed out that presidents from small parties are more predisposed to include a running mate that is not from their party (Uggla, 2020). Given the results presented above, the second hypothesis is turned down.

Furthermore, I assume that the party strategy of the presidential candidate might influence the selection of a running mate from other parties. In that case, parties with a presidentialized strategy i.e., that currently enter the Executive competition, look for the support of parties that run the Legislative race. By doing so, the presidential candidate might use the VP nomination as a bargain asset to attract allies, as shown in Table 2. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the path dependence of the presidential candidate's party will influence this decision. Then, I was expecting a positive influence of the predictor (*protagonist party*) on the intercept of model 1, which the equation has shown. However, the predictor is not statistically

significant, so we cannot dismiss the null hypothesis. Thus, the third hypothesis cannot be confirmed yet.

Table 3 - Results from a logistical regression for the selection of independent and partisan vice-presidential candidates

| | Partisan VP (1) | Independent VP (2) |
|----------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|
| (Intercept) | -2.530*** (0.817) | -0.810 (2.418) |
| Party size | 0.009* (0.005) | -0.026 (0.020) |
| Protagonist party | 0.415 (0.311) | -0.104 (0.470) |
| ENPP | 0.029 (0.070) | 0.133 (0.199) |
| Mandate interruption | -0.483 (0.382) | 2.130*** (0.527) |
| VP Legislative | -0.360 (0.444) | -3.746*** (1.181) |
| VP Executive | 0.007 (0.577) | -0.028 (1.142) |
| Democracy age | 0.005 (0.013) | -0.053** (0.024) |
| Federalism | 0.938* (0.522) | -19.704 (977.704) |
| Economic growth | 0.067 (0.049) | 0.037 (0.123) |
| Inflation | -0.0001 (0.0002) | -0.069 (0.051) |
| Observations | 435 | 471 |
| Log Likelihood | -175.106 | -76.766 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 372.212 | 175.533 |
| <i>Note:</i> | * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 | |

Moving forward to model 2 to analyze the conditions for selecting independent running mates, I stated that the party system crisis, previous mandate interruptions, and the type of assignments developed by the VP on the govern might conditionate their selection. First, according to the fourth hypothesis, the weakening of the party system might lead to the result. I considered this condition as the increasing of party system fragmentation. Hence, I rely on the ENPP's calculus to measure it. Therefore, the increase of the ENPP, which is the enlargement of the party system fragmentation, would indicate the selection of independent running mates. Model 2 of Table 2 demonstrates that ENPP is positively correlate to the nomination of independent VP candidates. Nonetheless, the coefficient is not enough and it did not show statistical significance. For this reason, I cannot confirm the hypothesis. So, by now, the results cannot suggest that the reasons for the emergence for independent presidential candidates are the same for their running mates.

Still on this matter, H5 stated that a previously forced interruption of the presidential mandate with the subsequent replacement by the vice-president might make prospective presidents skeptical about their running partners. This suspicion would increase the likelihood of choosing someone without party support. The employed predictor, a dummy for mandate interruption, set out to have a positive and statistically significant effect on the selection of those candidates (i.e., independent ones), even in the presence of the control variables.

In that vein, the previous incidence of a vice-presidential succession as a result of a presidential crisis enhances more eight times the selection of an independent candidate⁹. Thereby, the fear of treason leads presidents to seek running partners that have not any external support to drop them from the post (Marsteintredet & Ugglå, 2019; Ugglå, 2020). Therefore, these findings permit to confirm hypothesis 5.

For the last two hypotheses, I was expecting that where vice-presidents have assignments on the Legislative branch, prospective presidents would be more willing to have a partisan running mate rather than an independent one due to the necessity to work on congress in favor of the government's political agenda. Hence, a vice-president with party support would be more nested in the Legislative branch than an independent one. Consequently, I assume that an independent vice-president would be more likely in the cases that their activities are just concentrated in the Executive sphere, i.e., working directly with the president. However, the findings in Table 3 did not correspond to the stated hypotheses.

⁹ The table with the odd ratio calculus is on the appendix.

The results suggest that having duties on the Executive is positively correlated to the selection of partisan candidates, while having assignments on the Legislative is negatively correlated to the nomination of those running mates. These results are on the opposite side of the assumptions. Whatsoever, they are not conclusive, so it is feasible not to confirm hypothesis 6 instead of rejecting it. For the selection of independent candidates (model 2), not having duties in the Legislative and the Executive seems to be the answer for the result. However, this suggestion is stronger for the Legislative assignments, giving the resulting robustness compared to the coefficient for VP Executive. Therefore, it points out that the absence of duties in the Legislative, such as the presidency of the Senate, might stimulate the selection of an independent VP.

Finally, the control variables worked well to control the effect of the vice-presidential duties on the candidate's selection. Precisely, young democracies and unitary systems for the selection of independent candidates. Meanwhile, in the selection of partisan VP candidates, merely federalism demonstrated an effect on the explanatory variables.

5 Final considerations

In this paper, my aim was to set out what conditions a presidential candidate selected a partisan or an independent running mate on mixed tickets. Hence, the findings suggest the following conditions. On the one hand, independent VP candidates are more likely to be selected in cases of a past presidential crisis that led up to a forced interruption of the mandate and when they do not need to assume the presidency of one of the houses of the Legislative. On the other hand, the vice-presidential nomination is employed as a bargain asset, which is why partisan VP candidates will always participate in tickets that have a pre-electoral coalition, i.e., it is a necessary condition for the selection of this type of candidate, but not sufficient since others tickets have PEC.

Overall, the findings confirm some literature predictions, such as the influence of past mandate interruption. Still, it did not ensure others, like the weakening of the party system. For these, I suspect that other measures might be worthy. This is something to work on. In addition, the party size did not correspond in the way as Ugglá (2020) predicted.

The novelty of this work is the encompass of all electoral tickets, which is a touchy point since the leading tickets are defined after the election, whereas the construction of the presidential ticket happens before that. Likewise, past analyses based on a post-event (i.e., the election) misunderstand the previous selection calculus. Nonetheless, this might affect the

results that I found here. To control it, it is unreasonable to adopt the electoral performance because the candidate selection is preliminary to the race result. One feasible proxy would be the performance of the past election. As well, it is another factor to explore.

Lastly, this paper joins other works that are trying to understand how the VP functions and membership (if in the Legislative or the Executive) might influence the selection issue or even the government performance (Albala, 2017a; 2017b; Bidegain, 2017; Lopes, 2021; Uggla, 2020). One thing we can know for sure is independent candidates are less likely to be chosen when the VP has to conduct a Legislative house, which is appropriate given the importance of the position that needs to have experience, when it is the case of beginners, and a party behind them. It is still an increasing debate; these findings are merely the tip of the iceberg on the vice-presidential performance, and the scholars still have much more to work on.

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Appendix

Table 4 - Odd ratio calculus for the selection of independent and partisan vice-presidential candidates

| | Odds Ratio Calculus | |
|----------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) |
| (Intercept) | 0.080 ^{***} (0.065) | 0.445 (1.075) |
| Party size | 1.009 [*] (0.005) | 0.974 (0.019) |
| Protagonist party | 1.514 (0.471) | 0.901 (0.424) |
| ENPP | 1.029 (0.072) | 1.142 (0.227) |
| Mandate interruption | 0.617 (0.236) | 8.416 ^{***} (4.438) |
| VP Legislative | 0.698 (0.310) | 0.024 ^{***} (0.028) |
| VP Executive | 1.007 (0.581) | 0.973 (1.111) |
| Democracy age | 1.005 (0.013) | 0.948 ^{**} (0.023) |
| Federalism | 2.554 [*] (1.334) | 0.000 (0.00000) |
| Economic growth | 1.070 (0.052) | 1.037 (0.128) |
| Inflation | 1.000 (0.0002) | 0.933 (0.047) |
| Observations | 435 | 471 |
| Log Likelihood | -175.106 | -76.766 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 372.212 | 175.533 |
| <i>Note:</i> | * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 | |